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Executive Summary 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis most European countries are continuing to face 
employment problems. In a number of Member States government intervention has 
further resulted in increasing debt levels and high tax burdens overall and in particular 
on labour. Therefore well-targeted tax reforms seem to be in order to improve the 
labour market outcomes. It is often implicitly assumed that a decrease on the 
employee side, i.e. in the personal income tax rate or the employee part of social 
security contribution, leads to a higher labour supply. Similarly, a decrease in the 
employer labour taxes is often assumed to raise the demand of labour. However, the 
economic literature argues that in the presence of labour market imperfection 
economic incidence of a tax change is often different from the legal incidence. In this 
case the impact of a tax change on labour market outcomes depends on the 
interaction of the demand and the supply side of the market. This interaction is 
determined by the behavioural responses of economic operators, measured by 
elasticities. Higher (demand or supply) elasticities will cause larger responses to tax 
changes, with the relatively less elastic side bearing a higher tax burden. Against this 
background four main goals of this study emerge. First, is to identify from the 
literature which labour market imperfections result in employment problems and to 
attribute them to the labour supply or on the labour demand side. Given the 
heterogeneity in the labour market situation of different groups, we also set out to 
identify which socioeconomic groups are most vulnerable to employment problems. 
The next step is to review the literature which assesses the short-run and long-run 
economic incidence of labour taxation. To further break down the incidence into its 
underlying determinants we also review the literature on the (tax) elasticities of labour 
supply and labour demand. Then the literature on the influence of the economic 
environment on the tax incidence outcome, most notably the wage setting 
mechanisms and the institutional background, is reviewed. Finally the findings of the 
literature review are brought together in a framework of indicators to identify the 
potential of tax reforms to reduce tax related employment problems. 
Labour demand and supply side reasons for unemployment 
The study starts with a breakdown of employment problems into unemployment and 
non-employment. We argue that unemployment is more originating from the labour 
demand side and non-employment is more a labour supply side issue. This implies 
that cyclical unemployment can be attributed to the labour demand side, albeit only 
indirectly through the lack of aggregate demand which results in a lack of labour 
demand. It proves to be difficult to draw a clear line between cyclical and structural 
unemployment since unwinding of previously unsustainable situations, like necessary 
fiscal consolidation because of excessive public debt, can also result in longer term 
lack of aggregate demand.  
A key part of structural unemployment is due to mismatches between labour demand 
and labour supply and therefore inherently difficult to attribute to one of the two 
labour market sides. We investigate how recent socio-economic changes like 
population ageing, falling fertility levels, increasing female labour force participation 
and increasing migration contribute to a change in labour supply and the composition 
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of the workforce. At the same time a probably even larger share of short to medium 
term unemployment can be attributed to broad changes in labour demand as a result 
of occupational and sectoral changes and structural changes in the workplace. These 
shifts increase the labour demand for certain skills while others become obsolete. This 
highlights to the necessity of indicators looking into changes in labour supply as well 
as labour demand and how these coincide. Such indicators can help to allocate the 
source of employment problems to either side of the labour market. At the same time, 
it is noteworthy that these indicators are also highlighting more fundamental structural 
problems in the labour market, which are not the result of labour taxation. Therefore 
tax reforms may not be the best way to address these issues. 
The broad characterisation of employment problems further highlights the impact of 
wage rigidities in the labour market contributing to a labour demand problem. Also, 
incentive problems because of the tax and transfer system and the opportunity costs 
are key determinants of labour supply side problems.  
Vulnerable groups in the labour market 
Changes both in labour demand and labour supply leave some socio-economic groups 
at a vulnerable position in the labour market. First and foremost the low-skilled 
workers are facing a labour demand problem as a result of the sectoral shifts which 
substantially reduced the need for low-skilled workforce. Additionally the low-skilled 
are among those most affected by rigidities which prevent wages to adjust 
downwards. For example, binding minimum wages can result in a lack of labour 
demand for low-productivity low-skilled workforce. Given the relatively low wages of 
low-skilled people adverse incentives of the tax and transfer system can also result in 
a labour supply problem further adding to the employment problem.  
Another vulnerable group in the labour market are the young people. Their perception 
as unstable employees who would leave an employer in order to gain more experience 
before they settle into a permanent role contributes to this problem. In addition, they 
usually have temporary, flexible contracts that do not secure their employment. Due 
to their lack of experience, they are also seen as less productive than the rest of the 
workforce. Consequently, youth unemployment can be largely attributed to a labour 
demand problem. Migrants, in particular those from non-European countries, face a 
similar situation in the labour market. Often their previous work experience and 
foreign education is not adequately valued by employers and therefore they are facing 
a labour demand problem. Furthermore, while the increase in migration can help to 
mitigate geographical mismatches, it also contributes to a relative fast change in 
labour supply. As a result there can be an oversupply of specific types of workers. 
While the situation of the elderly has been steadily improving during the last decade, 
they are still facing relevant employment problems. Due to population ageing the 
labour supply of elderly people is increasing. At the same time the labour demand is 
not keeping up, because the elderly are often perceived as people of lower 
productivity, who are not keen on investing in themselves, and who are unable to 
acquire new skills and adapt to rapid changes in the market. Currently, permanent 
contracts, which protect them from instant loss of employment, help them to maintain 
their employment level. However, once they lose their employment, it is difficult for 
them to become employed again, often due to a shrinking labour demand for their 
specific skills.  
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The role of women in the labour market has undergone a profound change, not least 
due to decades of initiatives and debates on this issue. The gender employment gap 
decreased significantly during the last decade and the labour market participation of 
women increased. Despite the achievements relevant disparities between the labour 
market attachment of women and men remain. To a large extent these differences are 
related to labour supply issues since women are still largely responsible for child care, 
care of elderly relatives and other non-market household activities. As a result the 
reconciliation between work and household activities often results in weaker labour 
market attachment for women. In terms of indicators this section suggests that the 
first step should be to break down the employment problems into its category. 
Separately looking at unemployment and non-employment will give a first impression 
as to on which side of the labour market the problems are located. 
Survey of the labour tax incidence literature 
A review of the literature on tax incidence of labour taxation shows that there is no 
clear consensus on who ultimately bears the burden of labour taxes. In a recent meta-
analysis Melguizo and González-Páramo (2013) find that on average about two thirds 
of the incidence of labour taxes falls on workers. However, there is too much variation 
across different countries to view this result as a precise estimate. There are however 
a number of intermediate results which can be taken away from the survey of the 
literature.  
Despite the absence of a clear answer to the tax incidence question, the literature still 
does indicate that there is some degree of sharing even in the long run. The second 
key finding is that the estimation of the long run tax incidence is struggling with 
identification issues. Further, up to our knowledge, there are no convincing studies 
available so far looking at medium-term effects or adjustment processes. Whether the 
legal incidence matters is also empirically unanswered, but the lack of clear evidence 
on the invariance of incidence proposition allows the tentative conclusion that the legal 
incidence matters at least in the short run.  
There are differences in the tax incidence results across countries which can be at 
least partly attributed to the non-trivial role of centralisation of bargaining. The 
evidence is relatively robust that more centralised bargaining shifts the tax burden 
towards labour, while intermediate levels of coordination result in a partial shift of the 
tax incidence on employers.  
Review of labour supply and labour demand elasticities literature 
Following the argumentation of Metcalf (2002) the question of tax incidence can also 
be seen as a question of the relative elasticity of labour demand and labour supply. 
The review of these two strands of the literature allows some tentative conclusions. 
First, labour supply elasticities appear to be falling over time and recent meta-
analyses place them around 0.4 to 0.3. The overall elasticity is driven to a very large 
extent through the extensive margin, whereas the elasticities at the intensive margin 
are close to zero. Furthermore recent studies, as discussed in Saez et al. (2012b), 
exploiting tax return data find that the elasticities at the intensive margin can mostly 
be attributed to reporting effects. The literature is also relatively clear as to how the 
elasticity at the extensive margin varies across different socioeconomic groups. 
Women and in particular single mothers have a more elastic labour supply. Men 
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typically have a higher labour supply elasticity at the extensive margin at the 
beginning or the end of the career when they face trade-offs with further education 
respectively early retirement.  
Concerning the labour demand elasticities a recent meta-analysis by Lichter et al. 
(2014) suggests that the elasticities are increasing over time with a best guess of -0.3 
as the average labour demand elasticity. The long-run elasticity is found to be higher, 
as well as higher labour demand elasticities are observable for fixed term contracts 
and low-skilled workers.  
Framework of indicators 
The review of the different strands of literature guides the development of a 
framework of 25 data indicators. These indicators are then evaluated in a simple 
framework to break down the employment problems and to gain further 
understanding which tax reform have the potential to improve the labour market 
outcome.  
From the initial classification of employment problem we derive the first set of 
indicators which breaks down the employment problem into non-employment, 
unemployment and structural unemployment. Following the discussion about the 
vulnerable groups we dissect the unemployment and non-participation among socio-
economic groups. The contribution of labour supply and demand mismatches is taken 
into account through skill and sectoral mismatch indicators. The labour supply side 
contribution to the mismatches is additionally accounted for through sectoral and skill 
change indicators.  
The most important conclusion from survey of the tax incidence literature is that legal 
tax incidence likely to matter. This demands a more detailed look at the composition 
of the tax burden on labour. To this end we include measures of the implicit tax 
burden as well as statutory tax measures for personal income tax, social security 
contributions of both employers and employees  
The review of the labour supply literature reinforced the importance of distinguishing 
between different socio-economic groups. Additionally, labour supply is more 
responsive at the extensive margin, especially for the young who face a trade-off 
between work and education and for mothers who face a trade-off between work and 
child care and home production. This highlights that aspects of the welfare state can 
alter the work incentives. 
Among the wage settings institutions the role of wage bargaining is once more 
stressed, with a more centralised bargaining resulting in more incidence on workers 
than bargaining at the industry level. Furthermore minimum wages will affect the 
labour market outcome. In case they are binding the incidence result is clear, with the 
incidence fully falling on the employers. However, even in the case of non-binding 
minimum wages the literature suggests that they contribute to labour tax induced 
employment problems.  
Theoretical results suggest that the progressivity of the personal income tax affects 
the labour market outcome in the presence of matching inefficiencies. For a given tax 
burden a more progressive tax system will reduce the search effort of unemployed 
people because a higher part of the additional match-specific rent will be taxed away. 
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Similarly the incentive to pay efficiency wages above the market clearing wage rate is 
reduced in progressive tax system. Despite the lack of conclusive evidence for these 
theories so far, we therefore will also include progressivity measures in our framework 
of indicators.  
A review of the impact of welfare state on labour supply stresses the importance of 
measures of unemployment or participation trap. The withdrawal of cash benefits or 
transfers in-kind can create adverse incentive problems which can translate into 
employment problems through the labour supply side. Another important aspect 
affecting especially female labour supply is the availability of part-time work and 
possibility of parental or maternity leave. 
Country examples for Austria, Italy and Spain 
The last section uses the developed framework of indicators for Austria, Spain and 
Italy. Despite the common feature of a comparatively high tax burden on labour, the 
labour market outcomes in these three countries differ widely. Austria has a low level 
of unemployment and a slightly above average participation rate. Italy has an 
unemployment rate somewhat above average but also one of the lowest participation 
rates. Spain in contrast has a very high unemployment rate but an above average 
participation rate. 
Broadly speaking our framework of indicators suggest that there seems to be a strong 
labour demand problem in Spain and a moderate labour demand and labour supply 
problem in Italy. Taking into account cyclical aspects of the unemployment rate 
confirms that at least part of the labour demand problem in Spain and Italy is due to 
business cycle reasons.  
Despite an increase in female labour force participation Italy still faces a labour supply 
problem here. The participation rate of elderly has been increasing steadily in all three 
countries, but while in Austria this did not increase the unemployment rate, the 
unemployment rate rose since 2007 in Italy and Spain. Especially for the latter this 
indicates a labour demand problem for the elderly. We find high youth unemployment 
in both Italy and Spain. The constantly dropping participation rate in Italy points in 
addition to the apparent labour demand problem also to a labour supply issue. 
Unemployment rates for foreigners and low-skilled workers have increased 
dramatically in Spain since the crisis in 2007. This indicates a labour demand problem 
for these groups.  
The mismatch and change indicators identify a strong sectoral change and an 
increasing skill mismatch as labour demand side sources of the employment problems 
for Spain. For Austria and Italy there seems to be relevant regional variation in the 
level of unemployment, but the development is not clearly identifying whether the 
regional mismatch is contributing to the employment problems.  
The general fiscal situation in all three countries is such that all of them are struggling 
with increasing debt levels and persistent deficits. Further all three countries have a 
high implicit tax rate on labour relative to the implicit tax rate on consumption. 
Dissecting the tax burden of labour into its components one finds that social security 
contributions of employees make up a large part of the tax burden on labour in 
Austria. In Spain and Italy the social security contributions of employers make up a 
bigger share of the tax burden. This is also reflected in a high statutory total tax 
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wedge for an average workers income. Contrasting this with our measure of the 
statutory progressivity one finds that Austria and Spain have clearly regressive SSC 
for both employers and employees. According to predictions from the theoretical 
literature a less progressive tax burden should - for a given tax burden – result in 
more unemployment. This argument should be even strong since the tax burden in 
question is levied on the employers’ side. Hence the statutory structure of the tax 
burden indicates a contribution of labour taxation to demand side problems, especially 
for Austria and Spain. The high statutory tax burden in Italy will also contribute to the 
labour demand problem.  
In Italy the wage bargaining at the industry level is expected to result in shifting the 
tax incidence only partially to labour further contributing to the labour demand 
problem. A more – but not fully – centralized wage bargaining in Austria and Spain 
should result in more tax burden shifted to workers and therefore reduce the labour 
employment effects of the high tax labour burden. Additionally the link between the 
social security contributions should contribute to the tax incidence of employees’ social 
security contribution falling on labour. Hence a tentative conclusion from our country 
examples could be that Italy should envisage a reform which reduces the employers’ 
social security contributions. For Austria and Spain the prediction from the tax 
incidence literature indicates that the tax burden of either side of the social security 
contributions should fall on the workers, at least in the longer run. Therefore a 
planned reduction in the tax burden could be directed to either side. Any reform of the 
social security contributions should maintain the link between the contributions and 
the entitlements which further strengthens the shift of the incidence on labour. With 
the incidence more likely to fall on labour in Austria or Spain, tax reforms have less 
scope to reduce the labour demand problems, such as the one cause through the 
sectoral shift in Spain. Nevertheless, the increase in net disposable income should at 
least help to reduce the cyclical component of the employment problem in Spain. 
 
European Commission 
 
Study on the effects and incidence of labour taxation 
May 2015 | 14 
Résumé  
 
Bien après la crise financière, la plupart des pays européens continuent d’être 
confrontés à des problèmes sur le marché de l’emploi. Dans un certain nombre de 
pays membres de l’Union Européenne, les interventions de l’Etat ont par ailleurs mené 
à une hausse de la dette publique et à des taux d’impositions globalement élevés, en 
particulier sur le facteur travail. Des réformes fiscales ciblées peuvent en conséquence 
être appropriées pour améliorer le fonctionnement et les performances du marché du 
travail. Une hypothèse fréquente est qu’une baisse de l’imposition du côté des 
employés, c’est-à-dire une baisse des impôts sur le revenu ou des cotisations sociales 
payées par les ménages, engendre une hausse de l’offre sur le marché du travail. De 
manière symétrique, une baisse de la charge fiscale et des charges sociales sur les 
entreprises est censée augmenter la demande sur ce marché. Cependant, la littérature 
économique scientifique attire l’attention sur le fait que l’incidence économique d’une 
charge fiscale est souvent différente de son incidence juridique, en présence 
d’imperfections sur le marché du travail. Dans ce cas, l’impact d’une réforme fiscale 
sur les performances du marché du travail dépend des interactions entre offre et 
demande sur ce marché. Ces interactions sont déterminées par les changements de 
comportement des agents économiques et mesurées par des élasticités. Une plus 
grande élasticité, du côté de la demande ou de l’offre, donne un impact plus fort aux 
réformes fiscales, le côté le moins élastique du marché portant une plus grande part 
de la charge fiscale. Etant donné ce contexte, cette étude comporte quatre objectifs 
principaux. Le premier est l’identification des imperfections du marché du travail qui 
mènent à des problèmes d’emploi et leur attribution soit à l’offre soit à la demande de 
travail, basée sur une analyse de la littérature scientifique. Comme la situation des 
différentes catégories de personnes sur le marché du travail est hétérogène, nous 
identifions par ailleurs les catégories socio-professionnelles les plus vulnérables aux 
problèmes sur ce marché. La deuxième étape est une revue de la littérature qui 
évalue l’incidence économique de la fiscalité du travail à court et long terme.  Pour 
connaître les déterminants de l’incidence de la fiscalité du travail, nous réalisons 
également une revue de la littérature qui s’attèle aux élasticités (fiscales) de l’offre et 
la demande de travail. En troisième lieu, nous passons en revue la littérature qui 
étudie l’influence de l’environnement économique sur l’incidence de la fiscalité, en 
particulier les mécanismes de fixation des salaires et l’environnement institutionnel. 
Pour finir, les conclusions que nous dérivons de la revue de la littérature sont 
amalgamées en un cadre d’analyse basé sur des indicateurs, qui permet d’identifier le 
potentiel des réformes fiscales pour réduire les problèmes du marché de l’emploi liés à 
la fiscalité. 
Facteurs de chômage liés à l’offre et la demande de travail  
L’étude commence par séparer les problèmes du marché du travail entre chômage et 
non-emploi. Nous présentons l’argumentation selon laquelle le chômage tient en 
majeure partie sa source du côté de la demande sur le marché du travail tandis que le 
non-emploi est principalement une question d’offre sur ce marché. A titre de 
conséquence, le chômage conjoncturel peut être attribué à un problème de demande 
sur le marché du travail, même si cela se produit de manière indirecte par 
l’intermédiaire d’une faiblesse de la demande globale et, partant, de la demande de 
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main-d’œuvre. Dans ce contexte, il s’avère difficile de séparer clairement chômage 
conjoncturel et chômage structurel, dans la mesure où les conséquences d’une 
situation fiscale intenable, nécessitant par exemple un programme d’austérité, 
peuvent également comprendre une baisse de la demande globale sur le long terme. 
Un élément clef du chômage structurel est la présence d’inadéquations entre demande 
et offre de travail. Il est par conséquent difficile d’attribuer le chômage structurel à 
l’une ou l’autre des parties prenantes sur le marché du travail. Nous analysons de 
quelle façon des changements socio-économiques récents – comme le vieillissement 
de la population, le déclin de la fertilité, l’accroissement de la participation des 
femmes sur le marché du travail ou encore l’augmentation de l’immigration – 
influencent les changements d’offre et de composition de la main-d’œuvre. Dans le 
même temps, une proportion probablement plus large du chômage de moyen et long 
terme peut être attribuée à des changements d’envergure dans la demande de main-
d’œuvre, résultants d’évolutions au niveau des occupations et des secteurs ainsi que 
de changements structurels du milieu de travail. Ces évolutions augmentent la 
demande pour certaines compétences, tandis que d’autres compétences deviennent 
obsolètes. Cela souligne l’importance d’indicateurs qui prennent en compte tant les 
changements de l’offre que de la demande de travail, et la manière dont ces 
changements coïncident. De tels indicateurs aident à l’attribution des causes des 
problèmes du marché du travail à l’une ou l’autre des parties prenantes sur ce 
marché. Ces indicateurs soulignent par ailleurs des problèmes structurels 
fondamentaux du marché du travail qui ne sont pas la conséquence de la fiscalité du 
travail. Les réformes fiscales ne sont par conséquent pas forcément la meilleure façon 
de résorber les problèmes du marché de l’emploi. 
L’analyse générale des problématiques de marché de l’emploi souligne par ailleurs 
l’impact de la rigidité des salaires et leur contribution à un problème de demande sur 
le marché du travail. Finalement, les problèmes d’incitations que génère le système 
fiscal et de transfert, ainsi que les coûts d’opportunités, sont des déterminants 
importants des problèmes d’offre de main-d’œuvre. 
Groupes vulnérables sur le marché du travail 
Les changements à la fois dans la demande et l’offre de travail laissent certaines 
catégories socio-économiques dans une position vulnérable sur le marché du travail. 
D’abord et avant tout les travailleurs à faible niveau de qualification sont confrontés à 
des problèmes de faible demande, des transformations sectorielles réduisant la 
demande pour la main-d’œuvre à faible qualification. Cette même catégorie de 
travailleurs est par ailleurs celle qui est parmi la plus affectée par les rigidités qui 
empêchent les ajustements par le bas des salaires. Par exemple, un salaire minimal 
contraignant peut aboutir à une absence de demande pour de la main-d’œuvre à faible 
productivité nécessitant un faible niveau de qualification. Etant donné les salaires 
relativement peu élevés de cette main-d’œuvre, les impacts incitatifs négatifs du 
système de transferts et d’impôts peuvent par ailleurs conduire à un problème d’offre 
de main-d’œuvre, ce qui ajoute une dimension au problème de faible emploi de cette 
catégorie de socio-économiques. 
Les jeunes sont un autre groupe vulnérable sur le marché du travail. Un problème est 
le fait qu’ils soient perçus comme étant instables, prêts à quitter leur employeur dès 
qu’une opportunité de gagner plus d’expérience se manifeste, avant de se stabiliser 
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dans une occupation permanente. Ils ont par ailleurs souvent des contrats flexibles et 
temporaires qui ne leur garantit pas une activité professionnelle sur la durée. En 
raison de leur manque d’expérience, ils sont également vus comme étant moins 
productifs que le reste de la main-d’œuvre. Le problème du chômage des jeunes peut 
par conséquent être largement attribué à un problème de demande  sur le marché du 
travail. Les immigrants, en particulier ceux venant de pays non-européens, sont 
confrontés à une situation similaire sur le marché du travail.  Leur éducation et 
expérience professionnelle préalable, acquises à l’étranger, n’est souvent pas 
reconnue de manière adéquate par les employeurs, de sorte que les immigrants soient 
confrontés à un problème de demande sur le marché du travail. De plus, si 
l’augmentation des flux d’immigration permet de réduire les problèmes de disparités 
géographiques, elle contribue également à un changement relativement rapide de 
l’offre de main-d’œuvre. Une résultante potentielle est un excédent de certains types 
de travailleurs. Bien que la situation des personnes âgées se soit améliorée de 
manière régulière durant la dernière décennie, elles sont toujours confrontées à 
certaines difficultés sur le marché  de l’emploi. En raison du vieillissement de la 
population, l’offre de travailleurs âgés est croissante. Dans le même temps, la 
demande pour ces travailleurs ne suit pas, en raison de la perception fréquente que 
ces travailleurs sont de plus faible productivité, qu’ils sont peu intéressés à investir 
dans leur développement et incapables d’acquérir de nouvelles compétences ni de 
suivre les changements rapides du marché. A l’heure actuelle, les contrats à durée 
indéterminée, qui les protègent contre les pertes immédiates d’emplois, contribuent à 
maintenir leur taux d’emploi. Cependant, il leur est difficile de retrouver un emploi s’ils 
se trouvent au chômage, souvent en raison d’une baisse de la demande pour leurs 
compétences. 
Le rôle des femmes sur le marché du travail s’est transformé de manière profonde, en 
particulier en raison des initiatives et des débats sur ce sujet qui ont eu lieu sur 
plusieurs décennies. L’écart entre taux d’emploi des femmes et des hommes s’est 
encore réduit de manière significative ces dix dernières années  et le taux de 
participation des femmes sur le marché du travail a encore augmenté. Malgré ces 
accomplissements, il reste une disparité entre participation des femmes et des 
hommes. Pour une grande part, cette disparité est due à des problématiques d’offre 
de main-d’œuvre, dans la mesure où les femmes restent largement en charge de la 
garde des enfants, de celles des personnes âgées de la famille ou d’autres activités 
non marchandes du ménage. L’équilibre entre activité professionnelle et activités du 
ménage débouche donc souvent sur une participation au marché du travail plus faible 
pour les femmes. En termes d’indicateurs, cette section suggère que la première étape 
soit une séparation des problématiques du marché de l’emploi. Considérer de manière 
séparée chômage et non-emploi doit fournir une première impression sur la partie du 
marché du travail, offre ou demande, qui recèle les plus grands problèmes. 
Revue de la littérature sur l’incidence de la fiscalité du travail 
L’analyse de la littérature sur l’incidence de la fiscalité du travail révèle une absence 
de consensus sur qui, de l’employé ou de l’employeur, porte la charge fiscale. Dans 
une méta-analyse récente, Melguizo et González-Páramo (2013) parviennent à la 
conclusion qu’en moyenne deux tiers de la charge fiscale liée au travail est portée par 
les employés. Cependant, la variation d’un pays à l’autre est trop grande pour que 
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cette estimation soit considérée comme précise. Il est néanmoins possible de dériver 
un certain nombre de résultats intermédiaires de la revue de la littérature. 
Malgré l’absence d’une réponse claire sur la question de l’incidence fiscale, la 
littérature indique toutefois qu’il y a un degré de partage de la charge fiscale, sur le 
court et le long terme. La deuxième conclusion majeure est que l’estimation de 
l’incidence fiscale sur le long terme n’arrive pas à traiter facilement les problématiques 
d’identification statistique. A notre connaissance, il n’existe pas à l’heure actuelle 
d’étude convaincante sur les effets à moyen terme ni sur les processus d’ajustements. 
La question de savoir si l’incidence juridique joue un rôle ou non demeure également 
sans véritable réponse empirique. L’absence de preuve empirique ferme sur la 
proposition d’invariance de l’incidence fournit une conclusion provisoire, à savoir que 
l’incidence juridique joue un rôle, au moins sur le court terme. 
Les résultats sur l’incidence fiscale varient d’un pays à l’autre. Une partie de la 
différence de ces résultats peut être attribuée au rôle non-négligeable de la 
centralisation dans le processus de négociation entre acteurs du marché du travail. 
Les analyses empiriques montrent de manière relativement robuste qu’un plus grand 
degré de centralisation fait porter une plus grande partie de la charge fiscale sur 
l’employé, tandis que des niveaux intermédiaires de coordination mènent à faire 
porter une plus grande partie de la charge fiscale sur l’employeur. 
Revue de la littérature sur les élasticités de l’offre et de la demande de travail 
En suivant l’argumentation de Metcalf (2002), la question de l’incidence fiscale peut 
aussi être vue comme la question des élasticités relatives de l’offre et de la demande 
sur le marché du travail. L’analyse des deux parties correspondantes de la littérature 
permet de former quelques conclusions provisoires. Premièrement, les élasticités 
concernant l’offre de main-d’œuvre apparaissent déclinantes au cours du temps. Des 
méta-analyses récentes les situent aux alentours de 0.3 à 0.4. L’élasticité totale est 
définie pour une large part par la marge extensive, tandis que les élasticités à la 
marge intensive sont proches de zéro. De plus, les études récentes analysées par Saez 
et al. (2012b) et qui exploitent des données de déclaration fiscale parviennent à la 
conclusion que les élasticités à la marge intensive sont surtout dues à des effets de 
déclaration. La littérature est également assez claire sur les différences d’élasticités à 
la marge extensive d’un groupe socio-économique à l’autre. Les femmes, et en 
particulier les mères élevant leurs enfants seules, offrent leur travail de manière plus 
élastique. Les hommes offrent en général leur travail de manière plus élastique à la 
marge extensive au début et à la fin de leur carrière, périodes de leur vie pendant 
lesquelles ils sont confrontés à un choix entre travail et éducation, respectivement 
retraite précoce. 
En ce qui concerne les élasticités de demande de main-d’œuvre, une méta-analyse 
récente réalisée par Lichter et al. (2014) suggère que les élasticités augmentent au 
cours du temps, une élasticité moyenne de -0.3 représentant la valeur la plus 
probable pour les auteurs de l’analyse. Des valeurs plus élevées sont trouvées pour 
l’élasticité sur le long terme, les contrats à durée déterminée ainsi que pour la main-
d’œuvre faiblement qualifiée. 
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Cadre d’analyse à base d’indicateurs 
La revue des différentes branches de la littérature fournit un guide pour le 
développement d’un cadre de 25 indicateurs basés sur des données. Ces indicateurs 
sont rassemblés dans un cadre simple et utilisés pour différencier les problèmes 
rencontrés sur le marché de l’emploi et pour développer notre compréhension sur la 
capacité des réformes fiscales à améliorer le fonctionnement du marché de l’emploi. 
A partir de la classification initiale des problèmes du marché de l’emploi, nous dérivons 
un premier ensemble d’indicateurs pour établir une séparation de ces problèmes entre 
non-emploi, chômage et chômage structurel. En nous basant sur la discussion des 
groupes vulnérables sur le marché du travail, nous établissons une séparation entre 
chômage et non-participation pour chaque catégorie socio-économique. L’impact des 
inadéquations entre demande et offre de travail est pris en compte par des indicateurs 
sur les inadéquations de compétence et de secteur. La responsabilité de l’offre de 
main-d’œuvre dans les inadéquations est de plus prise en compte par des indicateurs 
de changements dans les secteurs et les compétences. 
La conclusion la plus importante d’une revue de la littérature sur l’incidence fiscale est 
que l’incidence juridique joue un rôle probable. Cela requiert un examen plus détaillé 
de la composition de la charge fiscale liée au travail. A cette fin nous incluons des 
mesures de la charge fiscale implicite, des mesures sur les taux d'imposition légaux 
pour l’imposition des personnes et pour les contributions sociales tant des employeurs 
que des employés. 
L’analyse de la littérature sur l’offre de main-d’œuvre renforce l’importance 
d’indicateurs qui fassent une distinction entre groupes socio-économiques. Par ailleurs, 
l’offre de main-d’œuvre est plus élastique à la marge extensive, en particulier pour les 
jeunes qui sont confrontés à un choix entre travail et éducation ainsi que pour les 
mères, confrontées à un choix entre travail et production domestique. Cela souligne le 
rôle des politiques publiques de l’état, qui peuvent modifier les incitations à travailler. 
Parmi les institutions qui influencent la fixation des salaires, le rôle de la négociation 
salariale est encore une fois souligné, un mécanisme centralisé conduisant à une 
charge fiscale plus forte pour les employés qu’avec des négociations au niveau des 
secteurs. Des salaires minimaux vont par ailleurs influencer les résultats sur le marché 
du travail. Dans le cas où ils sont contraignants, l’incidence fiscale est claire et repose 
uniquement sur l’employeur. Même dans le cas où ils ne sont pas contraignants, la 
littérature suggère de plus que les salaires minimaux contribuent aux problèmes sur le 
marché du travail dus à la fiscalité du travail. 
Les résultats théoriques suggèrent que l’imposition progressive des revenus des 
personnes a un impact sur le marché du travail, lorsque l’efficacité de celui-ci est 
pénalisée par la présence d’inadéquations. Pour un niveau de charge fiscale donné, un 
système fiscal plus progressif diminue les efforts de recherche de travail des 
personnes au chômage parce qu’une plus grande part du gain monétaire généré en 
cas d’obtention d’un emploi est perdue sous forme d’impôts. De manière similaire, les 
incitations à payer des salaires d’efficiences supérieurs au seuil d’équilibre entre offre 
et demande sont diminuées en présence d’un système fiscal progressif. Malgré 
l’absence de validation empirique robuste de ces théories, nous incluons tout de même 
des mesures de progressivité du système fiscal parmi les indicateurs. 
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Une analyse de la littérature sur l’impact des systèmes de sécurité sociale sur l’offre 
de main-d’œuvre souligne l’importance de mesures liées au chômage et au « piège de 
participation ». La réception d’allocations sociales en espèces ou en nature peut créer 
des incitations négatives, lesquelles peuvent se transformer en problèmes d’offre de 
main-d’œuvre et au final, d’emploi. Un autre aspect particulièrement important pour 
l’offre de main-d’œuvre des femmes est la disponibilité d’emplois à temps partiel et la 
possibilité de congés de maternité ou de congés parentaux. 
L’exemple de l’Autriche, de l’Espagne et de l’Italie  
Cette dernière section utilise les indicateurs du cadre d’analyse pour l’Autriche, 
l’Espagne et l’Italie. Malgré le fait que ces pays aient tous une charge fiscale sur le 
travail comparativement élevée, l’état du marché du travail dans ces trois pays diffère 
fortement. L’Autriche a un taux de chômage bas et le taux de participation est 
légèrement au-dessus de la moyenne. L’Italie a un taux de chômage quelque peu au-
dessus de la moyenne mais également un des taux de participation les plus faibles. 
L’Espagne, par contraste, a un taux de chômage très élevé ainsi qu’un taux de 
participation plus large que la moyenne. 
En termes généraux, notre cadre d’analyse suggère un problème important de 
demande de main-d’œuvre en Espagne ainsi que des problèmes modérés d’offre et de 
demande de travail en Italie. Tenir compte des aspects cycliques du taux de chômage 
confirme l’hypothèse qu’une partie des problèmes de demande de main-d’œuvre en 
Italie et en Espagne soit conjoncturelle. 
Malgré l’augmentation de la participation des femmes sur le marché du travail en 
Italie, le pays continue d’être confronté à des problèmes d’offre de main-d’œuvre. Le 
taux de participation des personnes âgées s’est élevé de manière continue dans les 
trois pays. Alors que cette augmentation n’a pas été accompagnée d’une 
augmentation du taux de chômage en Autriche, ce n’est pas le cas pour l’Espagne et 
l’Italie, où le taux de chômage s’est accru depuis 2007. En particulier pour l’Espagne, 
ces transformations mettent en évidence un problème de demande de main-d’œuvre 
pour les travailleurs âgés. Le problème du chômage des jeunes se retrouve aussi bien 
en Espagne qu’en Italie. En plus d’un problème de demande de main-d’œuvre, la 
diminution régulière du taux de participation des jeunes en Italie suggère la présence 
d’un problème d’offre pour cette catégorie de la population. Le taux de chômage des 
étrangers et des personnes à faible qualification s’est accru de manière dramatique en 
Espagne depuis la crise de 2007, ce qui indique un problème de demande sur le 
marché du travail pour ces groupes. 
Les indicateurs d’inadéquations de compétence, secteur et de changement permettent 
d’identifier en Espagne de forts changements sectoriels ainsi qu’une augmentation des 
inadéquations de compétences, tous deux attribuant à la demande de main-d’œuvre la 
source des problèmes sur le marché de l’emploi. Aussi bien en Autriche qu’en Italie, 
on observe une variation du niveau de chômage d’une région à une autre, mais leur 
développement ne permet pas de conclure clairement que la disparité régionale 
contribue aux problèmes du marché de l’emploi. 
La situation fiscale générale dans chacun des trois pays est difficile, tous étant 
confrontés à des dettes publiques croissantes et des déficits persistants. Les trois pays 
ont par ailleurs un taux implicite d’imposition du travail qui est supérieur aux taux 
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implicite sur la consommation. Décomposant la charge fiscale sur le travail en Autriche 
montre que les cotisations sociales des employés constituent une grande part de la 
charge totale. En Espagne et en Italie, les cotisations sociales des employeurs 
représentent la plus grande part de la charge fiscale.  Ces conclusions sont également 
reflétées par des hautes valeurs des taux d’impositions légaux totaux pour un revenu 
de travailler moyen. Par contraste, utilisant notre mesure de progressivité de 
l’imposition légale,  il s’avère que le système de cotisations sociales est clairement 
régressif en Autriche et en Espagne, aussi bien pour les cotisations des employés que 
pour celles des employeurs. Selon la littérature théorique, un système de taxation 
moins progressif doit, à charge fiscale équivalente, résulter en un taux de chômage 
plus élevé. Ces prédictions sont encore renforcées par le fait que la charge fiscale est 
collectée du côté des employeurs. Il apparaît ainsi de la structure légale de 
l’imposition que la fiscalité du travail contribue aux problèmes de demande de main-
d’œuvre, en particulier pour l’Autriche et pour l’Espagne. Le taux d’imposition légal 
élevé en Italie doit par ailleurs également contribuer aux problèmes de demande de 
main-d’œuvre. 
En Italie, le fait que la négociation salariale se situe au niveau des secteurs doit placer 
une plus grande partie de l’incidence fiscale sur les employeurs, ce qui doit contribuer 
aux problèmes de demande de main-d’œuvre. Un mécanisme de négociation plus 
centralisé en Autriche et en Espagne, sans toutefois être complètement central, doit 
conduire à placer une plus grande partie de la charge fiscale sur les employés, 
réduisant les effets d’une taxation élevée sur l’emploi. De plus, le lien entre cotisations 
sociales devrait aussi contribuer à ce que la charge des cotisations sociales des 
employés soit portée par le travail. Une conclusion possible de notre analyse de ces 
trois pays est que l’Italie pourrait faire une réforme visant à réduire les cotisations 
sociales des employeurs. Pour l’Autriche et l’Espagne, les prévisions de la littérature 
sur l’incidence fiscale suggèrent que la charge fiscale émanant des cotisations sociales 
à la fois des employés et des employeurs repose sur les épaules des employés, du 
moins sur le long terme. Une réduction planifiée de la charge fiscale de l’une ou l’autre 
des parties pourrait par conséquent être envisagée. Toute réforme du système de 
cotisations sociales doit maintenir le lien entre contributions et prestations, ce qui 
affermit le transfert de la charge sur le travail. L’incidence fiscale reposant moins sur 
les épaules des employés en Autriche et en Espagne, les réformes fiscales dans ces 
pays ont moins de chance de réduire les problèmes de demande de main-d’œuvre, tel 
que celui qui est créé par les changements sectoriels en Espagne. Toutefois, 
l’accroissement du revenu disponible net devrait aider à la réduction des problèmes 
conjoncturels d’emploi en Espagne. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The sharp recession as a result of the financial crisis in 2008 and the sluggish recovery 
has strongly increased the level of unemployment in the European Union. Figure 1 
highlights the development and the relationship between the quarterly GDP growth 
and the unemployment rate in the EU 28 countries. Following a period of solid growth 
in 2006 and 2007 the unemployment rate sunk to 6.8 % in the first quarter of 2008. 
The sharp recession caused an increase of the unemployment rate up to 9.6 % in the 
first quarter of 2010. 
Figure 1: GDP growth and unemployment in the EU 28, 2000-2014 
 
Source: AMECO and Eurostat, own illustration. 
However, the economic recovery in 2010 was not strong enough to reduce the level of 
unemployment and the next recession in 2012 and 2013 further increased the 
unemployment rate to 10.9 % in the third quarter of 2013. Only over the course the 
last year there has been a slow improvement in the European labour market. 
Figure 2 goes beyond the weighted average of the unemployment rate and highlights 
the fact that the labour markets in the Member States have been affected by the 
recession to a varying degree. In 2002 it was the new Member States who had high 
unemployment rates, most notably Poland and the Slovak Republic. Until the 2008 the 
unemployment rates in the EU converged, owed to a large degree of a much better 
labour market outcome in the new Member States. Starting with the recession in 2008 
the unemployment rate increased in most countries, but while the increase was 
moderate for some countries, in Spain and Greece the unemployment rate continued 
to rise at a fast pace. In 2013 the unemployment rate in Greece was at 27.3 % and in 
Spain a 25.6 %. At the other end of the spectrum the unemployment rate in 2013 was 
still only at 4.6 % in Austria and at 5.2 % in Germany. 
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Figure 2: Unemployment rates in EU 28 Member States 2002-2013 
 
Source: Labour force survey, own illustration. 
The sharp recession has not only left its mark on the labour market, but also 
significantly increased the debt level in most European countries. Figure 3 compares 
the pre-financial crisis debt level in 2006 to the current debt level in 2014. With the 
exception of Sweden all countries have now a higher debt level than before the crisis. 
The increase is most dramatic for countries which were hardest hit by the recession, 
i.e. Ireland, Cyprus and for the countries in southern Europe which continue to 
struggle with the aftermath of the crisis like Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal. In sum 
the figures illustrate the difficult situation in Europe with most European countries 
struggling with historically high levels of unemployment and large public debts. The 
currently fragile economic recovery makes the challenge for fiscal consolidation 
particularly difficult and highlights the necessity of well-targeted reforms even more. 
In that context the European Semester (European Commission, 2013a) has amongst 
others identified the tax system as an important area for growth promoting reforms. 
Following the ranking of growth-friendly tax structures by the OECD (see Johansson et 
al., 2008) the broad consensus is on a shift from labour taxation towards consumption 
taxation and recurrent taxes on immovable property. Using an indicator based 
approach a tax reform report by the European Commission (2013b) finds that around 
a third of the Member States have a potential need for reducing labour taxation. The 
European Semester translates this into country specific recommendations to cut labour 
taxation for nine Member States. However, until now the recommendation is not 
specific as to whether the cuts shall be on the employee or firm side. 
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Figure 3: Debt levels in the EU 28 Member States 2006 and 2014 
 
Notes: * For Estonia and Poland the value for the debt level in 2006 is not 
available, instead the value of 2010 is used.  
Source: AMECO database, own illustration. 
It is often implicitly assumed that a decrease on the employee side, i.e. in the 
personal income tax rate or the employee part of social security contribution, leads to 
a higher labour supply. Similarly, a decrease in the employer labour taxes is often 
assumed to raise the demand of labour. In both cases, the goal of such policies is 
generally to improve labour market outcomes and reduce unemployment. However, it 
is well established in the literature that the economic incidence of a tax change is 
often different from the legal incidence. Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) review the 
literature on the incidence of different aspects of taxation and Metcalf (2006) 
summarises that the impact of a tax change on labour market outcomes depends on 
the interaction of the demand and the supply side of the market. This interaction is 
determined by the behavioural responses of economic operators, measured by 
elasticities. Higher (demand or supply) elasticities will cause larger responses to tax 
changes, with the relatively less elastic side bearing a higher tax burden. 
While in the absence of labour market imperfections the legal incidence has no long 
run influence on labour market outcomes, it has been highlighted by Symons and 
Robertson (1990) that short-run effects might differ substantially. Furthermore wage 
rigidities due to minimum wages and institutional settings will affect both the 
incidence and the employment outcome of social security contributions and labour 
taxation.1 For example, Gruber (1997) shows, that the strength of the link between 
the labour taxes (social security contributions) and the benefits received by the 
workers, strongly affects the incidence both in the short run and in the long run. 
Against this background the four tasks below emerge. First, it is important to identify 
employment problems due to labour market imperfections, and whether these 
                                           
1 See e.g. Picard and Toulemonde (1999) and Econpubblica (2011). 
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problems originate more on the labour supply or on the labour demand side. The 
next step is to review the literature which assesses the short-run and long-run 
economic incidence of labour taxation. To further break down the incidence into its 
underlying determinants we also review the literature on the (tax) elasticities of labour 
supply and labour demand. Then the literature on the influence of the economic 
environment on the tax incidence outcome, most notably the wage setting 
mechanisms and the institutional background, is reviewed. Finally the findings of 
the literature review are brought together in a framework to identify the potential 
of tax reforms to reduce tax related employment problems. 
1.2. Objective and tasks 
The specific tasks of the study are structured along the tasks stated in the terms of 
reference and include:  
 a review of the economic literature on the identification of labour demand and 
labour supply as source of employment problems; 
 a review of the economic literature on short-term and long-term tax incidence on 
labour; 
 a review of the economic literature on how the different labour market 
institutions/regulations (employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits, 
minimum wage, wage setting institutions and trade unions etc.) influence the 
incidence and effects of labour taxation on employment outcomes, also across 
various categories of workers such as e.g. the low-skilled, women the young and 
older workers; 
 from the above analysis a framework to identify when employment problems are 
tax-related and the estimated efficiency of tax measures to fix these problems. 
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2. Review of the sources of employment problems 
It is beyond the scope of this study to exhaustively cover all the literature on 
employment problems.2 Rather than trying to do so, we aim for a general overview, 
which will guide us in the development of indicators. Based on the idea, that in the 
presence of labour market imperfections, the effectiveness of labour tax cuts in 
increasing employment could be improved by directing reductions towards the side of 
the market which is the source of employment problems, the focus of this overview is 
therefore the question whether the sources of the employment problems can be 
attributed to mainly the labour demand or the labour supply side. 
2.1. A broad characterisation of employment problems 
Before we set out to review the literature on the sources of employment problems, it 
is useful to broadly classify and describe what we intend to capture with the term 
employment problems. Table 1 provides a summary of our classification of 
employment problems and their main sources. We broadly distinguish between 
unemployment, and under- and non-employment, also referred to as out of the 
workforce. While the necessity and usefulness of this distinction was debated in the 
earlier literature, it was stressed prominently by Flinn and Heckman (1983) analysing 
the transition between the different employment states. Similarly, Murphy and Topel 
(1997) show that focusing exclusively on unemployment may increasingly fall short of 
capturing the full extent of employment problems, as many workers may decide to 
stop looking for a job and leave the workforce if their job prospects are bleak.3  
Therefore we subsume under the term employment problems unemployment, under-
employment and a large part of non-employment. The most obvious aspect and most 
visible part of the employment problem consists of unemployment, defined as the 
share of the workforce who wants to work and does not find employment. Hence the 
defining feature of unemployment is that it is involuntary and that those afflicted 
actively search for a job. There are various different definitions for unemployment 
which vary mostly along the criteria of active job search. For example Eurostat – in 
line with the International Labour Organization (ILO) - defines unemployed persons as 
someone aged 15 to 74 without work during the reference week who is available to 
start work within the next two weeks and who has actively sought employment at 
some time during the last four weeks.4 Unless otherwise specified we follow this 
definition of unemployment throughout this study. However, the ILO definition of 
unemployment is rather narrow, since it excludes everyone, who stopped actively 
searching for a job, is not immediately available for work or has a temporary 
employment during the observation period. Therefore simply looking at unemployment 
would fall short of covering the full extent of the employment problems. Therefore we 
also include under- and non-employment, defined as the share of the population 
                                           
2 The broader overview can be found in three partly complementing books on unemployment: 
Layard et al. (2005), Pissarides (2000) and Phelps (1994). See also Blanchard (2007) for a 
discussion about the relative strength and weaknesses of the respective books. 
3 For a more recent discussion see also Jones and Riddell (2006). 
4 For the exact definition see the glossary for unemployment on the Eurostat webpage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary. 
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who (apparently) voluntarily stays away from the workforce in our definition of 
employment problems. Again following Eurostat and the ILO definition, this group 
includes underemployed part-time workers, jobless persons seeking a job but not 
immediately available for work and jobless persons available for work but not seeking 
it.5 
Table 1: Broad classification of employment problems 
Employment  
problem Unemployment Under- and Non-employment 
Distinctive 
feature 
Non-voluntary out of 
employment and (actively) 
looking for employment 
Voluntarily out of employment 
and not (actively) looking for 
employment 
Reasons for 
employment 
problems  
Business cycle reasons  
(short term lack of aggregate demand) 
Reasons for non-
employment 
outside the 
labour market 
Structural reasons 
 Unwinding of unsustainable 
developments  
(long term lack of aggregate demand) 
 Mismatch between labour demand and 
supply 
o Skill-mismatch (including experience) 
o Geographical mismatch 
 Rigidities at the labour market  
o Wage rigidities  
o Other labour market regulations 
 
Incentive 
problems 
 Opportunity 
cost 
 Poverty 
trap 
Source: Own classification based on the literature review. 
Table 1 provides a broad categorisation of the causes of employment problems. Note 
that there are numerous different approaches to label and characterise sources of 
employment problems and labour market imperfections. In the spirit of Manning 
(2011), who characterises labour market imperfections around the rents accruing to 
employers and employees, we also chose not to investigate the literature along the 
canonical models.6 In contrast, in a first step, we organise our classification along the 
distinction between cyclical and structural unemployment. In a second step we split 
                                           
5 Eurostat groups together underemployment and potentially active. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary. 
6 For a recent survey of models explaining unemployment with search models see also Rogerson 
et al. (2005). 
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the reasons for structural unemployment into problems resulting from a mismatch 
between labour supply and demand and problems resulting from rigidities in the 
labour market. Additionally there are specific incentive problems that only contribute 
to under- and non-employment. 
One needs to bear in mind that not all persons voluntarily staying away from the 
workforce are effectively contributing to an employment problem. Ideally, we would 
only want to include those who are interested to participate (more) in the workforce, 
but choose not to actively seek (more) work, because of discouraging circumstances 
at the labour market. In our classification in Table 1 the share of non-employment 
which is not caused by adverse labour market conditions is represented by the shaded 
area. This part of non-employment includes for example women preferring to care for 
their children at home despite the sufficiently profitable opportunities to go back to 
work, young people choosing to travel, or older people choosing early retirement 
despite the availability of suitable positions. 
In terms of the distinction between labour demand and labour supply as the source of 
the employment problems, one can start from the broad categorisation that 
unemployment is the result of a labour demand problem and under- or non-
employment stems from a labour supply problem. This relationship only partly holds, 
since the underlying reason for persons not seeking employment can be the lack of 
suitable positions because of a labour demand problem. Similarly the reason for firms 
not hiring available workforce could ultimately be due to inadequate quality of the 
labour supplied or other underlying causes. Nevertheless it can be useful as a starting 
point to attribute unemployment more to the labour demand side and non-
employment more to the labour supply side. In the following we will briefly discuss 
where this generalisation appropriate and where caution is in order.  
2.1.1. Cyclical and structural employment problems 
It is useful to first distinguish short-term and demand-driven problems from longer 
term structural problems. In recessionary times the aggregate demand falls and in 
consequence the labour demand is also subdued. While this also creates an 
employment problem which is due to labour demand problems, this is not the type of 
labour demand problems, which should primarily be addressed by directed labour 
taxation reforms. In practice it is however difficult to separate short-term cyclical from 
structural long-term employment problems. One concept of the structural 
unemployment rate is the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU), the 
level of unemployment the economy would settle into in the absence of shocks (see 
e.g. Orlandi, 2012). The remaining part of unemployment is then solely due to 
business cycle effects, the short term lack of aggregate demand resulting in higher 
unemployment. For the purpose of this report we are less interested in business cycle 
effects, but rather in the structural unemployment resulting from labour market 
imperfections. However, the distinction is not as clear as it appears, since large shocks 
in aggregate demand can result in an increase in the structural unemployment. For 
example, Orlandi (2012) mentions the bust of the housing price bubble, which can 
result in a long term reduction of demand to unwind a previously unsustainable 
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development.7 Similarly, the necessary longer-term fiscal consolidation to reduce 
excessive public debt can be seen as a situation where the previously unsustainably 
high level of public consumption needs to be corrected. Therefore, some of the 
previously cyclical employment problems can manifest themselves in structural 
unemployment problems if a long term adjustment is necessary. 
In particular the concurrence of the strict fiscal consolidation, also debated as 
austerity programs, and the continuing employment problems in Europe have 
provoked an emotional debate, whether and to which the sudden withdrawal of public 
expenditure is contributing to the employment problems. The economic literature has 
largely focussed on the growth effects of government consumption and only recently 
addressed the employment effects of government consumption. Using a structural 
VAR approach Brückner and Pappa (2012) find that government spending can increase 
both unemployment and employment as a result of an increased participation rate. 
Dallari (2014) relies also on a structural VAR approach to directly address how recent 
cuts in government expenditures have affected unemployment in a number of 
European countries and find very heterogeneous results among countries. In contrast, 
Turrini (2013) analyses the same question using a narrative approach, i.e. he 
identifies episodes of discretionary fiscal consolidation, and finds a negative 
employment effect overall. However, at closer inspection fiscal consolidation result 
affects job separation and job finding rates differently depending on the strength of 
employment protection measures. In consequence the impact of fiscal consolidation 
may well be different in the longer run, depending on the labour market institutions. 
The tentative conclusion from the existing literature therefore is that necessary 
austerity programs are likely to contribute to short term cyclical unemployment. 
Whether this unemployment manifest itself in longer term structural unemployment 
depends on other aspects of the labour market. 
2.1.2. Mismatch between labour supply and labour demand 
Structural unemployment because of a mismatch between the labour supplied by the 
workforce and the labour demanded has per definition both a labour supply and a 
labour demand dimension. The underlying assumption that employment problem can 
be reduced by a labour tax reduction on the appropriate side might be less applicable 
here, since labour taxation only affects the incentives to overcome the mismatch. The 
mismatch itself cannot be directly addressed by labour taxation reforms.  
The mismatch between labour demand and can have different causes. The jobs 
offered might require specific qualifications and skills which are not sufficiently 
offered by the available workforce because they lack the necessary education or 
experience. From the outset, it seems somewhat puzzling that in times with high 
unemployment and the easy dissemination of information via the internet, firms 
struggle to find the matching employees. However, as Manning (2011) highlights, job 
and employee specific idiosyncrasies can create a match-specific rents, resulting in 
frictions in the matching function. Therefore even with an apparent abundance of 
adequate work force it can be difficult to find the worker which is suitable for the 
                                           
7 Orlandi (2012) refers to evidence for US states provided by Estevão and Tsounta (2011), but 
the results are easily transferable to Europe for countries like Spain and to a somewhat lesser 
extent Ireland. 
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vacancy. Another aspect of these idiosyncrasies implies that even workers with 
sufficient formal education may fall short of the necessary job related skills. Chevalier 
(2003) also points out skill heterogeneity within the same educational group. Thus, in 
the more recent literature there has been a clearer focus on the distinction between 
the level of education and the skill level (see for example Quintini, 2011).8 
While the discussion about search and matching problems in the labour market has 
seen a strong increase following the seminal contribution by Mortenson and Pissarides 
(1994), the consensus at the moment appears to be that these mismatches are 
insufficient to fully explain patterns in cyclical unemployment (for an overview see 
Rogerson and Shimer, 2011) and structural unemployment (see Barlevy, 2011, for an 
application to the US labour market).  
A further reason for matching problems can be geographical distance between the 
residence of the employees and the work place. Whereas migration caused by the 
pursuit of employment opportunities has been of longstanding interest in countries 
with high labour mobility like the United States (see e.g. Pissarides and Wadworth, 
1989), the view that the low geographical mobility of the workforce in continental 
Europe creates employment problems is somewhat newer.9 
Irrespective of the kind of mismatch, there is always a labour demand and labour 
supply side aspect to the disparity. While it is not always straightforward to attribute 
the cause of the mismatch to one side only, section 2.2 sets out to classify the most 
important aspects of changes and trends contributing to mismatches in the labour 
market. 
2.1.3. Rigidities in wages and the labour market 
Rigidities in the labour market can cause employment problems if they result in a 
wage rate above the market clearing rate. Standard reasoning sees a high wage 
rate as a labour demand problem since employers are not willing to hire sufficient 
people at this wage rate. An alternative view would be to treat a high wage as a 
labour supply problem if the workforce is not sufficiently productive for the going wage 
rate. For the purpose of this study, however, we will stick to the standard 
interpretation and see employment problems due to wage rigidities as primarily labour 
demand problems.  
The economic literature offers a number of reasons for why wages do not sufficiently 
adjust downwards to enable market clearing in the labour market. For example, 
Manning (2011) distinguishes between collusion and institutional reasons. The most 
obvious form of collusion is collective bargaining of the workforce organised in unions. 
The role of collective bargaining in creating unemployment has for example been 
addressed by Blanchard (1991). A different aspect of collusion is, when firms pay 
efficiency wages, i.e. wages above the market clearing rate to maintain 
                                           
8 See also McGuiness (2006) for a survey of overeducation in the labour market, which 
constitutes yet another aspect of skill mismatch. 
9 See for example Tatsiramos (2009) for a recent analysis how unemployment benefits interact 
with labour mobility in a number of European countries. 
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unemployment in order to keep employees motivated (see Shapiro and Stiglitz, 
1984).10 
On the institutional side, the most obvious labour market regulation is a binding 
minimum wage. Although, the clear-cut economic prediction of Stigler (1946) that the 
introduction of a minimum wage would result in more unemployment, was challenged 
by Card and Krueger (1994) using a quasi-experimental approach, the recent evidence 
indicates that binding minimum wages increase unemployment.11 More generally, the 
institutional setting, such as employment protection legislation, unemployment 
benefits, active labour market policies, and taxation of labour has a large influence on 
the labour market, as recently surveyed by Boeri (2011). Overly generous labour 
market protection legislation can result in a dual labour market, if firms become 
reluctant to hire new employees on fixed contracts.12 In a dual labour market one part 
of the workforce is in relatively well paid and stable jobs, while the other part of the 
workforce is in unstable jobs with lower wages. Boeri (2011) points out that the share 
of temporary workers exhibits a strong positive correlation (0.73) with employment 
protection legislation. Hence, strong employment protection seems to lead to more 
temporary contracts, which can lead to large increases in unemployment during 
economic downturns, because firms find it easy to lay off these workers, just as it has 
happened in some southern Member States in the wake of the recent economic crises. 
Young workers and workers in the construction sector in countries with a housing 
bubble such as Spain were particularly hit.13 While the earlier literature based on 
cross-country comparison struggled to differentiate the effects of the institutions from 
other country characteristic, the more recent literature learns primarily from within 
country variation through reforms. 
Given the importance of these different labour market institutions, and the complex 
interaction between them and with labour taxation, Section 4 will be devoted to these 
potential sources of employment problems. 
2.1.4. Incentive problems 
Adverse incentives of the tax-benefit systems can also cause non-employment or 
under-employment. Of all the mentioned reasons for employment problems, the 
assignment to labour supply is the clearest here. The incentives directly affect labour 
supply and have no connection to the labour demand.  
There is a longstanding debate about poverty or unemployment traps, where 
income related benefits create situations for unemployed people where they are better 
off staying outside the workforce.14 For example, Pedersen and Smith (2002) use 
detailed data from Denmark and show that especially for women, the disincentives for 
work (i.e. the unemployment benefit is higher than the disposable income under full-
                                           
10 See also Yellen (1984) for a broader discussion of the different efficiency wage theories, 
some of which see the efficiency wages as a motivational device and unemployment as a side 
effect. 
11 See Neumark et al. (2014) for a recent survey of this strand of the literature. 
12 The term dual labour markets stems back to at least Bulow and Summers (1986). 
13 See Bentolila et al. (2010) for a discussion about the effects of the crisis in countries with 
dual labour market. 
14 See Havemann (1996) for a discussion of these problems and some potential approaches to 
mitigate them. 
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time work) dominate other considerations and lead to a significant increase in non-
participation in the labour force. Similarly, progressive tax systems can create 
incentives for secondary earners to reduce their work effort or to decide to opt for 
part-time employment. Even stronger disincentives for secondary earners can result 
from joint filing for couples, because the marginal tax rate depends on the joint 
income and as a result can be very even for high low income levels of the secondary 
earner.15 
One final aspect we want to cover with the term incentive problems is the concept of 
opportunity costs of work. We interpret this term rather broadly and also include the 
costs which arise to the household through labour force participation. A prominent 
example is the cost of child care. That the rise in female labour force participation was 
in part driven by the falling cost of child care was already pointed out by Connelly 
(1992). More recently, Compton and Pollak (2014) find that geographical proximity to 
grandparents significantly increases the labour force participation of married women 
with young children. This allows the conclusion that there are still relevant opportunity 
costs for those mothers without family support. Therefore section 4.2 will be devoted 
to analyse the impact of family policies on the employment outcome. 
2.2. Changes in Labour supply and demand as sources of 
employment problems 
There are several ongoing socio-economic trends which already have affected both 
labour demand and supply, and even more importantly are expected to have a lasting 
impact on employment in Europe. Two main research projects have identified and 
summarised the key challenges lying ahead.16 For example NeuJobs (2014), sees the 
main challenges ahead in natural megatrends such as energy transition and climate 
change as well as in societal megatrends as population dynamics and changes in the 
way work is organised. The adaptation to the current employment problems and 
raising challenges in Europe result in innovative agricultural, industrial and service 
activities that will shape the skills, jobs and work organization. 
Table 2 classifies the socio-economic trends in factors affecting labour demand and 
labour supply. Changes in demography and educational attainment will influence the 
workforce available and their attachment to the labour market. While population 
ageing will reduce the workforce available, lower fertility rates and changing family 
structures contribute to raising female labour force participation. Together with 
migration these trends can significantly alter the workforce available. On the labour 
demand side the occupational shifts between sectors and other structural changes will 
affect the extent and quality of labour input required.  
 
 
 
 
                                           
15 For a recent discussion about labour force participation of secondary workers in the US see 
McClelland et al. (2014). 
16 The European Commission (2009) analyses the general outlook for the world in 2025, 
whereas NeuJobs (2014) directly investigates the future for work in Europe. 
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Table 2: Socio-economic trends affecting labour market outcomes 
Sources influencing  
employment Trends Characteristics 
Labour supply sources 
Demography 
Population ageing;  
Low fertility rates;  
Changing family structures; 
Growing female employment; 
Migration patterns 
Changes in 
educational 
attainment 
Higher share of people with higher 
education, 
Polarisation of labour force 
Labour demand sources  
Occupational shifts 
Development of green economies; 
Development of ICT tools; 
Increased demand in care sector and 
personal services, retail, tourism 
Structural changes 
Change in the patterns of market 
organization and culture; 
Changes in production and 
consumption 
Source: Own elaboration based on Neujobs (2014) and Styczyńska et al. (2013) 
2.2.1. Factors affecting labour supply  
The current demographic trends affecting labour supply include population ageing, 
low/falling fertility rate, changing family structures (increase of non-marital unions, 
patchwork families and single parents), growing female employment and the increase 
in migration. These trends generate new social risks and challenges for welfare 
systems and challenges in increasing the participation and employability of these 
groups in the labour market. As a result of these socio-demographic trends, potential 
labour market composition has notably changed and this change is expected to 
continue. The transition involves increasing share of elderly in the economically active 
population and women in the working population, as well as increasing emphasis on 
migration and employment of frequently marginalised groups (e.g. migrants including 
2nd generation migrants and the Roma). 
Table 3 summarises how these changes affect the characteristics of labour supply. 
This will in turn determine labour market outcomes and can result in increases 
employment problems. The full extent of the potential employment problems, 
however, will only become apparent once the changes in the labour supply are seen in 
connection with the changes in labour demand in the next subsection.  
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Table 3: Labour supply characteristics affecting labour market outcomes 
Factors Labour supply effect 
Population ageing People aged 50 + have lower chances of being employed 
Large share of population potentially decreases link 
between contributions and pension entitlements 
Falling fertility 
levels 
Having children has ambiguous effects on employment. 
While it increases the probability of men to be employed, 
the chances of being employed decreases for women. 
Changing family 
structures 
Being married has ambiguous effects on employment, for 
men there is a positive correlation, while for women it is 
negative. However, most likely also a reverse causality 
Female labour 
participation  
Women still have a lower labour force attachment 
Changes in 
educational 
attainment 
Lower educated people are less probable to find 
employment 
Increasing 
migration 
Migrants have lower chances of finding employment  
Source: Own elaboration 
The currently ongoing population ageing results in the ageing of the workforce and 
an increasing number of retired people. Between 2002 and 2012 the share of the 
population between 15 and 64 years has slightly decreased from 67.2 % to 66.4 %, 
while at the same time the share of over 65 year old has increased from 16.0 % to 
17.9 %.17 The different age composition of the labour force has a direct effect on the 
labour supply, while the increasing number of retired people can have an additional 
indirect effect via an altered link between the contributions and the pension 
entitlements in pay-as-you go systems. Despite the fact that the participation of the 
elderly is increasing, their employment rate is still much lower compared to the prime-
aged workforce (Styczyńska et al., 2013).18 Significant country differences are 
observed at the European level with employment ranging from 74.8 % in Sweden to 
40.3 % in Malta (Eurostat, 2013). There are several reasons behind that phenomenon. 
There are the retirement preferences of workers, their health status, the 
(dis)incentives to work provided by labour market institutions, the perception about 
the lower productivity of older worker, or employer’s decision about hiring older 
worker (Ruzik-Sierdzinska, 2013). 
Related to the population ageing and in line with the trend in a number of developed 
countries the fertility levels in the EU-28 have decreased significantly in the last 
decades. After only a small recovery in the last decade the fertility rate in 2012 is at 
                                           
17 See population age statistics from Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_ageing. 
18 Through this report we define the elderly as persons aged between 55 and 64 years. The 
prime-aged workforce in comparison is aged between 20 and 52 years. 
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1.58 live births per women in the EU-28 countries.19 This downward trend in the 
fertility rates is associated with numerous social and economic factors, but the 
causality of the relationship is unclear. A strong negative relationship between the 
increased participation level of women in the labour market and fertility rates has 
been observed in a large number of countries since 1960, (e.g. see Becker and Lewis, 
1973 and Butz and Ward, 1979, for the US). In addition, the opportunity costs of 
childbearing, the individualisation and changes in the family structures are the other 
social aspects affecting women’s decisions on motherhood. Additionally, participating 
in higher education also plays a role in women’s postponing their decision. The 
economic factors discouraging the parenthood decisions are economic uncertainty and 
drops in the household income as a result of labour market and financial instabilities.20 
Changing family structures have an ambiguous effect on the labour force 
attachment of individuals. A study conducted by US Urban Institute shows that the 
unemployment level of married men and women is significantly lower than that of 
unmarried, and labour force participation rates are much higher among married 
people (Lerman and Schmidt, 1999). The study also finds higher unemployment rates 
in the never-married group and that the labour market outcomes of men living with at 
least one of their own children are better than those of with no children. On the other 
hand, it has been shown that unemployment affects the individuals’ decision on 
marriage. Ackers (2002) collects several case studies of European countries to find 
that the impact of changing family structures on employment is strongly affected by 
the cultural background, which is also reflected in the resulting public policies. For 
example, Iza and de la Rica, (2005) find for Spain that holding unstable contracts or 
being unemployed strongly negatively affects the individuals’ decision on getting 
married in comparison with that of holding permanent contracts In contrast, for 
women fixed term contracts are a less strong determinant in their marriage decision. 
This trend might be explained by Becker’s theory of marriage, based on rational 
choice, which suggests that since men are more likely to specialise in the labour 
market than women, i.e. from the traditional perspective still being affective on the 
individuals’ view that “men are the main breadwinner”, the worsening of the labour 
market conditions for men reduces the gain of marriage, as a result the incidence of 
marriage among young people decreases (see Becker, 1973). 
Moving to employment of women, the last decade saw a gradual rise in labour 
market participation of women, and their employment rate. Despite recent 
improvements, a gender employment gap is still observed in all European countries. 
Women continue to deal with the challenges keeping them away from or limiting their 
participation in the labour market (e.g. see Tembon and Fort, 2008). Two aspects are 
crucial for the improved position of women on the labour market: the processes of 
school-to-work transitions and reconciling motherhood and work, through their 
relative importance and performance. Understanding these processes and their 
contribution to the overall improvement of female labour market participation is 
necessary to make policy recommendations for the employment strategy and to make 
predictions about the potential changes in the future. 
                                           
19 Eurostat, Fertility Statistics, 2014. 
20 Tausig and Fenwick, 1999, Neels and de Wachter, 2010, Van Bavel 2001 for Belgium; Yule 
1906, Teitelbaum 1984, for Great Britain and Bengtsson, and Lee 2004 for the Eurasian region. 
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Changes in educational attainment can also play an important role for the 
composition of workforce. Education plays a major role in the probability of finding a 
job (see Ridell and Song, 2011). Data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in Europe 
show that highly educated have higher chances of being employed than their lower-
educated counterparts. This is common for all EU countries (Nunez and Livanos, 
2010). Low skilled make up 34 % of the EU population and their labour market 
attachment is significantly lower than for their more skilled counterparts.21 The 
European Strategy for Employment and Growth 2020 estimates that just over a 
quarter of the population in Europe, about 80 million people, has low or basic skills 
and therefore are less likely to benefit from life-long learning. In contrast, additional 
education improves the ability of the labour force to adjust to economic shocks, 
enhances adaptability to change and in consequence increase the probability of being 
employed. Low-skilled workers encounter increasing difficulties to find a job, face 
lower job stability and are out-competed by medium-skilled workers even in 
elementary occupations (European Commission, 2014a) 
Europe has a history of migration. And the removal of internal barriers further 
contributed to the strong increase in migration in all EU countries. In 2012, about 1.7 
million people migrated to the EU from a non-EU country and 1.7 million previously 
residing in one of the EU-27 Member States migrated to another one.22 The 
unemployment level of migrants in the EU is significantly increasing since 2007 and 
remaining much higher than that of the total population. 2013 Eurostat data show that 
the unemployment level of the migrants in EU-28 is 18 % in comparison to 10.4 % for 
the native population (Eurostat, Indicators of Immigrant Integration, 2013). This level 
substantially differs across the population depending on the citizenship of the migrant. 
The largest difference is observed in Belgium, as non-EU born unemployment level is 
14 percentage points higher than that of total population, while for EU-born migrants 
this difference is only 2 percentage points. Studies suggest that migrants arriving to 
EU may suffer in the labour market of the host country for several reasons. First, the 
educational qualifications provided by the country of origin might not provide the 
necessary qualifications in the host country and put migrants in a position where their 
competencies are much lower than the native workers in the country. Second, 
because the human-capital has a limited level of mobility, and therefore is mostly 
country specific, most migrants find it hard to translate their knowledge and adapt the 
system and qualifications in the host country (Chiswick, 1978, Borjas, 1994, 
Friedberg, 2000). In addition, if the employer perceives that the migrant is not willing 
to work permanently, then both parties refrain from investing in human-capital since it 
is not likely that it will pay off in the future (Dustman, 2000). Similarly, if the job 
search costs are so high for the migrants or if they are unlikely to become a resident 
in the host country, they may refrain from undertaking long searches for a better job 
and prefer the one immediately available even if it is low-status, therefore they are 
overqualified for the job (Kalter and Kogan, 2006; Dustman, 2000). 
                                           
21 Low skilled adults are defined as people over 25 with lower secondary education at most, 
which includes International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) categories 0 to 2. 
22 Eurostat, Migration and Migrant Population Statistics, 2014. 
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2.2.2. Factor affecting labour demand 
When considering the demand side of the labour market, we should ask the questions 
of how many jobs will be created, or destroyed on the market, in what sectors, and 
what would be the reason of such a change. During the last decade we observe a 
relatively fast evolution in the consumption of goods and services, changes in the 
structure of products demanded, introduction of modern technologies, changes in the 
lifestyle of people. All these evolutions, which are broadly called in the literature socio-
ecological transformation, result in changes in the labour market demand for specific 
skills, education, or abilities. Changes in the demand for labour can be characterised 
by two phenomena: occupational shifts in labour demand, and structural changes in 
labour market organization and working conditions due to the introduction of 
information and communications technology (ICT) measures. These changes will 
significantly affect the creation of jobs, and employment overall in the medium- and 
long-run.  
There is a longstanding debate over the impact of occupational shifts on labour 
market outcomes. On the one hand, the sectoral shifts hypothesis developed by Lilien 
(1982) states that occupational shifts tend to be slow and typically involve significant 
unemployment before labour fully adjusts to new patterns of labour demand. This can 
generate considerable fluctuations in the unemployment rate that are not directly 
related to the fluctuations in aggregate demand. On the other hand, some studies 
tend to reject the hypothesis, showing that it has small and insignificant impact on 
aggregate unemployment rate (Abraham-Katz, 1986). 
Empirical studies - at least superficially - seem support both hypotheses. Van Ours 
and Van der Tak (1992) show that sectoral shifts do not have a substantial influence 
on the unemployment rate in the Netherlands. Fluctuations of unemployment rate are 
mainly due to aggregate demand factors. Similarly, Sakata and McKenzie (2001) find 
no relation between sectoral shifts and the unemployment rate in the long run in 
Japan. When analysing the same hypothesis for different groups of workers, Sakata 
and McKenzie (2004) confirm that sectoral shifts do not have any long-term impacts 
on unemployment. They contribute, however, to the unemployment of old males in 
the short-run. 
In contrast, Pelloni and Polasek (2003) show that sectoral re-allocations in Germany, 
UK, and the US account for a substantial share of aggregate employment variation, 
while the effects of aggregate shocks for sectoral shares are of smaller magnitude. In 
contrast Also, Grubb (2002) finds that due to the rapid increase in the information 
society, communication revolution, or the hi-tech revolution the nature of work has 
changed. It shifts from occupations rooted in industrial production to occupations 
associated with knowledge and information. In order to moderate the negative effect 
of occupational shifts the idea of career information and career guidance is supported. 
Due to these rapid changes the more recent European studies point to a problem of 
skill shortages, when higher demand than supply exist for certain occupations, such as 
ICT professionals, nurses, or engineers. They also highlight the problem of skill 
obsolescence related to the risk of losing acquired skills and abilities, due to the rapid 
introduction of new technologies and innovation in the market. 
Summing up, the empirical results confirm that occupational shifts are likely to 
increase the unemployment rate, but mostly in the short- to medium-run. When 
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considering the problem in the long-run, occupational shifts are insignificant for 
(un)employment level of individuals. In terms of shifting sectoral structure of 
employment, several studies document the structural shift from manufacturing to 
services in developed countries (Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006). The service sector has 
become the most important sector in all OECD economies. It is, however, composed of 
a wide variety of different activities ranging from fast food to brain surgery. An 
increase in the demand for social services, healthcare, and education is observed. The 
most recent data on occupational shortages show that in Austria in 2014 registered 
nurses, data processing technicians, and technicians in engineering were highly 
demanded. Other more recent studies (Beblavy et al., 2013) confirm that due to the 
technological and ecological transformation, we observe the decrease of employment 
demand in agriculture, non-market services, and the increase in employment demand 
in transport, energy, construction, and private services. The projections of the future 
labour market show that employment growth will be mainly driven by job creations in 
private services sector. The same changes will be observed in transport. The industry 
sector and agriculture will lose around 30 % of their jobs in 2030 (Boitier et al., 
2013). 
In Employment in Europe 2009, the European Commission clearly summarises the 
state of the art on the impact on employment of the socio-ecological transition to a 
low carbon economy. Sectors directly involved in the adaptation are those especially 
related to (i) the efforts to increase energy efficiency and (ii) renewable energies. In 
the long run the net effect on employment is expected to be neutral or slightly 
positive. The main impact will occur on redistribution across sectors and regions. 
Intra-sectors redistribution is deemed smoother since it is easier for a worker to 
change company within the same sector rather than to find an entirely different job. 
Structural changes in the labour market are characterised by several factors 
affecting the workplace. Prominent examples are the as the introduction of ICT tools in 
the workplace, which fundamentally alter the tasks of jobs. Modern communication 
has further allowed work reorganisation through international division of labour. This 
often leads to highly specialised jobs in Europe, while simple mechanical tasks are 
either substituted by technology or outsourced to low-income countries. The 
remaining and newly emerging jobs in Europe often require a very different skill set, 
which in conjunction with a slowly adjusting workforce results in skills gaps, 
characterised through the fact that workers’ skills are not up to requirements of the 
jobs. These were highlighted by a recent study on adult skills revealing proficiency 
problems in basic literacy, numeracy and ICT skills (OECD, 2013a). Despite the fact 
that measuring the impact of technological change on labour market has proved 
difficult, there is agreed consensus that the world is changing faster and more severe 
consequences are expected in the labour market (OECD, 2012a). There is a general 
agreement that the long-term trend has been toward jobs requiring more education 
and cognitive skills, but the level and types of skills in demand, and the drivers of 
change are matters of debate and are difficult to understand. Growing development of 
ICT tools and increasing use of ICT and knowledge-sharing in the workplace might be 
assumed as significant determinant of unemployment increase. OECD (2012b) shows 
the demand for educational, cognitive and interpersonal skill increases, while craft 
skills, physical demands and the frequency of repetitive physical tasks declined. This is 
related to the facilitation of handling of complex systems, speeding up the process of 
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knowledge-sharing worldwide and across all areas, and creating a cheap 
communications space for new world views and lifestyles (NeuJobs, 2014).  
Table 4 summarises the changes in labour demand and how they will contribute to the 
skill mismatch. While the findings in the literature and consequently this short survey 
here suggest that the skill mismatch is primarily a short run problem, the speed of 
adjustment will crucially depend on the labour supply side as well. Higher education 
and increasing mobility of the workforce positively contributes and reduces the length 
and the extent of the mismatch resulting from changes in labour demand.  
Table 4: Labour demand characteristics affecting labour market outcomes 
Factors Labour demand 
Occupational 
shifts 
Shifts of production between occupations/sectors cause 
increased demand for one type of skills, and decreasing 
demand for different type of skills. In the short- to 
medium-run such shifts can results in a skill-mismatch, 
i.e. mismatch between skills that are demanded on the 
labour market and skills that are available. It causes the 
increase of unemployment and the increase in vacancies 
at the same time. 
In the long run the market should adjust and the 
unemployment should decrease and employment 
increase. 
Structural 
changes in 
labour market 
Introduction of innovative tools in the workplace, 
changing nature of the workplace induce demand for 
different types of skills, often unavailable on the labour 
market. Again, we observe a skill shortage, which creates 
unemployment and lower employment. 
Source: Own elaboration 
Given the differences between different socio-economic groups with respect to their 
ability to adapt to changes in labour demand, the respective labour market outcome 
will be different. Therefore the next subsection will shed some light on how this 
manifests into employment problems for different vulnerable groups of the 
population.23 
2.3. Groups vulnerable to employment problems 
The interplay of changes in labour demand and labour supply can create labour 
market outcome which are less favourable for specific socio-economic groups. Both, a 
strongly increasing labour supply or a sharply falling labour demand can put a socio-
economic group into a vulnerable position. Therefore we review the situation of some 
groups to highlight their relative exposure to employment problems. Specifically we 
look at the low-skilled, the youth, the elderly, women and migrants.  
                                           
23 Note that the matching problems in the labour market are an inherently two-sided problem, 
but it is beyond the scope of this particular project to also investigate the role of employers in 
detail. 
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2.3.1. Low-skilled 
The level of education and the resulting skill level of the workforce is a key 
determinant of the labour market outcome. Despite this importance there is an 
ongoing debate how to adequate measure the skill-level. There are several schools 
explaining how the concept should be defined and measured (CEDEFOP, 2010). 
Therefore, before proceeding, we outline the problem of the definition and the 
challenges that this entails for policy makers and analysts. There is a tendency to 
define low-skilled adults on the basis of their prior qualification attainment, in 
comparison to that of the population as a whole. This is driven largely by the fact that 
comprehensive data on the labour forces of individual Member States is not readily 
available. Nevertheless, measurement by educational attainment alone sterilises the 
concept of low-skilled adults and obscures it from the sources of the low-skilled that 
are important for a better understanding of the heterogeneity of low-skilled workers 
within and across countries. Rather, factors such as the characteristics of individuals, 
which relate more to their employability (i.e. how they are regarded by employers in 
terms of being work-ready, trainable, and having the appropriate attitudes and 
aptitudes), should be taken into account. At the same time, it is important to 
recognise that qualifications (and other characteristics or factors on which employer 
hiring decisions are based) tend to operate as proxies for these wider attributes that 
are sought by employers. Nevertheless, the lack of data prevents researchers from 
providing such analyses. 
To proceed, we follow Eurostat and define low-skilled adults as people over 25 with 
lower secondary education at most, including ISCED 0 to 2. Therefore, due to data 
availability and in order to maintain comparability with the majority of studies at the 
European level, we use Eurostat’s definition for measuring low-skilled workers. 
Since 2002, the ratio of employment rate of the low-skilled has constantly decreased 
to a level of 60 % of the employment rate of the rest of the working population in 
2013. This trend has been fuelled by the fact that low-skilled workers were the ones 
mostly affected by the crisis, also mirrored in the continuously increasing 
unemployment rate of the low-skilled. At the end of 2013, the unemployment rate of 
low-skilled workers was over 2 times higher than the unemployment rate of the rest of 
the workforce. The participation rate of low-skilled workers is much more responsive 
to business cycles than for the rest of the population, suggesting that they are easier 
discouraged to participate in the labour market and seek employment. 
Low-skilled adults constitute a significant proportion of the workforce: in 2013, around 
25 % of the EU-28 population aged 25 to 64 had an education level of ISCED of 2 or 
less (Eurostat, 2014). Low-skilled workers encounter increasing difficulties finding a 
job, face lower job stability, and are out-competed by medium-skilled workers even in 
elementary occupations (European Commission, 2014a). The need for (continuous) 
upgrading of the skill level in most occupational fields threatens the labour market 
position of low-skilled workers who are crowded out of their traditional occupational 
domains (Borghans and Groot, 1999; Jacobebbinghaus and Zwick, 2002). Low-skilled 
workers are often either locked up in poorly paid elementary jobs with flexible 
contracts that further weaken their labour market position. Furthermore, low-skilled 
are increasing crowded out of employment, by better skilled people taking jobs for 
which they are over-qualified because of a lack of jobs for which their qualification and 
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skill level are commensurate. A further problem constitutes the increasing number of 
people at high risk of becoming low-skilled workers. Fast sectoral structural change in 
economies and globalization, which result in a shift towards a service-sector economy 
and away from the primary sector and select manufacturing activities in Europe, 
imposes the risk of increased number of low-skilled people in society. Since the issue 
of inadequate skill levels can not sufficiently be addressed through tax reforms, 
further policy measures are necessary. Box 1 describes a few approaches. 
Box 1: Examples for policy measure for low-skilled workforce 
 
Low-skilled make up an especially vulnerable group since they are confronted with a 
lack of labour demand which cannot be easily addressed through labour cost 
reduction because of tax reforms. Therefore additional policy measures are 
necessary to improve the labour market situation of the low-skilled. To this end the 
OECD (2014c) indicates several policy measures to adapt individuals’ level of 
specialised skills to the changing nature of jobs and the changing demand for skills.  
One of the measures mentioned includes full involvement of employers in designing 
and delivering training. Employers themselves are asking for a more active role in 
designing and delivering training programs to ensure that programs provide skills 
they need in their workforce.  
A stronger network between small and medium enterprises, collaboration between 
public employment services and companies is recommended. In Sweden, for 
example, every higher vocational education and training programme has a steering 
group involving employers that advise on provision and ensure programmes and 
qualifications that are in line with the needs of labour markets. In the USA 
Community colleges can rapidly develop courses demanded by employers, as they 
use industry representatives as trainers. The increase in funding for firms, that see 
the need of upskilling, or re-skilling of their low-skilled employers should be made 
available.  
Other measures proposed for upskilling are related to flexible lifelong learning 
opportunities for individuals. Flexible training systems can build the skills necessary 
to activate and connect unemployed individuals, especially low-skilled individuals, 
to the labour market during the life course at different stages of the employment 
path. For employed individuals, the opportunities to further develop skills are an 
important condition in preventing unemployment and building career progression.  
To decrease the risk of falling in low-skilled employment traps further measures are 
proposed. They include helping employers to upgrade their management practices 
and introduce practices that enable skill improvement (like shifting employees into 
different jobs and positions within the company in order to facilitate the learning of 
news skills, employee participation in discussion on business strategies, knowledge 
transfer and several others). Policy makers should also provide guidance, and 
incentives in order to increase the collaboration and networking across firms, 
universities and colleges to help them share knowledge, new technologies and 
innovation. In addition, the public sector should give an example and should also 
implement human resource management, and incentivise the collaboration between 
different stakeholders on the labour market. 
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2.3.2. Youth  
The unemployment rates of young people have reached alarmingly high rates in some 
European countries. The scale of the problem is exemplified by Eurostat statistics 
which show that in August 2013 more than half of young workforce in Greece 
(57.9 %) and Spain (55.2 %) were unemployed. Only Germany (7.9 %) and Austria 
(8.7 %) had levels below ten per cent. More widely, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO, 2013, p. 3) stated that “since 2009, little progress has been made 
in reducing youth unemployment in the advanced economies”, with both the level and 
duration of unemployment increasingly significantly. There are a number of causes of 
youth unemployment. Apart from poor macroeconomic performance, which affects all 
groups of workers, young people face higher barriers to entry into the labour market 
due to their lack of job-specific experience relative to adult experienced workers. 
Youth are also perceived to be more likely than adult workers to resign voluntarily 
because they are more likely to explore different opportunities before they settle 
(Görlich et al., 2013). 
The youth labour force is further characterised by flexible contracts. Given the 
common practice to offer temporary contracts to young people, the recession hit this 
group particularly hard. Among the first one to lose their jobs, the unemployed youth 
population is also finding it particularly difficult to find a new one (OECD, 2009). This 
effect is again aggravated by lower levels of education. While the unemployment level 
among the youth with tertiary education is 19 %, this level reaches 34 % in the lower 
education group. 
Contrary to the overall labour market, there no is significant difference between the 
unemployment rates of young men and women; this holds both in lower and higher 
education groups. However, in the labour market participation the difference 
reappears. Young female activity rate between the ages of 20 and 24 is 56.8 % while 
this rate among young males is 65.6 %.24 This difference is most pronounced in the 
lower education group, decreases with an increased level of education and completely 
disappears in the tertiary education group. Hence the lack of a gender gap in youth 
unemployment is primarily driven by less educated young women staying away from 
the labour market. 
Therefore, the European Commission clearly states that it is important to measure the 
situation of young people that are out of the labour market as well. The European 
2020 flagship initiative “Youth on the Move” aims at “unleashing all young people’s 
potential” and clearly emphasises the importance of focusing on youth, in general, and 
on young people who are neither in employment or in education or training (NEETs), 
in particular (European Commission, 2010). Figure 4 places the NEET category in the 
general labour market classification. NEETs includes young people aged 15-29 
discouraged from seeking employment and unwilling to take up any kind of training. 
This includes a variety of subgroups that have very different personal experiences, 
characteristics, education levels, and attitudes toward job seeking.  
 
 
                                           
24 Eurostat, 2014. 
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Figure 4: NEETs position within the labour market classification 
 
Source: Styczyńska (2013) 
The NEET rate for the young people aged 15 to 24 has been increasing since 2008 and 
reaches 13 % in 2013 in the EU-28, while their unemployment rate is at 23.5 %. NEET 
rate for people aged 25-29 is even higher and reached the level of 20.9 % in the EU-
28 in 2013.25 Eurofound (2012) studies the NEET and suggests that the main reason 
for not seeking employment is the belief that there is no work available. Other studies 
find that strict employment protection regulations for adults are the main reasons of 
higher unemployment rates among young people (Breen, 2005; Esping-Andersen, 
2000), lower youth employment rates (Bassanini and Duval, 2006), longer job search 
periods (Wolbers, 2007), and lower chances of getting reemployed (Russell and 
O’Connell, 2001); hence, pushing them towards NEET. In addition, the youth labour 
force is characterised by flexible contracts as compared to the type of contracts of the 
rest of the population (Eurostat, 2014). During crises, it is more difficult for an 
employer to dismiss a permanent worker than the temporary employee on a zero-
hours contract.26 Therefore, young people are the first to lose employment in the case 
of the reduction of short-term adjustments (OECD, 2009). 
Consequently, young people have a much weaker labour force attachment with an 
employment rate of only 43 % of the employment rate of the adult population. Their 
unemployment rate is constantly around 2.4 times higher than the unemployment rate 
of their older counterparts.  
While some young people withdrawing from the labour market choose to stay in the 
education system, many young people end up in inactivity because of discouragement 
and marginalisation of the labour market. This position of the youth in the labour 
                                           
25 See Eurostat (2014) for the latest data on the NEET rate. 
26 The term zero-hours contract is not legally defined, but usually refers to very flexible 
contracts, where the employer has the option to offer any number of hours between zero and 
full time, but has no obligation to offer any. At the same time the employee does have no 
obligation to accept any work hours. See also the website of ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service) for a more thorough discussion. 
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market can result in multiple disadvantages such as the lack of qualifications, health 
problems, poverty and other type of social exclusions. For example, Bell and 
Blanchflower (2010) estimate that a 6-month unemployment spell of young workers 
aged 22 results in an 8 % decrease in wage preference. At the age of 30, the wage is 
expected to be lower by 2-3 percentage points than it would have been otherwise. 
Moreover, some young people who are NEET for a long period of time are trapped into 
a vicious cycle hard to escape, and, as a result, they quit the labour market entirely 
(Quintini and Manfredi, 2009). 
2.3.3. Elderly 
The labour market situation of the elderly has been steadily improving since 2002. 
Both the employment rate of the elderly and their activity rate have been increasing 
steadily. At the same time the unemployment rate of the elderly was significantly 
lower than the unemployment rate of their younger counterparts during the whole 
period. It fluctuated around the level of 65-70 % of the unemployment rate of their 
younger counterparts. Despite the fact that the situation of the elderly is improving, 
several issues are masked by these data. 
First of all, it is important to note that the positive change in the employment rate of 
the elderly was supported by enormous policy efforts, numerous initiatives and 
monetary subsidies, which have been undertaken in order to encourage and improve 
the labour market activity and employability of the elderly.  
We should also note that the ratio of activity rate of the elderly has been increasing, 
but to a very limited extent (by 1.5 percentage points during last 10 years). The 
elderly still do prefer to leave the labour market when they have the possibility and to 
stop participating in the workforce (Styczyńska, 2013). 
Further, it is noteworthy that the elderly are very strongly protected by their 
permanent contracts and labour code and they cannot be dismissed instantly. 
Nevertheless, once they are dismissed, their probability of finding employment 
decreases significantly. Therefore, their long-term unemployment rate as a percentage 
of total unemployment remains substantially higher among older workers than any 
other group in the labour market. With an increasing trend after the crisis, the long-
term unemployment rates as a percentage of the total unemployment among the 
elderly reached its highest level in 2013 at 59 % (Eurostat, 2014). The data implies 
that more than half of the unemployed elderly could not find a job for over one year 
from when they became unemployed. There are several reasons behind this fact. First, 
the elderly are perceived as people less productive and unwilling to undertake any 
type of training (Ruzik- Sierdzinska, 2014). Gelderblom et al. (2011) also find that 
after the age of 55 workers’ own human capital investment declines sharply.  
Additionally, the elderly are perceived as people with inadequate IT and ICT skills 
(Arias et al., 2014). In addition to the perceptions of older workers, the high long-
term unemployment level is also a result of job immobility. A study in Netherlands 
finds that starting with the age of 45, the level of job mobility declines sharply, and by 
the age of 55, it drops even to a level that is less than 1 % (INSPIRES, 2014). In line 
with expectation, the unemployment rate among the elderly with the lowest level of 
education is substantially higher than in the rest of the better-educated population 
(Eurostat, 2014).  
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Looking at within-group differences reveals that the activity rate of the female elderly 
aged 50-64 is 12 percentage points lower than that of male elderly (Eurostat, 2014). 
Still, in several European countries, gender stereotyping continues to be an issue 
despite the majority of people accepting gender equality in the labour market (ISTAT, 
2011). Older women tend to be the main providers of care for their family members, 
namely grandchildren and the elderly.  
2.3.4. Women 
The ratio of the employment rate for women has been increasing from 77 % of the 
employment rate of men in 2002 to 87 % in 2013. This is a result of a faster increase 
in the employment rate of women than men. In addition, during the crisis, women’s 
employment was affected to a lesser extent than men’s. Moreover, women managed 
to recover much quicker after the crisis while men are still struggling with decreasing 
employment rates. Similar to the improvement in the employment ratio, the ratio for 
the unemployment rate has also improved. While in 2002, the unemployment rate of 
women was 1.2 times higher than that of men, it is at a comparable level since 2009. 
In addition, a constant increase in the activity rate of women is observed. In 2013, the 
activity rate of women was at 85 % of the activity rate of men.  
Nevertheless, the cultural expectation of women remains one of the biggest 
challenges. In many European countries, women are expected to take care of the 
children and the elderly as well as doing the housework. These views on the traditional 
role of women appear to be still present among young people (Vella, 1994; Guiso 
et.al, 2003; Algan and Cahuc, 2004)27. As a result, women experience more difficulties 
in reconciling their career with their non-market household activities. When they are 
employed, they tend to spend less time in the workplace as compared to their male 
counterparts, since they are more likely to work part-time (Bardasi and Gornick, 
2000; Jacobs and Gornick, 2002). Consequently, their salary and pensions are lower 
than that of men. 
Furthermore, for women having young child(ren) has a negative impact on finding 
employment, their employment duration, and their employability (see e.g. Wolff, 
1990; Phipps, 1990; Knudsen and Peters, 1994; Gornick et al. 1996; Pettit and Hook, 
2002). The opposite holds for men in that fatherhood increases the labour force 
participation of men (Gornick, 1999). Working mothers report a higher level of stress 
in their lives than other workers. To overcome this, jobs may allow workers to work 
flexible hours to allow them to manage family responsibilities during normal work 
hours. The longer women stay outside the labour market as a result of child or elderly 
care duties, the harder it is for them to become reemployed again, which further 
deteriorates the gender gap in the labour market and creates serious consequences in 
women’s lives. 
The other factor shaping the labour market position of women is the level of 
education. While the employment rate is only 36.5 % among women with primary 
education, this level increases to 78 % among the women with tertiary education. 
Similarly, in line with the well-established view on the effect of education, 
unemployment rates are much lower in the tertiary education group than in the 
                                           
27 Thornton et al. (1983) also find an profound impact of fundamental religious beliefs on the 
role of women in the society.  
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primary education group, at 6.9 % and 18.7 % respectively (Eurostat, 2014). 
Women’s employment rate and working hours increase with their educational level; 
this suggests that earnings capacity affects the labour market behaviour of women 
(Phipps, 1990; Knudsen and Peters, 1994; Gornick et al. 1996; Pettit and Hook, 
2002). This relationship is observed in the available data for the female labour force in 
the EU. 
Additionally, due to changes in family structures, the number of single mothers has 
increased over the last 50 years. The labour force participation rates of mothers with 
partners are significantly higher when compared to lone mothers. With some 
exceptions (i.e. Luxembourg and the Netherlands), younger single mothers are less 
likely to fully participate in the labour market (RAND Europe, 2014). In addition, single 
mothers working part-time are more likely to be in low-skilled jobs. 
2.3.5. Migrants 
Eurostat defines a migrant as a person [who] establishes his or her usual residence in 
the territory of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 
twelve months, having previously been usually resident in another Member State or a 
third country (Poulain, 2008). Here, a distinction between migrant groups is necessary 
since the groups are too heterogeneous in terms of their labour market 
characteristics. The first group are European migrants who migrate between Member 
States while the second group are non-European or third country migrants who 
migrate to the EU from a non-Member State. 
The employment patterns of migrants show a high degree of cyclical sensitivity. Since 
2002, the employment rate of migrants (both European and non-European migrants) 
had been increasing. However, the financial and economic crisis particularly affected 
the non-EU migrants. Their employment rate decreased by over 4 percentage points 
right after the crisis in 2009 and in contrast to EU migrants and natives has not yet 
fully recovered after the crisis. This suggests that in times of economic difficulties, 
non-EU migrants are the ones who lose their jobs first and are struggle to get back 
into employment. 
This is even more visible in the unemployment rates, which remain substantially 
higher for the migrants in comparison to the natives. However, this still hides the real 
picture of the labour market problems that third country migrants experience. A 
recent study presenting multi-level analysis of migrant unemployment rates finds that 
migrants coming from Islamic countries have higher rates of unemployment than 
those who originate from Western Europe (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010).  
Kogan (2007) suggests that labour market regulations which are aimed at 
employment protection impose high firing costs on the employer. This can result in 
employers being reluctant to hire migrants as they are considered riskier and making 
a mistake in the hiring process is costly. This tendency results in discrimination, 
therefore resulting in hiring natives over migrants. In addition, the motivation to avoid 
the costs of job search causes migrants to end up in poor jobs. In the long run, this 
aversion might trap them in low status, badly paid, and unpleasant jobs (Reyneri and 
Fullin, 2011). According to a study by the European Commission (2011) based on 
2009 data, while the over-qualification rate for the total population is 21 %, the rate is 
33 % for foreign-born persons. The over-qualification rate was even higher among 
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people born outside the EU, at 36 % (European Commission, 2011). This difference 
holds for both women and men, but women suffer at a higher level than men, as they 
do almost in every other position.  
Gender studies confirm the disadvantaged situation of female third country migrants 
as well. A recent study focusing on migrant women in the EU (RAND Europe, 2008) 
finds that non-EU migrant women are much more intensely concentrated in a few low-
skilled jobs than that the EU-born group. The study also finds that having a child 
under five years old decreases the labour force participation of migrant women further 
than it does for native women. Considering the fact that third-country migrant women 
are much more likely to have younger children compared to native-born women, this 
finding is particularly important in explaining the differences in the labour force 
participation of women. The study also suggests that how the recently arrived migrant 
woman determines the labour market achievements of migrant women. The 
differences between the labour market achievements of women in old and new 
migrant-receiving countries are mostly a result of the fact that the migrant women in 
the new migrant-receiving countries are, on average, younger. The study on migrant 
women also finds that in the new migrant-receiving countries, when differences in 
education, marital, and family status are controlled for, the results show no significant 
difference between native-born and migrant women.28 On the other hand, the same 
methodology results in only minor changes in the labour-force participation of migrant 
women in the old migrant-receiving and Nordic countries. Therefore, this might imply 
a potential negative discrimination towards non-EU migrants. 
Even though the data and literature show that the integration of migrants is not well 
achieved yet, and there still are labour market penalties for migrants, when education 
is introduced to the estimation models, the penalty in terms of the probability of 
entering the white-collar class increases instead of decreasing, unlike the situation in 
the past (Reyneri and Fullin, 2011). Although, in the EU-28, there is no substantial 
difference between the tertiary education achievement rate of the total population and 
foreign-born persons (28 % and 32 %, respectively), the significant difference is 
mostly pronounced in the lower level of education. There is a 10 % difference between 
the share of foreign-born people with low education attainment and that of total 
population. This is the result of the migration of a large number of people from outside 
the EU with a low level of education. While the share of population with primary or 
less education is lower in the total population and not significantly different for the EU-
born migrants, this share is significantly higher for third country migrants (27 %, 
28 %, and 40 %, respectively, Eurostat, 2014). 
Considering the future path of the European labour market, where unemployment 
among the low-skilled is likely increase while there will be excess demand for skilled 
workers (Constant and Zimmermann, 2005), as a result of the large numbers of non-
EU born persons having the lowest level of education, their level of vulnerability will 
become much more noticeable.  
                                           
28 RAND Europe (2008) defines Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Austria, as the old migrant receiving countries, while Spain, 
Greece and Portugal are defined as the new migrant receiving countries. 
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2.4. Summary 
The aim of this section was to gain an understanding whether the observed 
employment problems in Europe are mainly due to a labour demand or a labour 
supply problem. Starting with the observation that unemployment is more originating 
from the labour demand side and non-employment is more a labour supply side issue, 
cyclical unemployment can be attributed to the labour demand side, albeit only 
indirectly through the lack of aggregate demand which results in a lack of labour 
demand. It is difficult to draw a clear line between cyclical and structural 
unemployment since unwinding of previously unsustainable situations, like necessary 
fiscal consolidation because of excessive public debt, can result in longer term lack of 
aggregate demand.  
A key part of structural unemployment is due to mismatches between labour demand 
and labour supply and therefore inherently difficult to attribute to one of the two 
labour market sides. Looking at recent trends one can make progress in attributing 
the employment problems to the labour supply side where socio-economic changes 
like population ageing, falling fertility levels, increasing female labour force 
participation and increasing migration change the composition of the workforce. At the 
same time a probably even larger share of short to medium term unemployment can 
be attributed to broad changes in labour demand as a result of occupational and 
sectoral changes and structural changes in the workplace. These shifts increase the 
labour demand for certain skills while others become obsolete. 
Changes both in labour demand and labour supply leave some socio-economic groups 
at a vulnerable position in the labour market. First and foremost the low-skilled part 
of the population is facing a labour demand problem as a result of the sectoral shifts 
which substantially reduced the need for low-skilled workforce. Additionally the low-
skilled are among those most affected by rigidities which prevent wages to adjust 
downwards. For example, binding minimum wages can result in a lack of labour 
demand for low-productivity low-skilled workforce. Given the relatively low wages of 
low-skilled people adverse incentives of the tax and transfer system can also result in 
a labour supply problem further adding to the employment problem.  
Another vulnerable group in the labour market are the young people. There are 
several reasons behind this phenomenon. Young people are usually perceived as 
unstable employees who would leave an employer in order to gain more experience 
before they settle into a permanent role. In addition, they usually have temporary, 
flexible contracts that do not secure their employment. Due to their lack of 
experience, they are also perceived as less productive than the rest of the workforce. 
Consequently, youth unemployment can be largely attributed to a labour demand 
problem. Migrants, in particular those from non-European countries, face a similar 
situation in the labour market. Often their previous work experience and foreign 
education is not adequately valued by employers and therefore they are facing a 
labour demand problem. Furthermore, while the increase in migration can help to 
mitigate geographical mismatches, it also contributes to a relative fast change in 
labour supply. As a result there can be an oversupply of specific types of workers. 
While the situation of the elderly has been steadily improving during the last decade, 
they are still facing relevant employment problems. Due to population ageing the 
labour supply of elderly people is increasing. At the same time the labour demand is 
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not keeping up, because the elderly are often perceived as people of lower 
productivity, who are not keen on investing in themselves, and who are unable to 
acquire new skills and adapt to rapid changes in the market. Currently, permanent 
contracts, which protect them from instant loss of employment, help them to maintain 
their employment level. However, once they lose their employment, it is difficult for 
them to become employed again, often due to a shrinking labour demand for their 
specific skills.  
The role of women in the labour market has undergone a profound change, not least 
due to decades of initiatives and debates on this issue. The gender employment gap 
decreased significantly during the last decade and the labour market participation of 
women increased. Despite the achievements there relevant disparities between the 
labour market attachment of women and men remain. To a large extent these 
differences are related to labour supply issues since women are still largely 
responsible for child care, care of elderly relatives and other non-market household 
activities. As a result the reconciliation between work and household activities often 
results in weaker labour market attachment for women. 
In terms of indicators this section suggests that the first step should be to break down 
the employment problems into its category. Separately looking at unemployment and 
non-employment will give a first impression as to on which side of the labour market 
the problems are located. Furthermore distinguishing between structural and cyclical 
aspects of unemployment will give an indication on the part of unemployment which 
can be traced back to a lack of aggregate demand and is therefore not the result of a 
labour supply problem. The discussion of the vulnerable groups further highlights that 
the overall employment situation can hide labour market problems of specific groups.  
The above discussed socio-economic trends can result in a mismatch between labour 
supply and labour demand. This highlights to the necessity of indicators looking into 
changes in labour supply as well as labour demand and how these coincide. Such 
indicators can help to allocate the source of employment problems to either side of the 
labour market. At the same time, it is noteworthy that these indicators are also 
highlighting more fundamental structural problems in the labour market, which are not 
the result of labour taxation. Therefore tax reforms may not be the best way to 
address these issues. 
The broad characterisation of employment problems also revealed that rigidities in the 
labour market and incentive problems because of the tax and transfer system are key 
determinants of the labour market outcomes. These will be picked up in Section 4 to 
further refine the need for appropriate indicators. 
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3. Review of the tax incidence on labour 
In this section of the report, we provide an overview of what is known about the 
short- and long- run economic incidence of labour taxation. In doing this we first 
examine the literature that directly assesses the incidence of taxation, utilisation both 
cross-country and within-country variation in labour taxation. In a second step, we 
make use of the much broader economic literature that examines labour demand, and 
particularly labour supply: as highlighted in Fullerton and Metcalf (2002), in the 
classical model of the labour market, incidence is determined by the relative 
responsiveness of labour demand and labour supply. Finally, we move beyond 
reduced-form and partial-equilibrium models to consider incidence in a general 
equilibrium framework.  
We begin, however, with a discussion of the conceptual and empirical difficulties that 
arise in identifying the incidence of labour taxation. 
3.1. How can one identify the incidence of a tax?  
The extent to which workers or employers bear the burden of labour taxation is 
intimately linked to the relative degree of responsiveness of each to the financial 
(dis)incentives created by the tax: that is, to the relative elasticities of labour supply 
and labour demand.29 This is most clearly seen in a simple representation of a classical 
perfectly competitive labour market. 
Figure 5 shows the situation where labour supply is somewhat elastic, and: in panel 
(A) when labour demand is completely elastic; and in panel (B) when labour demand 
is incompletely elastic. The labour supply curve is shown in orange, and the labour 
demand curve shown in blue. 
Initially, no taxes are levied. Market equilibrium is at the point at which labour 
demand and labour supply are equal: let’s call the resulting level of employment “E*”, 
and the resulting wage rate “w*”. Now let’s introduce a tax, in this case, formally 
levied on workers, so, that for a given gross wage paid by employers, workers receive 
a lower net wage. But who bears the economic burden of this tax? In the case of 
completely elastic labour demand, panel (A) shows that the incidence is fully on the 
worker: the gross wage remains unchanged, and the worker bears the full burden of 
the tax in the form of a lower net wage. However, in the case of incompletely elastic 
labour demand, panel (B) shows that the incidence of the tax is split between the 
worker and the employer. Intuitively, as the workers reduce the amount they are 
willing to work because of the lower net wage they receive when the tax is in place, 
the employers are willing to pay a higher gross wage to help maintain supply of (the 
now more scarce) labour. Thus the burden of taxation is split between employers who 
                                           
29 An elasticity is a measure of the degree of responsiveness. In this context, for instance, an 
elasticity of labour supply of 1 means that the amount of labour supplied increases by 1 % when 
the net wage increases by 1 % (or in the case of labour demand falls by 1 % when the cost to 
the employer increases by 1 %). If labour supply or demand is completely unresponsive to 
changes in wages, this report terms it “completely inelastic”. If labour supply or demand 
responds infinitely to a small change in wages, we describe it as “completely elastic". See also 
Section 3.3 for a distinction of the different types of elasticities. 
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pay somewhat higher gross wages than in the absence of the tax, and workers, who 
none-the-less still receive a lower net wage than in the absence of the tax. 
Figure 5: The relationship between behavioural response to taxation and 
tax incidence 
 
Source: Own illustration 
This illustrates a more general pattern. Holding the elasticity of labour supply fixed, 
the more elastic is labour demand, the larger the share of the burden of tax that is 
borne by the worker, and vice versa. Intuitively, as employers become more 
responsive to the price of labour, they are less willing to bid up wages when a tax is 
imposed, and therefore more of the burden falls on workers. And holding the elasticity 
of labour demand fixed, the more elastic labour supply is, the lower the share of the 
burden of tax that is borne by the worker. Intuitively, as workers become more 
responsive to the price of labour, taxes reduce their labour supply more, and therefore 
employers have to bid up wages more to keep them working; therefore more or the 
burden falls on employers, and less on workers. As already mentioned, the incidence 
of tax is therefore a function of the relative responsiveness of labour demand and 
labour supply. 
Figure 6 shows another feature of classical models of the labour market: the side of 
the market on which a tax is legally (or statutorily) levied does not affect its economic 
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incidence – which is a function of labour supply and demand elasticities. The Figure 
shows two scenarios. First, as in Figure 5, the case when the tax is legally levied on 
the employee so that the net wage they receive (the dashed blue line) is lower than 
the gross wage paid by the employer (the solid blue line). Second, is the case when 
the tax is legally levied on the employer, so that the cost of employing the worker (the 
dashed orange line) exceeds the gross (and net) wage the employee receives (the 
solid orange line). In both cases the tax is of the same magnitude; just its legal 
incidence differs. Figure 6 shows that the economic incidence is the same though – the 
cost to the employer, and the net wage received by the employee adjust in exactly the 
same way, irrespective of which side of the market the tax is legally levied. This is the 
“invariance of incidence” proposition (IIP). 
Figure 6: The invariance of incidence proposition (IIP) 
 
Source: Own illustration 
Of course, even in this simple model, it may take time for wages to adjust. In the 
short run then, the legal incidence of a tax may matter for its economic incidence. And 
in different models of the labour market – for instance, bargaining models where 
workers and employers bargain over the gross wage –, perhaps formal incidence 
matters in the long as well as short run. Testing whether the IIP holds is therefore key 
to understanding the incidence of taxation, and the effects of employer versus 
employee taxes on the labour market and economy more generally. It is perhaps 
surprising therefore, that only a relatively small number of papers actually test this 
proposition. However, rather than a lack of interest, this may reflect the fact that 
changes in employer and employee social security contributions (SSCs) often occur in 
conjunction, rather than separately, which presents problems for econometric 
identification.  
More generally, identifying the incidence of taxes from observable data is problematic. 
Whilst the relationship between behavioural responses to taxation and the incidence of 
taxation is relatively simple in theory, separately identifying behavioural effects from 
the incidence of taxation is often more difficult in practise.  
If one observed both gross earnings, and the amount of labour utilised, one could 
calculate the wage rate paid. In this case, one could calculate everything that one 
needs to separately identify labour supply, labour demand, and tax incidence: 
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 The overall change in labour utilised would reflect the combined absolute effect of 
the responsiveness of labour supply and labour demand; 
 The change in the wage rate would reflect the incidence of the tax, which reflects 
the relative responsiveness of labour supply and demand; 
 This could then be used to work out how much of the overall responsiveness of 
labour utilised reflects labour supply and labour demand responsiveness. 
However, in practise, one does not observe the amount of labour utilised, nor the true 
underlying wage rate. Instead, one typically observes hours of work – which omits 
important margins on which people can respond to taxation, such as the effort exerted 
per hour of work. To see the problems this can cause, again consider a tax increase. 
Individuals respond by reducing how much labour they supply, not by working fewer 
hours, but by exerting less effort per person. Because workers are putting in less 
effort, all else equal, employers would be willing to pay them less per hour. But if 
labour demand is incompletely elastic, employers will bid up the underlying wage per 
unit of effort in order to encourage more labour effort to be supplied. This would tend 
to push wages per hour back up. The change in the hourly wage paid therefore 
reflects a mix of changes in effort, and the partial incidence of the tax on employers. 
One therefore cannot separately identify incidence from the underlying behavioural 
effects that drive incidence.  
This problem plagues the literature that examines tax incidence and the larger 
literature examining behavioural responses to taxation. Much of the classical labour 
supply literature, for instance, estimates how responsive hours of work or employment 
are to the incentives created by the tax and benefit system. But in doing this it omits 
responses on other margins, including effort (Meghir and Phillips, 2010). The literature 
examining the elasticity of income that developed following the work of Feldstein 
(1995, 1999), looks at how responsive taxable or total income is to changes in tax 
systems, precisely to account for responses by variables other than hours – effort, 
compensation form, tax evasion etc..30 However, implicitly the analysis is built on the 
foundation of perfectly elastic labour demand where incidence of a tax is fully on 
workers. If taxes are not fully borne by workers, change in income may not only 
capture broader behavioural responses, but also be “contaminated” by changes in 
underlying wage rates due to the sharing of the burden of taxation between workers 
and employers.  
This means that certain forms of behavioural responses to taxes need to be ruled out 
by assumption to make progress.  
One option is to rule out non-hours responses to taxation. This is the implicit 
assumption utilised in studies of incidence that use measures of hourly pay, or unit 
labour costs, to examine the incidence of taxation. This includes influential papers in 
both the macro- and micro- incidence literatures (see below). 
A second option is based on the observation that behavioural response to taxation can 
be split into substitution effects (related to the marginal tax rate), and income effects 
(related to the average tax rate). If one defines the incidence of a tax based on the 
overall proportion of a tax that is borne by workers vis-à-vis employers, it is also 
                                           
30 See also section 3.3.5 for a short review of the literature using tax return data to learn about 
the elasticity of taxable income. 
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related to the average tax rate. If one is therefore willing to rule out income effects, 
one can therefore interpret the relationship between average tax rates and individual 
total or taxable earnings as providing information on the incidence of the tax. This 
approach has been used in a single paper in the micro- literature (Lehmann et al., 
2013). 
More novel identification techniques also exist – exploiting differences between intra-
firm and inter-firm differences in tax rates, for instance, as in Bingley and Lanot 
(2002). However, as their approach relies on variation in the tax rate at the local level 
and very detailed information it may only be applicable to a few countries. 
3.2. Direct estimates of the incidence of labour taxation 
There are two broad strands in the literature that attempts to directly estimate the 
incidence of labour taxation. The first makes use of the non-linear structure of tax and 
social security contributions – arising from tax-free allowances, contributions ceilings, 
and multiple rates –, or differences in tax and social security contribution schedules 
for different individuals or employers, to investigate the incidence of labour taxation 
using within-country variation. Analyses using this micro-econometric approach 
have found a range of results – with no real consensus as to whether employees or 
employers bear the burden; or whether the formal legal incidence of a tax (i.e. 
whether the employer or employee formally pay the tax) matters for its economic 
incidence. 
The macro-econometric literature makes use of cross-country and/or time-series 
variation in labour taxation and aggregate measures of the compensation of 
employees (such as labour income shares) to uncover the incidence of labour 
taxation.31 In contrast to the mixed findings from the micro-econometric literature, the 
macro-econometric approach has often been interpreted as finding that the burden of 
labour taxation is largely borne by workers. In particular, analysis in Symons and 
Robertson (1990) is often cited as evidence that the burden of employers’ social 
security contributions is largely shifted on to workers. However, as we discuss below, 
there are a number of problems with this analysis, and later macro-econometric 
studies have actually found more mixed results. 
3.2.1. Meta-analysis of results 
Before discussing these literatures in more detail, we summarise the findings of a 
recent meta-analysis of papers estimating the incidence of labour taxation.  
                                           
31 Calling the cross-country time-series literature macro-econometric is actually somewhat of a 
misnomer: rather than using the tools of macro-econometrics, such as time series 
econometrics, most empirical studies actually utilise panel models, usually more associated with 
micro-econometrics. But because the literature makes use of aggregate (“macro”) employment, 
wage, and tax data, it seems more natural to think of it as macro-economic, rather than micro-
economic. The use of panel models in many of these studies could be problematic though – it is 
a method designed for analyses where the number of observations (n, for instance, the number 
of countries) is relatively high, and the number of periods of observation (t, for instance, the 
number of years) is relatively low (see e.g. Greene, 2003, p. 283.). In contrast, in some 
studies, the number of countries included is relatively small compared to the number of years of 
data available. This means results may not be as robust as we would like, since the standard 
fixed effects approach uses only the variation over time. 
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Melguizo and González-Páramo (2013) include results from 52 empirical studies from 
both the micro- and macro- literature. In a first stage, they provide some descriptive 
statistics of the results of these papers. The mean proportion of the burden of labour 
taxation borne by employees in the included studies is 66 %.32 However the standard 
deviation is very high (51 %), reflecting the fact that different studies find everything 
from labour taxes being more than fully borne by employees, through to them being 
more than fully borne by employers. In other words, there is little consensus in the 
literature.  
In the meta-analysis itself they estimate that 66 % of the burden of labour taxation is 
borne by employees in the form of lower wages; the standard error of this estimate is 
actually quite low (4 %). This reflects the large sample sizes of many of the underlying 
studies. When including controls for the institutional features of the countries included 
in a study, or the methodology of a study, they find that: 
 Workers bear less of the burden of tax in the short run (43 %) than in the long run 
(74 %).33 
 Workers bear a greater share of the burden of taxation (79-88 %) in “Nordic 
economies” (with a highly centralised bargaining), than in “Continental-
Mediterranean economies”, with an intermediate degree of centralisation, (59-
70 %). In contrast, there is little difference in incidence between “Continental-
Mediterranean economies” and “Anglo-Saxon economies” (which have a low degree 
of centralisation). 
 Different taxes have different effects on net real wages. In studies looking at income 
tax, payroll tax and social security contributions only, employees are found to bear 
59 % of the burden of taxes. But in studies that look at the overall fiscal or salary 
wedge (including indirect taxes, or in the latter instance, all factors that contribute 
to wedge between producer and consumer purchasing power), employees are found 
to bear 79 % of the total burden. It is not clear whether these differences are a 
short- or long-run phenomenon.  
 The degree of linkage between social security contributions and benefits does not 
have a statistically significant effect on the proportion of labour taxation borne by 
employees. 
 Unfortunately, they do not test for whether the invariance of incidence proposition 
(IIP) holds – perhaps reflecting the fact that very few papers have explicitly tested 
this, as our literature review will show. 
                                           
32 As discussed above, while the remaining share of taxes is naturally thought of as being borne 
by employers, of course this is true only in the first instance: ultimately the burden of the taxes 
may be shifted to consumers or suppliers via prices, or shareholders via dividends. 
33 This is interpreted as evidence of “nominal rigidities”, but it is not clear that this 
interpretation is correct, as “nominal rigidities” lead to economic incidence being affected by 
statutory incidence. A lower share being borne by workers in the short run does not necessarily 
mean that incidence is closer to statutory incidence – this is only the case where incidence is 
being identified primarily variation in employer social contributions (where statutory incidence is 
on the employer). If, instead, identification comes primarily from variation in taxes statutorily 
incident on the employee (such as employee contributions, or income tax), the fact that 
incidence is less on the worker in the short run, would actually count against “nominal rigidities” 
being important in the short run. 
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In this report, we utilise a narrative approach to reviewing the literature. While this 
may seem less objective and rigorous than a meta-analysis approach it does have 
some benefits. It allows a more nuanced evaluation of the quality of particular 
analyses, and can help avoid the risk of drawing too strong conclusions from a 
literature that actually finds a wide range of results. Our reading of the literature 
suggests that some of the results suggested by Melguizo and González-Páramo (2013) 
do seem relatively robust – in particular, a number of papers find that the degree of 
centralisation of wage bargaining, and/or of the degree of labour market coordination, 
matters for the incidence of labour taxation.34 And there is some evidence that 
nominal wage rigidities mean that statutory incidence may matter more in the short 
term than in the longer term, as one might expect (it takes time to re-negotiate 
wages). On the other hand, we would caution against placing too much emphasis on 
the central estimate that employees bear two-thirds of the burden of labour taxation. 
The wide range of estimates obtained in different studies, in different countries, and 
using different methodologies, mean that we believe that no strong conclusions on the 
average proportion borne by workers can be drawn from the available evidence. And, 
from a policy point of view, it is important to distinguish between shorter- and longer- 
run effects, between the effects of different forms of taxation, and between different 
countries and institutional contexts, meaning that such an average measure is of only 
limited practical use. 
3.2.2. Macro-studies 
The OECD (1990) study  
The seminal macro analysis was undertaken in Symons and Robertson (1990).35 Two 
approaches were used: The first, and most widely known, utilised data from 16 OECD 
countries in 1974 and 1986. Incidence of employer and employee social security 
contributions was estimated by looking at the link between changes in real average 
gross wages and average indirect tax, income tax, and employee and employer social 
security contribution rates (measured as aggregate revenues divided by GDP) between 
1974 and 1986. In particular, the following equation was estimated: 
 
dln(w) = β0 + β1dtr + β2dte + β3dtc + β4dln (
y
e
) + dε 𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑤) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑡𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑡𝑐 +
𝛽4𝑑𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦
𝑒
) + 𝑑𝜀dln(w) = β0 + β1dtr + β2dte + β3dtc + β4dln (
y
e
) + dε                    (1) 
where 𝑤 is the gross wage; 𝑡𝑟 is the employer’s SSC rate, 𝑡𝑒 is the sum of the 
employee’s SSC rate and personal income tax rate; 𝑡𝑐 is the indirect tax rate; 
𝑦
𝑒
 is 
average labour productivity, calculated as output divided by employment; and 𝜀 is the 
error term. In such a framework, a coefficient of 0 is interpreted as indicating that full 
incidence of employer’s SSCs is on employers, and full incidence of other taxes is on 
employees (because the gross wage paid to employees in unaffected by taxes 
formally levied on employers or employees). A coefficient of -1 on 𝑑𝑡𝑟 would instead 
                                           
34 Section 4 of this report provides further discussion on how labour market institutions affect 
the incidence and behavioural effects of taxes. In this section, we focus largely on empirical 
results. 
35 The study formed chapter 6 of the economic outlook and is therefore also commonly referred 
to as OECD (1990). We also use OECD (1990) for the ease of exposition. 
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indicate full incidence of employer’s SSCs on employees (and a coefficient of +1 on 
𝑑𝑡𝑒 and 𝑑𝑡𝑐 is interpreted as indicating full incidence of these taxes on employers). 
Equation (2) shows the results of this regression: 
 
𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑤) =  −0.05 − 0.91∗∗𝑑𝑡𝑟 + 0.33𝑑𝑡𝑒 + 0.68𝑑𝑡𝑐 + 0.97
∗∗𝑑𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦
𝑒
)                (2) 
where ** indicates statistical significance. The results suggest that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the rate of employer social security contribution rate reduces the rate 
of growth of real wages by 0.9 %, on average. This is statistically significantly 
different from 0 %, but not from 1 %: the result has therefore been interpreted as 
indicating that employer social security contributions are fully incident on employees. 
In contrast, the coefficients on employee contributions and income tax, and on indirect 
taxes, are not statistically significantly different from 0, which is again interpreted as 
indicating full incidence on employees. An f-test that tests whether the incidence of 
each tax is the same (i.e. on employees) cannot be rejected – that is, the IIP cannot 
be rejected.36 But nor are the coefficients for employee and indirect taxes statistically 
significant from +1 meaning that we cannot reject that employers ultimately bear the 
full incidence of these, – and indeed, for indirect taxes, the coefficient is closer to 1 
than to 0, and the central estimate is that employers bear two thirds of the burden. 
This indicates the weak statistical power of this particular analysis, based as it is on 
only 16 pair-wise observations. 
Given that it is based on 12-year difference, some have argued that these results are 
likely to pick up the longer-run incidence of tax changes.37 This is not necessarily the 
case though, and depends upon the exact pattern of tax changes that took place.38 A 
second approach based on individual time series for each of the 16 countries, and 
covering the period from 1955 to 1986, attempts to estimate long-run effects more 
directly by estimating the following auto-regressive equation: 
 
ln (𝑅𝑃𝑊)t =  𝛽1ln (𝑅𝑃𝑊)t−1 + 𝛽2(𝑙𝑛𝑘 − 𝑙𝑛𝑙) + 𝛽3𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑋 + 𝑑𝜀                (3) 
where 𝑅𝑃𝑊 is the real product wage, defined as the gross wage plus employer social 
security contributions, all deflated by the producer price index; 𝑘 is the capital stock; 𝑙 
is the labour force; 𝑋 is a dummy for the period 1970 to 1976 to account for a “wage 
explosion” during that period; and 𝑇𝑇 is the total tax wedge calculated as: 
 
𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑟 + 𝑡𝑒 + 𝑡𝑐 + 𝑡𝑚                                                      (4) 
                                           
36 The F-test performed tests whether 𝛽1 = (𝛽2 − 1) = (𝛽3 − 1). 
37 Intuitively, this argument relies on the fact that the measured tax changes that occurred 
between 1974 and 1986 are more likely to have taken place at some point prior to 1985, say, 
than in 1985. Thus taking differences over longer periods (e.g. a 12 year period) is more likely 
to pick up longer term effects that taking differences over shorter periods (e.g. a 1 year period). 
38 Tax changes could have taken place between 1985 and 1986, for instance; or, perhaps, tax 
changes later in the period reversed tax changes earlier in the period, so that the 12-year 
difference picks up the shorter-term impact of a later tax cut, say, and the longer term impact 
of an earlier tax rise. 
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where the additional term 𝑡𝑚 reflects the difference between the pre-tax price of 
consumption goods compared to produced output (which OECD (1990) terms an 
“import tax”, as one reason a difference in these two price indices is difference 
between the price of produced goods and consumed imports). Equation (5) shows the 
result of averaging the coefficients from regression in each of the 16 countries: 
 
ln(𝑅𝑃𝑊)t =  0.8 ln(𝑅𝑃𝑊)t−1 + 0.15(𝑙𝑛𝑘 − 𝑙𝑛𝑙) + 0.08𝑇𝑇 + 0.03𝑋 + dε         (5) 
                             (8.4)                          (1.7)                          (0.5)          (2.1)   
where average t-statistics are in parentheses. Because coefficients from 16 individual 
regressions have been averaged to obtain these results, under the assumption of 
independence, an average t-statistic of 0.5 is “on the borderline of significance”, which 
means that the results may indicate that employers bear a small positive fraction of 
the tax burden in the first instance. A further regression is estimated to test for the IIP 
by in addition including the term 𝑡𝑟- te in equation (5). The average coefficient on this 
difference is -0.05, and the average t statistic is 0.1: this is far from significant, 
meaning that the IIP cannot be rejected. But as the OECD (1990) points out “the 
coefficient on 𝑡𝑟- te is not well determined”. Once the feedback effects of ln(𝑅𝑃𝑊)t on 
ln(𝑅𝑃𝑊)t−1 ... in such an auto-regressive framework are taken into account, the 95 % 
confidence of the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in employer SSCs combined 
with a 1 percentage point reduction in employee taxes is a change in the real product 
wage of between -1.6 % and +1.2 %. In other words, while the IIP cannot be 
rejected, neither can the proposition that employer taxes are borne by the employer, 
and employee taxes by the employee (or indeed, the reverse!).  
Lastly, OECD (1990) undertakes a shorter-run analysis: 
 
ln (𝑅𝑃𝑊)t =  𝛽1ln (𝑅𝑃𝑊)t−1 + 𝛽2(𝑙𝑛𝑘 − 𝑙𝑛𝑙) + 𝛽3𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑑𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽5𝑋 + 𝑑𝜀       (6) 
where the change in the tax wedge (𝑑𝑇𝑇) is also included, either with, or instead of 
the level of the tax wedge (𝑇𝑇). This finds a 𝛽4 coefficient of approximately 0.5, 
suggesting that in the short run, around half the burden of taxes are borne by 
employers in the form of a higher real product wage. This coefficient is very highly 
significantly different from both 0 and 1. They also test whether the incidence of 
employer’s SSCs differs from that of employee taxes and indirect taxes. They find that 
 Employers bear a relatively lower share of employee taxes than employer taxes, 
meaning that the IIP can be rejected. However they also reject statutory incidence 
as well, suggesting that even in the short term, some shifting may occur; 
 Employers bear more of the burden of indirect taxes than labour taxes, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that employees and employers pay significant attention to 
inflation (which will be affected by indirect tax changes) when negotiating pay. 
The discussion so far has generated two findings from the OECD (1990) study. First, is 
that the statistical power of its “longer run” analyses is weak. In the analysis making 
use of 12-year differences in gross wages and tax rates, one can reject neither the 
hypothesis that the full incidence of employee taxes and indirect taxes is on 
employees, nor that it is fully incident on employers. In the long-run auto-
regressive model, one can reject neither statutory incidence nor the IIP. Second, in 
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the “shorter run” analysis, where statistical power is stronger, taxes are found to be 
partly incident on employers, and the IIP can be rejected. This latter finding is 
something we will find further support for in other studies. 
The OECD (1990) study has also been subject to a recent critique. In a forthcoming 
review Geibel et al., look at the empirical methodology and data utilised in the study. 
They highlight a number of problems with both. For instance, they criticise the use of 
the following type of approximation ln (1 + 𝑡𝑟) ~𝑡𝑟 when deriving equation (1), pointing 
out that it does not hold particularly well for large values of 𝑡𝑟.
39 They also find 
problems with the tax revenue data utilised by the OECD (1990) – and subsequently 
by a number of other studies –, which differs from measures constructed directly from 
published National Accounts data. Although unable to replicate the OECD (1990)’s 
results using published OECD data, the results that are obtained are shown to be 
highly sensitive to the choice of years and countries used (excluding Sweden, for 
instance). For instance, if 6-year (rather than 12-year) differences are used, the 
coefficient on 𝑑𝑡𝑟 is found to vary between 0.119 and -3.622, depending on which 6-
year pairs are used. 
OECD (1990) – a seminal study which has done much to influence subsequent 
thinking on labour taxation (see for instance, Saez et al. 2012a, and CPB and CAPP, 
2013) – is therefore not a valid basis for concluding that the incidence of labour 
taxation is shared in the short term, but borne fully by employees in the long term. 
We now review other papers in the macro- literature, and find some support for 
differences between short- and long- run incidence, but no firm consensus on whether 
taxes are fully borne by workers in the long run. A summary of the papers and their 
results can be found in Appendix Table 1. In what follows, we draw out the 
implications of the literature, rather than assess each paper on a case-by-case basis. 
Other macro studies 
We have identified seven other studies that directly estimate the incidence of taxes 
using macro cross-country data: Alesina and Perotti (1997); Arpaia and Carone 
(2004); Azemar and Desbordes (2010); Daveri and Tabellini (2000); Nunziata (2005); 
Ooghe et al. (2003); and Tyrvainen (1995). In general, these studies have improved 
upon the methodology used in the OECD (1990) study – for instance, including 
ln (1 + 𝑡𝑟) rather than making use of the aforementioned approximation –, although two 
of the most cited studies use the same problematic OECD revenue statistics to derive 
their measures of taxation (Alesina and Perotti, 1997, Daveri and Tabellini, 2000). 
Measurement error in these tax variables may bias results. 
As Appendix Table 1 shows, the studies find a range of results – with some suggesting 
that labour taxes are borne almost entirely by workers, even in the short run (Arpaia 
and Carone, 2004), whilst others find that a substantial degree of taxes are borne by 
employers, even in the long run (for instance, Azemar and Desbordes, 2010), in some 
contexts. There is also a significant degree of heterogeneity across countries 
(Tyrvainen, 1995), which, as we discuss below, seems to be linked to wage bargaining 
                                           
39 The regression model is derived from the first order condition of a profit maximising firm, 
which includes the term ln (1 + 𝑡𝑟). They also point out the regression model includes average 
labour productivity, whereas the underlying model of profit maximisation is based on marginal 
labour productivity. 
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regimes. This means that no strong conclusions can be drawn about the incidence of 
taxation in general. But what patterns emerge from the literature? 
We first examine whether there are systematic differences between short- and long-
run tax incidence. The dynamic effects of labour taxation are accounted for in most of 
the papers. Tyrvainen (1995) applies a vector auto-regressive model to look at the 
long-term effects of taxation on wages. Arpaia and Carone (2004), Azemar and 
Desbordes (2010), and Nunziata (2005) all include an auto-regressive component: by 
modelling the persistence of wages, one can differentiate between short- and long-
term effects (as in the OECD study). And within the studies applying static panel 
models, perhaps the most cited paper (Alesina and Perotti, 1997), examines whether 
calculating changes in wages and taxes over 1-year or 2-year periods affects results. 
Alesina and Perotti (1997), in fact, find little difference between such estimates: and if 
anything, their results that employers bear part of the burden of labour taxation, and 
the wage bargaining regime is important for tax incidence are stronger (rather than 
weaker), for 2-year as opposed to 1-year differences. In addition, in Arpaia and 
Carone (2004), Nunziata (2005), and Azemar and Desbordes (2010), the high degree 
of persistence of labour costs implies that the long-run effects of taxes on labour costs 
are larger than the short-run effects. Given that each of these studies finds that a part 
of the burden of taxation is borne by employers in the short-run; the implication is 
that employers bear more in the long term.  
However, these results should be treated very cautiously. First, as in OECD (1990), 
the longer-run models have weak statistical power: in Arpaia and Carone (2004), for 
instance, the long-run effects of taxation on labour costs are statistically insignificant, 
meaning that it cannot be rejected that the employee bears the entire burden, 
whereas the (smaller) short-run effects are statistically significant. Second, accounting 
for the persistence of employer costs is not a particularly convincing way of controlling 
for the longer-run effect of taxes: it may be better to include lagged values of taxes, 
or lagged values of changes in taxes. Unfortunately none of the studies examined does 
this. Third, Azemar and Desbordes (2010) suggest that one should account for 
feedback effects of the larger long-term effects of taxes on employer costs (on 
unemployment, say). Doing this they find that the rather than bearing around 90 % of 
the burden of taxation, falls in wages induced by higher unemployment, mean 
employers bear only around 55 % of the burden of taxation in the longer term, close 
to the share borne in the short term. We are less convinced by this argument (it could 
surely apply to short-term effects too), but it does highlight the difficulty in separately 
identifying the incidence of taxes from their behavioural effects, that we raised earlier.  
Thus it seems difficult to conclude whether incidence differs between the long- and 
short- run from the macro- evidence.  
Estimating separately the effects of different components of the tax wedge – such as 
employer SSCs, employee SSCs, income tax, and indirect taxes – allows one to test 
the IIP. Only one study we have found undertakes such a test. Arpaia and Carone 
(2004) find that employer SSCs and income taxes increase labour costs by a similar 
statistically significant (but economically very modest) amount, whereas employee 
SSCs are borne entirely by employees in the form of lower wages. However, in the 
longer run, the IIP may hold: Arpaia and Carone cannot reject the IIP in the longer 
run, although like their other long-term results, this may again reflect weak statistical 
power.  
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More studies examine whether social security contributions have different effects to 
income taxes. Alesina and Perotti (1997) finds evidence for differences in the 
incidence of income tax compared to SSCs (employer plus employee) in the short-
term – with employers bearing more of the burden of income tax than SSCs in 
countries with highly centralised bargaining, and more of the burden of SSCs relative 
to income tax in countries with moderate or low degrees of centralisation (only the 
former result appears to be statistically significant though). The authors suggest this 
may reflect the link between SSCs and benefit entitlements (see also Summers, 1989) 
– which negotiators in more centralised wage bargaining systems are better able to 
take account of. In support of this, Ooghe et al. (2003) also find hints that the share 
of the burden of employer SSCs that is shifted to employees increases with the 
strength of the link between contributions paid and benefit entitlements. Again, in the 
long-term, these factors may matter less: Tyrvainen (1995) finds no difference 
between the incidence of employer SSCs and income tax in 8 out of 10 countries in his 
longer-run analysis.  
Perhaps the most consistent result is that labour market institutions, and in particular, 
the degree to which the wage bargaining process is centralised, plays a role in 
determining the economic incidence of labour taxation. Following analyses of how 
wage bargaining processes affected the link between taxation and unemployment, 
Alesina and Perotti (1997) examined how they affected the link between taxation and 
labour costs. They find that in countries with highly centralised wage bargaining 
(between a general employers’ confederation, and the confederation of trade unions, 
say), and in countries with strongly decentralised wage bargaining (such as between 
individual firms and its workers, or individual workers), taxes are borne almost 
entirely by workers. In contrast, in countries with an intermediate degree of 
centralisation (e.g. industry-level bargaining), around two-thirds of the burden of 
taxation is borne by employers. This is consistent with their theoretical model of the 
labour market where as unions gain market power they are able to shift more taxes 
on to employers but that when bargaining takes place at the economy-wide level, less 
shifting occurs as unions then have more of an incentive to take account of the 
negative effects of high labour costs on employment. This develops ideas from Olson 
(1982), Calmfors and Drifill (1988) and others.  
Following this work, four of the other studies also examine the role wage bargaining 
plays in determining the incidence of taxation.40 Daveri and Tabellini (2000) find 
similar (albeit less strong) effects, with employers bearing around 40 % of the burden 
of labour taxation in countries with an intermediate degree of centralisation, and 
relatively little elsewhere. Nunziata (2005) use a different measure of “labour market 
coordination” and find employers bear a slightly higher fraction of taxes in countries 
with a moderate degree of coordination, than in those with a lot or a little 
coordination. However, when using the same measure of “centralisation” as in earlier 
work, they find that employers bear part of the burden in countries with a moderate 
and low degree of centralisation: only in countries with a high degree of centralisation 
                                           
40 Tyrvainen (1995) find a significant degree of heterogeneity of incidence across countries. 
Although not explicitly linked to bargaining institutions, the pattern is suggestive. Incidence is 
more on workers in the US, UK and Sweden (highly centralised or decentralised countries), and 
more on employers in Germany and a number of other continental European countries (which 
have an intermediate degree of centralisation). 
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do workers bear the entire burden. Azemar and Desbordes (2010) also find this 
pattern: workers in countries with a high degree of centralisation, bear all of the tax, 
but less than half in decentralised countries. Finally, Arpaia and Carone (2004), find 
the opposite pattern – with countries with an intermediate degree of centralisation 
exhibiting full incidence on workers, but those with a high degree of centralisation or 
decentralisation showing some incidence on employers (albeit only a modest amount). 
Whilst consistently finding an effect of bargaining institutions on tax incidence, 
therefore, the literature does not provide a simple consensus on just what those 
effects are.41  
Taken together, the picture from that emerges from the macro literature is therefore a 
little disappointing and more than a little confusing: 
 It is not clear what fraction of the burden of tax is borne by workers or employers in 
either the short- or long-run, in part, reflecting the difficulty of estimating long-run 
incidence; 
 Little work examines the IIP. More work examines differences between the incidence 
of SSCs and income tax, a comparison to which the IIP need not apply – because of 
the link between SSCs and benefit entitlements;  
 It is clear that wage bargaining institutions matter and most papers suggest a high 
degree of centralisation is associated with a greater share of taxes being borne by 
workers than an intermediate degree of centralisation. Furthermore, papers tend to 
find that incidence under decentralised systems is closer to that under high degrees 
of centralisation. 
We now examine studies making use of within-country changes to SSCs and taxes to 
see if stronger conclusions can be drawn from these. 
3.2.3. Within-country studies 
The literature that makes use of data from a single country, often in the form of micro 
(employer- or worker-level) data, is larger, and growing more rapidly than the macro- 
literature. It also differs in its scope: rather than examine how changes in the overall 
tax wedge (including SSCs, income tax, and sometimes indirect taxes), papers in the 
micro- literature typically examine the incidence of SSCs, or payroll taxes, only. Of the 
studies we have identified, only 2 examine the incidence of income tax (although 
rather more examine the incidence of tax credits, such as the Earned Income Tax 
Credit in the US, and similar schemes in Europe). We therefore organise this part of 
the review by tax rather than countries or econometric approach.  
Studies of the incidence of SSCs 
Turning first to SSCs and payroll taxes, the evidence does not support Fullerton’s and 
Metcalf’s (2002) claims that studies have “consistently” found that the incidence of 
such taxes is fully on workers. While three of the most influential studies find this to 
be the case (Gruber, 1997, Anderson and Meyer, 1997 and 2000), a number of other 
studies find incidence of the tax is shared between workers and employers, and that 
the splitting of the legal incidence of SSCs (Saez et al., 2012a) translates into 
economic incidence.  
                                           
41 The review of the wage settings institutions in section 4.1 will shed some more light on the 
differences in the results.  
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The majority of the studies adopt a panel, or difference-in-difference (DiD) style 
approach, making use of reforms to social security contributions that affect different 
workers or different employers in different ways. Gruber (1997) is typical. Gruber uses 
data from censuses (in 1979, 1980, 1984 and 1985) of all manufacturing plants in 
Chile with more than 10 employees. A major reform to the Chilean social security 
system in 1981 led to substantial changes in both employee and employer SSCs, 
which differed substantially across different manufacturing plants, because of the 
significant degree of heterogeneity in the amount of SSCs different employers were 
liable to for a given wage bill, both pre- and post- reform. This reflects the wide range 
of different social security institutions in Chile, with different tax rates, and features of 
the SSC regime such as tax rates depending on assessed risks, and the exemption of 
certain wage costs from SSCs. Gruber (1997) is only interested in estimating the 
incidence of employer contributions: changes in employee SSCs are a confounding 
factor in his model that he attempts to overcome. A number of different empirical 
approaches are used, to try to overcome this, and other confounding factors. This 
includes standard DiD (identifying from differential changes in wages between plants), 
and difference-in-difference-in-difference (identifying from differential changes in 
wages between blue and white collar workers within a plant). The results suggest that 
there is full shifting of employer contributions to employees in the form of lower 
wages. And for white collar workers in particular, there is evidence of more-than-full 
shifting (with wages falling by more than the cash value of contributions). Gruber 
interprets this as indicating that workers highly value the type of insurance provided 
by the SSC system (which is often poorly provided for in the private sector), and are 
therefore willing to pay a more than actuarially fair price for it. This suggests that the 
link between SSCs and benefits may matter for incidence. 
Anderson and Meyer (1997, 2000) use similar variation in SSCs across employers in 
the United States to estimate the incidence of employer contributions there. In both 
papers they find evidence that, aggregate or industry-level changes in employer SSCs 
are borne to a significant extent by workers (point estimates from their 1997 paper 
suggest there is a little less than full shifting, but those from their 2000 paper 
suggests there may be more than full shifting to workers). However, two things are 
worth noting. First, the standard errors associated with the estimated coefficients are 
large – in a number of instances, the 95 % confidence intervals span the interval 
between no shifting, and far more than full shifting. Second, employers are much less 
able to shift firm-specific changes in employer SSCs to workers. This may reflect the 
fact that firms are competing with other firms in the same industries for workers (as 
well as for customers), and can therefore not pass on firm-specific costs, but only 
costs that are common across firms in the industry. This can lead to employment 
reallocation across firms, which the authors argue means the results confirm that “in 
some cases, differences in taxes across employers lead to large dead-weight losses”. 
This difference between “firm” (or individual) and “market” level incidence is important 
and is something that the rest of the literature using micro- data has tended to not 
pay close enough attention to. 
Murphy (2007) uses variation in unemployment insurance (UI) taxes and wages 
across US states in the period between 1992 and 2002 to look at the extent to which 
the incidence of tax differs for different types of workers. He notes that with variation 
in UI rates across states, workers (and employers) can respond by moving between 
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states: those workers who are most mobile across states would be more “responsive” 
to variation in UI rates and would therefore bear less of the burden of the tax than 
those who are less geographically mobile. Based on data on inter-state mobility, those 
aged 16-24 and working at least 20 hours a week, and married white women aged 25-
54 working full time are defined as “less mobile”; married white men aged 25-54 
working full time are the “more mobile” group. He finds evidence that the falls in 
wages when the UI base is extended or when there are unpredictable increases in UI 
rates42 take two years to materialise, and are larger for the “less mobile” workers. 
Depending on the method used, between one quarter and three quarters of UI 
appears to be borne by married male workers (and the rest by employers); for 
women, and youths, however, there is some evidence of more than full shifting of the 
burden.  
The US has, on the whole, highly decentralised wage bargaining, as does Chile. Taken 
together, these papers therefore add to the impression that workers are likely to bear 
a substantial part of the burden of employer (and likely employee) SSCs in countries 
with decentralised bargaining. Within Europe, this includes countries like the UK and 
Ireland. But what do studies undertaken in European countries themselves suggest?  
Bell et al. (2002) use a DiD approach and industry-level data to analyse the incidence 
of employer SSCs in the UK with identification provided by the differential impact 
across sectors of a 1999 reform. Changes in the average wage in each industry are 
related to the average change in employer SSCs paid by firms in that industry. Results 
suggest that employer SSCs are fully borne by workers – indeed, there is some 
evidence again, that workers bear more than the full burden, which is somewhat 
strange in the UK context given the very weak link between contributions and benefits 
(and the fact that the reform did not change benefits). However, estimates are 
imprecise (the 95 % confidence is that workers bear anything from about a quarter of 
the incidence, to more than two and a half times the incidence) and there is evidence 
of output prices also responding to the change in SSCs, which would seem strange 
SSCs if SSCs are quickly and fully reflected in changes in nominal wages. Results from 
this study (the only published study for the UK we have found), should be treated with 
caution. 
Lehmann et al. (2013) look at the effect of changes in employer SSCs (and tax 
credits) on the employer cost of labour in France. They make use of reforms in the 
mid-2000s that differentially affected firms operating 35-hour and 39-hour contracts 
to identify the behavioural effects of SSCs (identification for the impact of tax credits 
comes from their differential affect according to income and number of children). A 
model of the following form is estimated: 
 
∆ ln(z) =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝐶∆ ln(1 − t𝑆𝑆𝐶) + 𝛽𝑡
𝑖𝑡∆ ln(1 − t𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽τ̅
𝑆𝑆𝐶 ∆ln(1 − τ̅𝑆𝑆𝐶)                                      
+ 𝛽τ̅
𝑖𝑡∆ ln(1 − τ̅𝑖𝑡) + 𝑋𝛿 + 𝜀                                                                                   (7) 
where z is employer cost, t𝑆𝑆𝐶 and t𝑖𝑡 are marginal SSC and tax credit tax rates, and 
τ̅𝑆𝑆𝐶 and τ̅𝑖𝑡 are the equivalent average tax rates. Coefficients on the marginal tax rates 
pick up substitution effects, whilst those on average tax rates pick up either income 
                                           
42 Murphy (2007) argues that many of the changes in UI rates are predictable based on the 
economic cycle. 
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effects, participation responses, or the incidence of a tax (the paper is agnostic about 
which of these phenomenon it is investigating). The results show that changes in 
employer payroll taxes are reflected almost one-for-one in employer cost (i.e. the 
hypothesis 𝛽𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝐶 = −1 cannot be rejected) indicating that employers bear almost the full 
incidence of employer contributions, at least in the short run. Note, that income 
effects and participation responses would tend to go in the opposite direction (i.e. 
have a positive effect on 𝛽𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝐶) meaning this result cannot be explained by these 
effects confounding the effect of the incidence of employer SSCs. This result is in line 
with results from Aeberhardt and Sraer (2009), who find that the reduction in 
employers' payroll tax for low-wage workers did not generate wage moderation (see 
also Lhommeau and Remy, 2009 and Bunel and L'Horty, 2012). 
Saez et al. (2012a) find similar results for Greece but plausibly argue that their 
method uncovers the long-term rather than short-term incidence of SSCs. They make 
use of a reform in 1993 which led to new entrants to the labour market after that date 
facing a permanently much higher earnings cap for payroll taxes than existing workers 
did. This increased the amount of employer and employee contributions levied on the 
earnings of those new workers who earned more than the initial cap. The analysis 
uses a regression discontinuity design approach, comparing the earnings of people 
entering the labour market just before and just after the reform took place. In their 
main specification, “just before” is interpreted as the 5 years prior to the reform; and 
“just after”, the 5 years after. Because these 5-year bands may seem too wide, they 
also test the sensitivity of their results to using 2-year “before” and “after” bands. 
Three measures of earnings are measured: the employer cost; the gross “posted” 
earnings; and the net earnings received by the worker. If employers were able to shift 
the burden of employer SSCs fully on to workers, the employer cost of people entering 
the market “just before” and “just after” the reform should be the same; the gross 
and net earnings would be lower though, reflecting the additional employee SSCs and 
shifted employer SSCs being borne by workers. On the other hand, if workers were 
able to fully shift the burden to employers, net earnings would remain unchanged and 
gross wages and employer cost would be higher for those entering the labour market 
after the reform. 
In fact, it is gross earnings that are unchanged before and after the reform; employer 
cost jumps up, and net earnings jumps down. The size of the discontinuities mirrors 
the discontinuities in average employee and employer SSC rates caused by the 
reforms. Saez et al. argue that this means that statutory incidence matters for 
economic incidence: employers bear the cost of employer SSCs, and employees of 
employee SSCs. This is rationalised by long-lasting nominal wage rigidities associated 
with workers and employers bargaining over gross earnings, rather than net earnings 
and employer costs. In other words, employers find it difficult to offer different gross 
earnings to workers based only on the tax regime they face. However, this is not 
necessarily the case: it could just be that the economic incidence of both employee 
and employer contributions is the same and it just happens that the share formally 
borne by workers versus employers happens to align well with the sharing of the 
economic incidence of the tax. So Saez et al.’s approach  – where the change in 
employee and employer contributions is co-linear – cannot really allow one to test 
whether the IIP holds or not. Nevertheless the results are fairly convincing indicative 
evidence that the IIP may not hold in the long run. 
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A number of studies look at the incidence of SSCs in Scandinavia.  
Holmund (1983) is an early paper for Sweden, and uses a very simple time-series 
model relating changes in average SSC rates to changes in average hourly wages and 
prices in the mining and manufacturing sectors. The results suggest that around half 
of the burden of employer social security contributions is borne by employers, and the 
other half by employees, at least in the short term. 
The more recent Scandinavian literature focuses on evaluating the impact on wages of 
reforms to SSCs that target particular regions or parts of the population. A number 
examine the effect of reductions in SSCs in so-called “regional support areas” in 
Finland and Sweden. Bennmarker et al. (2009) looks at the impact of a 10 percentage 
point reduction in employer SSCs in 2002 in northern Sweden. When looking at 
existing firms only, they find that workers saw a 0.25 % increase in wages for every 1 
percentage point decrease in the employer SSC tax rate. This would suggest workers 
gained a little, but most of the gains from lower employer SSCs were retained by 
employers. Interestingly, when allowing for entry and exit of firms, the effect on 
wages becomes statistically insignificant (although this could relate to selection effects 
– those firms who enter to take advantage of labour costs could be lower-paying 
employers, for instance).43 
Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2009) and Korkeamäki (2011) look at the impact of similar 
policies in Finland using a DiD approach. The former paper finds that wage increases 
shifted about half of the gains from lower employer SSCs to workers in the form of 
higher wages, although the estimates are unfortunately not statistically significantly 
different from zero. However, the latter paper, which uses a larger sample of 
employers, finds little effect on wages (suggesting that employers kept all the gains). 
Delving deeper, Korkeamäki (2011) estimates the effect on wages to be positive and 
significant in one region (Lapland) but negative and significant in the other (Kainuu). 
It is possible that the results for Kainuu are impacted by a negative shock in that 
region (a violation of the common trends assumption required for DiD analysis), but 
equally, so could the results for Lapland.44 These papers therefore highlight the 
difficulty in finding a plausible identification strategy.  
Two other Swedish studies examine the impact of reforms to employers SSCs for 
young people in 2007 and 2009, which reduced contribution rates by a total of around 
16 percentage points (11 percentage points in 2007, and a further 5 percentage points 
in 2009). Egebark and Kaunitz (2012) analyse the impact of the first round of cuts in 
2007 across the economy as a whole. A DiD approach is used, where the treatment 
group are aged 21–24 (those benefiting from the first round of the reform), and the 
control group are those aged 25–26. The study finds a small positive effect on 
employment, and virtually no effect on wages, implying that the cuts in employer 
SSCs were incident on employers. Skedinger (2012) focuses on the impact of the 
reforms on workers in the retail sector. Again a DiD approach is used, and he finds 
that wages increased by between only 0.8 and 1.1 per cent as a result of the reforms, 
which would mean an overwhelming majority of the incidence of the cut in SSCs was 
enjoyed by employers in the form of lower labour costs. 
                                           
43 Selin (2012) investigates the role of taxation for the SSC for self-employed and finds at tax 
price elasticity of -0.5. 
44 See section 3.3.2 for a short discussion of the common trend assumption. 
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Along with the results for France and Greece, and those of Anderson and Meyer (1997, 
2000), this Scandinavian literature highlights that the incidence of a change in labour 
taxes is likely to vary according to how broad a group of people or employers that 
change affects. For instance, in the US reforms, a large part of the change in employer 
SSCs that was common across employers in their sector was passed on to workers, 
but very little of the firm-specific change was. In France, 35-hour and 39-hour firms 
faced differential changes in employer SSCs, and could not pass these on to workers. 
And one interpretation of the results for Greece is that employers could not pass on a 
large increase in employer SSCs to workers who entered the labour market after 
reforms, but that workers did bear the effect of higher employee SSCs. Competition 
between similar employers for workers, and between similar workers for jobs, 
combined with firm-level bargaining over the nominal gross wage (rather than 
employer cost and net wage) could explain such a pattern. It could also mean that 
targeted reductions in employer SSCs are more likely to lead to reductions in 
employer costs, than more broad-based reductions in employer SSCs. 
These findings also have methodological implications though. One reason why studies 
using micro- data may be more likely to find employers bear a substantial part of the 
burden of SSCs than macro- studies do is the type of variation in tax rates utilised. 
Micro- studies exploit variation between workers and employers, whereas macro- 
studies exploit variation over time or between countries. Employers may not be 
able to change gross wages for different employees, or offer different gross wages to 
other employers, in order to pass on idiosyncratic variation in their SSC bills. But it 
seems more likely that they can offer different wages over time, or compared to 
employers in other countries (due to limited labour mobility, for instance, as 
suggested by Murphy, 2007). And perhaps a note of caution should be sounded for the 
results more generally. If employers pass on changes in SSCs to workers not by 
changing individual wages, but by changing the average wage they pay across all 
workers (that is the burden of SSCs is shared across workers), identification based on 
comparing individuals directly affected by a reform with those not directly affected 
would be inappropriate. This means DiD analysis comparing workers (or employers) 
affected differentially by a reform may be drawing erroneous conclusions. Taxes may 
be shifted from employers to workers (or vice versa) not at the individual level, but at 
the employer or market level. This is a difficult issue to overcome, but has been 
utilised as an identification strategy in a novel analysis of the incidence of income tax. 
Studies of the incidence of income tax or tax credits 
Bingley and Lanot (2002) make use of the variation in local income tax rates across 
municipalities in Denmark to identify both the behavioural effects and incidence of 
income tax. Tax rates vary based upon where the employee lives, rather than where 
the employer is based. This means that a given employer (or establishment) will often 
employ people who face a range of different income tax rates. At the same time, the 
average tax rate faced by employees will differ across employers based on where they 
are located, as employees tend to be drawn from a fairly local pool. Bingley and Lanot 
assume that establishment- or employer- level wage setting means that employers 
cannot vary wage rates paid to employees based solely differences in the income tax 
rates they face. Any within-employer variation in the earnings of “similar employees” 
associated with differences in the income tax rates they face, are therefore assumed 
to be the result of behavioural response (e.g. working longer hours, or working harder 
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per hour). Information on the incidence the income tax is then backed out using 
information on between-employer variation in earnings and average income tax rates, 
and what is known about behavioural response from the within-employer variation. 
Results suggest there is partial shifting (40 %) of the burden of income tax from 
workers to employers. 
Kubik (2004) looks at the incidence of income tax using the American 1986 income 
tax reforms. He looks at how hourly wages change for different occupations affected 
differently by these tax reforms, implicitly assuming that behavioural change is 
captured by hours of work and employment. The findings show that those occupations 
that saw relatively large falls in their marginal tax rates also saw their relative wages 
fall.45 
A range of papers examine the incidence of tax credits. Azmat (2006), looks at the 
incidence of the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK. Using a DiD approach 
(comparing claimants with similarly skilled non-claimants), she finds that employers 
captured about 35 % of the value of the tax credits paid to men, on average, by 
reducing the gross hourly wage. Employers could not reduce wages below the National 
Minimum Wage, however, meaning less of the incidence of the tax credit was on 
employers for the lowest paid. This may be one reason why no robust effect of tax 
credit receipt on the wages of women can be found (women tend to have lower hourly 
wages). Azmat also finds evidence of spillover effects, with wages in industries and for 
education groups with high numbers of WFTC claimants seeing a slow-down in wage 
growth relative to other industries.  
Leigh (2010) and Rothstein (2008) find similar results for the US Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC). Rothstein’s identification is provided by the differential effect of the 
EITC on individuals with different skill levels and different family structures. He finds 
that for every $1 of EITC paid, recipients benefit by 70 cents, with reductions in their 
gross wage benefiting their employer by 30 cents. Again, there is strong evidence of 
spill-over effects on the wages of other ineligible low-skilled workers. Reductions in 
their wages benefit employers of low-skilled labour more generally by 42 cents for 
every $1 of EITC paid, increasing the overall benefit to employers to 72 cents.46 These 
results therefore emphasise how different market-level and individual level incidence 
can be. It is a weakness of the incidence literature that most papers do not distinguish 
between these two phenomena. 
3.2.4. Summary  
A recent meta-analysis (Melguizo and González-Páramo, 2013) provides a relatively 
precise estimate of the fraction of labour taxes borne by workers in the form of lower 
wages: around two-thirds, on average. The narrative literature review undertaken 
here, however, finds that the range of estimates is too broad, and too contextually 
specific, to consider this to represent a consensus on how the incidence of labour 
taxes are shared between workers and employers. However, the review has suggested 
the following: 
                                           
45 Unfortunately, Kubik (2004) relates changes in hourly wages to changes in marginal (and 
not average) tax rates, meaning that results are not fully comparable to other studies. 
46 In a follow up paper Rothstein (2010) simulates the incidence of the EITC and finds that 
employers capture 0.36 cents from non-eligible low skilled workers.  
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 Although there is a wide-range of results, the balance of evidence suggests there is 
likely to be some degree of sharing of the incidence of labour taxation between 
workers and employers, possibly even in the long run. This includes income taxes as 
well as social security contributions. 
 But the extent to which labour taxes are borne by workers or employers seems to 
differ between different countries. In particular, incidence appears to be related to 
the degree of centralisation in bargaining, in both theory and practise. There is 
some evidence that more of the incidence of such taxes are borne by employers in 
countries where bargaining takes place at the industry level (an “intermediate 
degree of centralisation”), than at the firm/worker level (“low centralisation”) or at 
the multi-sector or economy-wide level (“high centralisation”). Support for this is 
strongest in the macro- as opposed to the micro- literature, perhaps reflecting that 
many of the micro- studies for countries with a high degree of centralisation (like 
Sweden) are based on reforms that affect only a subset of the labour market.  
 Tests of whether the legal incidence matters for economic incidence (i.e. whether 
the IIP holds) are surprisingly few and far between. What evidence that does exist 
suggests that legal incidence is likely to matter in the short term; whether it 
matters in the long term is less clear, in part because standard errors are large in 
many long-run models. 
 More generally, the literature examining long-run incidence is sparse and beset by 
identification problems. More research is needed, using consistent methods on both 
macro- and micro- data on a cross country basis. This includes application of true 
time-series econometrics, rather than simple autoregressive models. 
3.3. Review of the literature on labour supply elasticities  
Individuals can respond to changes in (real) wage rates along three margins: 
participation on the labour market (the extensive margin), hours worked (the 
intensive margin) and taxable income (Blundell, 2012). The last margin includes 
variations in work effort, as well as the shifting of wage income towards other forms of 
taxable income (such as capital or corporate income), towards activities that reduce 
the tax base (such as higher expenditures on housing or charitable giving), or towards 
tax evasion (Saez et al., 2012b). In this section, we will first discuss the pure labour 
supply response to changes in the real wage rate, starting with a brief description of 
the economic model of labour supply, and the empirical strategies that have been 
employed in the recent literature to estimate the size of responses, mentioning the 
key econometric issues with each approach. Then we will aim to give an overview over 
consensus estimates of labour supply elasticities for various socio-economic groups 
relying on other surveys and recently published studies. We then discuss recent efforts 
to incorporate family decision making into the standard labour supply model. In the 
final part of this section, we review what can be learned from the literature about the 
elasticity of taxable income from recently available tax return data. 
3.3.1. Economic model and interpretation of the wage elasticity of 
labour supply  
The Marshallian (uncompensated) wage elasticity of labour supply is defined as the 
percentage change in labour supply in response to a 1 percent change in the (net) 
wage rate (holding non-labour income constant). In contrast, the Hicksian 
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(compensated) elasticity holds utility constant, isolating the “pure price effect” of a 
change in the wage rate. More studies report the uncompensated (Marshallian) than 
the compensated wage elasticity, which is why we concentrate on this measure. In the 
theoretical model, the income effect of a change in the net wage rate has to be 
considered as well: as wages increase, budget sets expand, and individuals might 
want to substitute time towards leisure, counteracting the price effect of a wage 
increase. In the empirical literature, however, there is a consensus that the income 
elasticity of labour supply is zero, or very close to zero, to the extent that the 
literature on taxable income tends to assume income elasticities away (e.g. Bargain et 
al. 2014, Saez et al. 2012b).47 
A typical static model of labour supply could take the form 
 
ln (ℎit) =  𝛼ln (𝑤it) + 𝛽𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (8) 
Where 𝑤it is a measure of the after tax wage rate, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is non-wage income, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a 
random disturbance, including influences that are not observable to the researcher. If 
estimated correctly, 𝛼 is the Marshallian wage elasticity in a static model of labour 
supply (holding non-wage income constant). As noted by Blundell and MaCurdy 
(1999), this static model assumes individuals to be either myopic (they only consider 
the present period when making their labour supply decisions) or credit constrained 
(they are unable to transfer income across periods). Furthermore, this model ignores 
the effect of current labour supply on future wages (Keane, 2011).  
If individuals do shift income and consumption between periods (e.g. save income in 
anticipation of idle periods over the life cycle), this elasticity confounds two different 
labour supply adjustments: the labour supply response to anticipated wage 
movements over time (the intertemporal or Frisch elasticity), and the response to 
shifts in the entire wage profile (changes in the expected wage for each period over 
the lifecycle, e.g. due to a permanent shift in the demand function, or a tax reform). 
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) call the first change an evolutionary change in the wage 
rate, because it constitutes a move along the same individual wage profile, and the 
second a parametric shift, because it alters the entire expected wage profile. To see 
the difference between these concepts, consider a temporary reduction in the tax rate 
that is expected to be rescinded in the future. Anticipating a lower after-tax wage rate 
in the next period, an individual could decide to work and save more in the current 
period, while reducing her labour supply in the future, when the tax reduction is 
abolished. Estimating a model such as (8) would yield an inflated Marshallian 
elasticity, since the individual plans to reduce her labour supply in the next period, 
merely shifting it through time. 
The direct assessment of labour supply elasticities over the life-cycle is 
methodologically – and computationally – cumbersome, and the data requirements, 
most importantly regarding information on savings and public pension entitlements 
are difficult to meet in practice (Meghir and Phillips 2010).48 Also, the static labour 
                                           
47 Blomquist and Selin (2010) estimate the taxable labour income elasticity at -0.07 for men, 
implying that the compensated is about 5 percentage points higher than the uncompensated 
one.  
48 Both types of elasticities stemming from a lifecycle model can in principle be estimated from 
cross sectional data using the appropriate specification (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). The wage 
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supply elasticity is the relevant concept for comparing steady state impacts of 
differences in tax rates across countries (Chetty et al., 2011).We will therefore 
concentrate on this literature. 
3.3.2. Econometric issues and identification  
A cross sectional analysis of labour supply usually estimates a (static) labour supply 
function such as (8), where hours of work are regressed on a constant, the net wage 
rate, a measure of non-wage income, the spouses’ wage rate where applicable, and a 
vector of other individual characteristics that are thought to influence labour supply, 
for example the presence of young children, indicating fixed costs of work (Blau and 
Kahn, 2005).  
Since wages are only observed for individuals with positive labour supply, they have to 
be imputed for those who do not work during the relevant time period. This is usually 
accomplished using wage information from those in the sample that do work, 
correcting for selection bias into work.49 
One major issue with the estimation of a model such as (8) is the endogeneity of the 
wage rate. Hours worked can correlate with the wage rate not only because labour 
supply curves are upward sloping (that is, those with higher wage offers tend to work 
more hours) but also because wage rates and labour supply are both influenced by 
another, unobserved variable, such as motivation, that leads to both higher wage 
rates and more hours worked (Blau and Kahn, 2007). If this is the case, ε_it would be 
correlated with the wage rate in the empirical model (8), which would lead to a biased 
estimate of 𝛼. Willingness to work (or a low taste for leisure) could also be correlated 
with present asset income, because it implies high past earnings (Keane, 2011). 
Empirical models therefore often include taste-shifter variables assumed to be 
correlated with, and thus to a certain degree to control for, taste for work, such as 
education, number of children, marital status etc. Other empirical strategies to deal 
with omitted variable bias are instrumental variable techniques and differencing 
methods, discussed below. 
Also, with a progressive tax schedule, hours worked directly influence the net-wage 
rate, as the individual determines his or her own marginal tax rate by his or her hours 
choice (Evers et al., 2008). An individual with weak preferences for leisure is likely to 
                                                                                                                               
elasticity corresponding to a move along the same wage profile can be estimated by regressing 
log hours on age, personal characteristics influencing the lifetime wage profile, preferences and 
permanent income, and the wage rate, which can be instrumented with higher order age 
variables. Intuitively, this holds the wage profile fixed on the individual level, while letting the 
wage rate and age vary across individuals. Regressing log wages on property income, higher 
order age variables, and the wage rate (instrumented by personal characteristics) on the other 
hand yields the response to a shift in the entire wage profile. 
49 Those who do not work either have higher fixed costs of work (or higher reservation wages), 
or are offered lower wages than those who do work. Therefore, predicting their wages from the 
sample of those who participate in the labour market, using their observed characteristics, 
would lead to an overestimation of their wage offers. The standard approach to deal with this 
selection into work effect is the Heckman correction. Following Heckman (1979) this involves 
first the estimation of a selection equation using a probit estimate to derive the probability of 
working. In the second stage regression the derived inverse mills ratio is used to control for the 
selection bias. An exception is Blau and Kahn (2007) who predict wages using the observable 
characteristics of those individuals with low working hours (below 20 hours). Löffler et al. 
(2014) have a critical discussion of the two-step approach and show that the results are 
sensitive to the treatment of wages.  
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work more, and thus face higher marginal tax rates, which can lead the researcher to 
underestimate the effect of tax rates on labour supply (Meghir and Phillips, 2010). 
Non-labour income is also likely to depend directly on the wage rate and hours worked 
since means-tested benefits are usually phased out as earnings rise. This will generate 
a negative correlation between hours worked and non-labour income (because means-
tested benefits are withdrawn if total income rises) and hours worked and marginal, 
net-of tax wage rates (because of the progressive tax system) (Keane, 2011). 
Another concern with the direct estimation of a model such as (8) is measurement 
error with regards to wages and hours worked (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Even if 
the measurement error is completely random and unrelated to any other included 
variables it will bias the OLS estimator towards zero. Furthermore, the measurement 
error can be considerable, and because hourly wage rates are typically computed by 
dividing weekly, monthly or annual earnings by hours worked, Keane (2011) argues 
that measurement error in this context is not random: If hours worked are measured 
with error, and the error increases in absolute value with hours worked, reported 
wages for individuals with high labour supply will be consistently lower than they 
actually are (“denominator bias”), leading to deflated estimates of labour supply 
elasticities. 
Moreover, a labour supply curve such as (8) treats the wage rate as fixed, while 
observed wage rates are equilibrium wage rates, determined by the interplay of 
supply and demand. This model assumes that as 𝑤it varies across individuals, we are 
moving along the labour supply curve which enables us to calculate the labour supply 
elasticity, while in fact the demand curve might be shifting. One approach to deal with 
this type of endogeneity is controlling for factors that determine the wage rate, but do 
not influence the labour supply curve directly, e.g. through a correlation with 
preferences for work. For example, education and age have been put forward in the 
literature as instruments for labour demand. However, these controls are vulnerable to 
criticism: someone with a high preference for work might have acquired more 
education in the past, while preferences for leisure might well vary across the life-
cycle (Keane, 2011). 
Instrumental variable approaches 
One way to address these biases is to use instrumental variable approaches. An 
instrument is a variable that is correlated with the independent variable of interest – 
in this case the net, hourly wage rate – but affects the dependent variable of interest 
(hours worked) only through the independent variable of interest. That is, an 
instrument can be excluded from the main equation or model of interest (this is an 
exclusion restriction). Intuitively, the instrumental variable approach looks for 
exogenous variation in the wage rate, so that any labour supply response can be 
thought of as being caused by exogenous factors. E.g. Keane (2011) suggests using 
demand shocks as sources of exogenous variation: businesses might want to increase 
production if the oil price falls, leading to a demand shock that increases wages. It is 
unlikely that oil price increases directly affect preferences for work. The instrumental 
variable approach is typically implemented by two-stage-least-squares: in a first 
stage, the independent variable of interest is regressed against the instrument or 
instruments, and against a vector of controls. The fitted values of this regression are 
then used in the main model (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). Finding good instruments 
that are both strongly correlated with the hourly net wage, and yet can be included 
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from the labour supply model can be a challenge. Instruments for the hourly wage 
rate that have been used in the literature include gross wage rates, deciles of the 
wage distribution, and education (Blau and Kahn, 2007). Education was often used as 
an instrument in earlier studies, but the assumption that education is not related to 
tastes for work is increasingly called into question (Meghir and Phillips, 2010). 
Therefore, estimates based on cross sectional studies can be viewed as somewhat less 
reliable as those based on natural experiments or other forms of exogenous variation 
in wages, such as changes in the wage structure over time.  
Quasi Experiments 
Quasi experiments are policy reforms that change the opportunities or incentives for 
one group of people (treatment group), while another group sharing many of the 
same characteristics remains unaffected (control group).50 DiD estimators then 
compare the average change in the outcome of interest following the policy reform, 
e.g. hours of work, between the treatment and the control group (average treatment 
effect on the treated).  
Fixed effects models that decompose the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 into an individual fixed effect, 
capturing unobserved factors such as motivation or taste for leisure, and a “true 
random effect”, that is not correlated with wages or non-wage income in a 
specification such as (8), are computationally equivalent to DiD estimators (Blundell 
and MaCurdy, 1999). If unobserved individual characteristics, such as preferences for 
leisure, can be assumed to be time invariant, they can be differenced out using panel 
data.  
Besides its simplicity, the quasi-experimental approach is appealing because it avoids 
many of the econometric issues discussed in this section. The drawback of this 
approach is that any results are confined to the specific treatment group and policy 
reform studied. Also, time effects must be the same for the treatment and control 
group so any difference in (average) outcomes can be attributed to the policy reform, 
and the composition of both the treatment and the control group must remain 
constant before and after the reform (Blundell, 2012).51 
Discrete Choice Models 
Rather than estimating a continuous labour supply function such as (8), discrete 
choice models assume that individuals (or households) choose from a set of discrete 
hours options, such as non-participation, part-time, or full time work. For couple 
households, the discrete options are husband-wife hours combinations. The advantage 
of discrete choice models is that they directly account for the fact that observed hours 
of work cluster around zero and full-time hours and incorporate both the intensive and 
extensive margin of labour supply (Bargain et al., 2014). Furthermore, the use of a 
maximum likelihood approach implies that the theoretical framework of the random 
                                           
50 Blundell et al. (1998) and Burns and Zilliak (forthcoming) use tax reforms which affected 
people differently as instruments to identify the labour supply elasticity, respectively the 
elasticity of taxable income. In a sense they are exploiting quasi experimental information, but 
use an IV approach.   
51 This is also commonly known as the “common trend assumption”. Based on the seminal work 
by Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985) is well established that a DiD approach 
can only consistently identify the treatment effect if there is neither selection into the 
treatment, nor a different trend in the treatment group. See also Imbens and Wooldridge 
(2009) for further potentially confounding e.g. serial correlation) problems in DiD estimators. 
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utility model coincides with the empirical approach.52 Also, the discrete choice 
approach is well suited to the incorporation of the complexities of the tax benefit 
system, and its interplay with means tested benefits given the labour supply of 
different members of one household, because it is not necessary to specify the entire 
budget constraint. For each hours choice, transfer entitlements and take home pay are 
directly evaluated, typically using a micro-simulation model with tax benefit 
calculation capabilities for the relevant country.53 Fixed costs of work, such as 
childcare costs, transportation or work attire, can also be included in the model 
specification (Blundell et al., 2000).54 
These models allow the exploitation of the discontinuities and nonlinearities of tax 
systems for identification: because they lead to individuals with the same gross wage 
rates receiving different net wages, they provide exogenous variation (Bargain et al., 
2014).55 
Discrete choice models require the specification of utility functions of individuals or 
households including the parameterisation of preferences for leisure and consumption. 
This involves making strong assumptions regarding preferences, which is the major 
drawback of this approach (Blundell, 2012). While tastes for leisure and consumption, 
as well as fixed costs of work are allowed to vary both with observed and unobserved 
characteristics, this approach necessitates strong assumptions on the distribution of 
unobserved heterogeneity, on budget constraints and fixed costs of work (Blundell, 
2012). 
3.3.3. Empirical evidence on labour supply elasticities 
In this section, we aim to summarise the consensus on the absolute size of labour 
supply elasticities as it emerges from recent surveys of the extensive literature on this 
topic. We will add to this by citing examples of some recent studies.  
Labour supply elasticities have been shown to vary significantly across demographic 
groups and over the life cycle. It therefore makes sense to consider the labour supply 
responses of men and women separately. Moreover, the response at the extensive 
margin (participation elasticity) is generally found to be more important for the overall 
response than adjustments in hours worked for those already employed (e.g. Blundell, 
2012). For example, looking at 18 different countries, Bargain et al. (2014) find that 
the intensive margin elasticity is very close to zero even for those socio-economic 
groups that are expected to be most responsive to changes in the wage rate, such as 
married women (see below). We therefore distinguish these two margins where 
possible. 
                                           
52 See for example Dagvik (1994) or Aaberge et al. (1999). 
53 The take-up of benefits can be directly incorporated in such models, by allowing for disutility 
due to the stigmatisation of welfare claimants, or because of time costs involved in applying for 
certain benefits (hassle-costs, Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, Blundell and Shepard, 2011). 
54 The omission of fixed costs of work might have led to an overestimation of the elasticity of 
married women’s labour supply in earlier studies (Blundell et al., 2013). Fixed costs of work 
explain why small positive hours of work are rarely observed – once the offered wage rate 
exceeds the fixed cost of work, the labour supply jumps, leading the researcher to overestimate 
the effect of a marginal increase in the wage rate. 
55 Structural models do not directly estimate elasticities, but preference parameters. Elasticities 
are then calculated by marginally increasing net wage rates, and comparing the labour supply 
before and after the increase. 
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Women’s labour supply elasticities are generally found to be considerably higher than 
men’s, especially those of married women (the group most frequently studied in the 
labour supply literature) and of women with young children. Generally, on the country 
level, participation rates are negatively related to estimated wage elasticities, which is 
consistent with the extensive margin of labour supply quantitatively dominating the 
intensive margin (e.g. Evers et al., 2008). Women’s overall participation rate is still 
below men’s. This is particularly true for married women and those with young 
children who not only face a work – leisure, but a work – leisure – home production 
trade off: they perform tasks that would otherwise have to be delegated to the market 
at a cost, most prominently child care. Therefore, it is not surprising that their labour 
supply elasticities exceed those of men (Blau and Kahn, 2007).  
Estimates of female labour supply elasticities in the literature vary widely but tend to 
be positive and below or close to 1. Overall, annual wage elasticities tend to be larger 
than weekly or monthly elasticities, which is to be expected since longer terms allow 
more time for labour supply adjustments that can include both adjustments at the 
extensive and intensive margin. In their survey, Meghir and Phillips (2010) report a 
“consensus estimate” for married women’s labour supply of close to 1, but warn that 
these estimates should be regarded with caution, since most of these estimates rely 
on cross sectional comparisons. Estimates of weekly elasticities, in contrast, vary 
between zero and 0.3, which implies a quite inelastic labour supply, also for women. 
Indeed, more recent reviews that concentrate on studies that do not rely on cross 
sectional comparisons find lower mean values for married women’s labour supply 
elasticities. Evers at al. (2008) construct a sample of 209 elasticities from 30 empirical 
studies, excluding studies based on (cross sectional) OLS estimates because of the 
endogeneity and consistency problems detailed above. They report a mean elasticity 
for women of 0.43, with a wide range of estimates between 0.03 and 2.79. Similarly, 
Bargain and Peichl (2013) collect 90 estimates from recent studies (mainly from the 
1990’s and the 2000’s), also reporting a mean elasticity of 0.43, with estimates 
clustering in the 0 to 0.5 interval.56 They find that elasticities decrease over time, and 
that studies based on cross sectional-data tend to result in higher estimates of 
married women’s labour supply, although this last result is more clear-cut for the US 
than for Europe.57 
In a recent study, Bargain et al. (2014) estimate the same discrete choice model for 
17 European countries and the United States using a data set with comparable 
variable definitions, covering the period 1998-2005. For married women, wage 
elasticities are estimated to range between 0.1 and 0.4, with only small differences 
between countries.58 Overall, elasticities for married women are found to be highest in 
countries with the lowest female participation rates. Blau and Kahn (2007), using 
                                           
56 Studies that use discrete choice estimates are overrepresented in their sample, because this 
approach is most often used in the recent literature. 
57 For the more recent time-period 1990-2010, their sample contains studies based on both OLS 
regressions and discrete-choice models for the US, while for Europe, they almost exclusively 
rely on structural models. Therefore, it is less obvious whether the decline in labour supply 
elasticities is due to the estimation method or a time trend. 
58 For married women, they identify a group of countries with slightly higher elasticities, ranging 
between 0.2 and 0.4 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands), a group 
of countries with lower elasticities between 0.1 and 0.2 (France, Finland, Portugal, Sweden, 
Estonia, Hungary, Portugal, the UK and the US) and a group of outlier countries with elasticities 
between 0.4 and 0.6 (Ireland, Greece and Spain). 
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cross sectional (Current Population Survey) data from the US to estimate labour 
supply elasticities for married women for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000. They find 
that (mean) labour supply elasticities decreased steadily over this time period: from 
0.8 to 0.9 (depending on the model specification) in 1980 to 0.4 in 2000. Elasticities 
fell at both margins: at the extensive margin from 0.5-0.6 1980 (again, depending on 
the model specification) to 0.3 in 2000, and at the intensive margin from 0.3 to 0.1 
during the same time period. Using the same data and a similar methodology, Heim 
(2007) similarly estimates elasticities at the extensive margin to have declined from 
0.7 in 1980 to 0.03 in 2000, while intensive margin elasticities decreased from 0.4 to 
0.2 over the same time period. One reason for this change is mechanical: as the 
female labour force participation rate accelerated throughout this period, a growing 
share of married women was already in full time employment, and therefore unable to 
further increase their labour supply in response to rising wages. But Blau and Kahn 
(2007) also suggest that over time, women became more committed to their careers, 
as they expect to spend a larger fraction of their life without a spouse. As a 
consequence, their labour supply patterns increasingly resemble those of men. 
One demographic group that has been shown to be particularly responsive to changes 
in the net wage are women with small children. For this group the extensive margin is 
particular important because they face high fixed costs of work (Blundell et al., 2013). 
Lone mothers have received a lot of attention in the literature because they face a 
higher risk of poverty, and are therefore often the object of targeted policies that can 
be exploited for exogenous variation in wages. Meghir and Phillips (2008) report 
participation elasticities of over 1 for this group. Bargain and Peichl (2013) note that 
elasticity estimates for this group, although generally higher than for the overall 
population, are quite dispersed - in their sample, the mean value is 0.6. In a recent 
study, Blundell and Shepard (2011) develop a structural model of the labour supply of 
parents with children in the UK, with a focus on lone mothers. They model the tax-
benefit system in detail, and allow for unobserved heterogeneity and fixed costs of 
work, using data from 1998 to 2003. For single mothers, they report a total elasticity 
of 1.5 (including the extensive and intensive margin). The participation elasticity is 
more important than the hours elasticity, 0.8 vs. 0.04. The labour supply of women 
with young children is significantly less elastic than the labour supply of mothers of 
school-aged children, especially at the participation margin. For the US, using cross 
sectional data for the years 1979 to 2003, Bishop et al. (2009) find very similar values 
for the intensive margin with an elasticity of 0.05, while their estimate for the 
extensive margin is significantly lower at 0.25. In line with the findings of Blau and 
Kahn (2007) and Heim (2007) for married women for the same time period, Bishop et 
al. (2009) find that the labour supply elasticities of single women (with and without 
children) decreased significantly over the quarter of a century their data covers.59 
For men, labour supply responses are strongest at the beginning of their careers, 
reflecting the education/ training versus gainful employment decision, and at the end 
of their careers, where the incentive structure of pension systems comes into play. 
They also react mostly on the extensive margin. The consensus in the literature is that 
labour supply elasticities for men on the intensive margin – adjustments in hours 
worked while employed – are very small (close to zero) (Meghir and Phillips, 2008, 
                                           
59 They report a drop of 82 % in the wage elasticity at the intensive, and of 36 % at the 
extensive margin. 
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Saez et al. 2012b).60 In their meta-study of 209 estimates of labour supply elasticities, 
Evers et al. (2008) report a range of estimates between -0.08 and 0.18 for the male 
labour supply elasticity, with a sample mean of 0.07. This is not surprising, given the 
distribution of hours choices for men - men tend to either work full time, or not work 
at all, leaving little room for adjustments on the intensive margin.61 In contrast, 
Bargain et al. (2014) find own wage elasticities for married men that are, though 
small, significantly different from zero, between 0.05 and 0.15. These responses are 
almost exclusively driven by the extensive margin; hours elasticities are very close to 
zero. The responses of single men are somewhat larger (between 0 and 0.4), mostly 
driven by the responsiveness of younger men who have lower overall employment 
rates. 
Low wage elasticities at the mean can mask differences in the responsiveness of 
labour supply across the income distribution. Bargain et al. (2014) show that for single 
individuals, wage elasticities for the bottom 20 % of the income distribution can go up 
to one, mainly due to responses at the extensive margin. For married women, the 
opposite holds, with women at the top end of the (potential) wage distribution being 
more responsive than those at the bottom.62 
3.3.4. Labour supply and household decision making 
Family decision making matters for labour supply because we would expect the labour 
supply choices of an individual to be influenced by their spouse’s labour supply and 
earnings, just as we would expect it to depend on unearned income. Families have to 
decide jointly how to organise home production and consumption, and we would 
expect some complementarity in leisure in the utility functions of couples. The 
standard economic approach to modelling the labour supply and consumption 
behaviour of couple households, the unitary model of household behaviour assumes 
that couples act to maximise a unique household utility function. This assumption has 
been criticised in the literature, primarily for violating the principle of methodological 
individualism (the idea that the basic unit of decision making is the individual, 
Chiappori, 1988), and for lacking empirical support.63 
                                           
60 An exception is Keane (2011), who suggests a mean value of the (compensated) labour 
supply elasticity for males of 0.31. He argues that the consensus in the literature of a zero or at 
least very small labour supply elasticity for males stems from the (flawed) assessment that 
many older studies that report higher labour supply elasticities failed to properly account for 
taxes, while there is actually a wide range of estimates irrespective of the estimation method. 
61 For example, while across 32 % of employed women in the EU-28 Member States worked 
part time in 2013, only 8 % of employed men worked part time (EUROSTAT database, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database). 
62 This is consistent with the “added worker effect” that emphasises the role of risk sharing in 
marriage. When the main earner in the family – usually the husband – experiences a negative 
income shock, the labour supply of the secondary earner – usually the wife – becomes crucial 
for household income. Hence, married women in families at the bottom of the income 
distribution make a more important contribution to family income than women at the top, which 
leads to their labour supply being more inelastic. In contrast, women living in households at the 
top of the income distribution are more responsive to financial incentives. See e.g. Blundell et 
al. (2012) for a recent discussion. 
63 One particular empirical implication of the unitary model, income pooling, has been 
repeatedly refuted empirically. Income pooling is a feature of unitary household demand that 
postulates that which member contributes what to joint household income should not matter for 
consumption decisions. Among others, Lundberg et al. (1997) and Ward-Batts (2008) show that 
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Considering the household, rather than the individual, to be the relevant decision 
making unit implies assuming the existence of some form of decision process within 
the household. The literature on household decision making can be broadly 
categorised in two strands: cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models of 
family decision making (the seminal contributions here are, Manser and Brown, 1980, 
McElroy and Horney, 1981, Lundberg and Pollak, 1993) and the literature on the 
collective model of household decision making, developed by Chiappori (1988). 
Bargain models generally impose a lot of structure on the household decision making 
process, complicating empirical implementation. The collective model on the other 
hand only imposes that within household allocations be efficient. The individual utilities 
of the spouses are determined through a generic decision making process that is 
influenced by individual bargaining power, but this bargaining element only 
determines the location of household demand on the Pareto frontier.64 
It has been shown that, even without imposing much structure on the household 
decision process, testable restrictions can be derived from the collective model, and 
that it can be taken to data even if labour supply choices are discrete (that is, working 
hours do not vary continuously between zero and full-time, but individuals are either 
employed full time or do not work at all, as it tends to be the case for men, Blundell et 
al., 2007). 
As Meghir and Phillips (2010) point out, although there is a very active theoretical 
literature on the empirical implication of the collective model, there are very few 
actual empirical applications. An exception is Blundell et al. (2007), who estimate a 
collective model of household labour supply using British survey data over two 
decades. They assume that men’s labour supply decision is discrete (either work full 
time or be idle), while women can choose their working hours continuously. While 
preferences are allowed to depend on education, and education therefore cannot be 
excluded from the labour supply function, education-time interactions (and age-time 
interactions) can be excluded in their framework. That is, they assume that while 
preferences towards work (and leisure) may change over time, this change is the 
same for all educational groups. Because returns to education have changed in the 
period they observe, this exclusion restriction allows them to exploit this exogenous 
variation in the wage structure to identify the labour supply function. They find a wage 
elasticity of 0.33 for married women, which is in line with previous estimates for the 
UK. 
Vermeulen et al. (2006) calibrate the collective model, assuming that preferences for 
consumption and leisure do not change upon marriage; therefore, these parameters 
can be estimated from data on singles using a standard labour supply model, which 
allows residual calculation of the sharing rule. Using this model, Bargain et al. (2006) 
compare labour supply elasticities based on the unitary and collective model. They find 
that, if the unitary model is wrongly assumed to be correct, women’s labour supply 
elasticities are understated, whereas men’s elasticities are overstated. However, these 
                                                                                                                               
this does not hold using a policy reform in the UK as a natural experiment. See Browning et al. 
(2014), chapter 5, for a recent survey. 
64 More formally, the collective model assumes that household maximise the weighted sum of 
the spouses’ individual utility function, where the weight is influenced by distribution factors. 
Some of these distribution factors influence the couple’s budget set, like wage rates, while 
others only influence the bargaining power, like the prevailing divorce law regime. 
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differences could also be due to differently specified utility functions and identifying 
assumptions (Bloemen, 2010). Although the household decision process does seem to 
influence labour supply elasticities, the empirical literature providing concrete 
estimates is still quite thin. 
3.3.5. Using tax return data to estimate behavioural responses to 
taxation 
When studying the intensive margin of labour taxation, one is usually interested in 
how hours of work respond to income taxation, i.e. the labour supply elasticity. Hence, 
traditional labour supply literature focused purely on hours of work as the variable of 
interest (in the intensive margin case). However, as already pointed out in section 
3.2.2., hours worked by individuals are in most cases very difficult to observe, and 
relying on survey responses often comes with large measurement errors (e.g. people 
have a tendency to report 40 hours per week). Furthermore, difficulties arise because 
income taxes might distort many other margins beyond hours of work, for instance 
motivate to shift income between sources which are taxed at different rates. This is 
why in recent years the public economics literature progressed using the elasticity of 
taxable income (ETI) instead of pure labour supply, pioneered by the seminal work of 
Feldstein (1995). Focusing on taxable income as a broader measure of labour supply 
holds the potential to represent an upper bound of the labour supply elasticity since it 
captures all potential responses to income taxation in a single elasticity measure. 
Feldstein (1999) also puts forward the measure that the ETI is under some conditions 
a sufficient measure for the overall deadweight loss of the income taxation. This holds, 
since an optimising individual will reduce the hours worked or avoid taxation in such a 
manner that the marginal costs will equalise. Given that both real and avoidance 
responses to income taxation matter when aiming to understand the true impact of 
labour taxation, the ETI has taken to a large degree the centre stage of many 
normative questions in public economics. Furthermore, the increased availability of 
high-quality administrative tax data offers researchers the opportunity to observe the 
taxable income of large populations over many years. The use of administrative tax 
return data instead of survey data is preferable since it offers much larger sample 
sizes and has far fewer problems with attrition, non-response, and measurement 
error. In recent years a fast-growing literature has emerged using these large 
administrative datasets and compelling identification strategies to estimate 
behavioural responses to income taxation. 
The Feldstein (1995) study 
To estimate (intensive-margin) elasticities of taxable income most studies are using 
variation in tax rates for identification. In 1995, Feldstein published his influential work 
using administrative tax panel data to estimate the ETI for the Tax Reform Act 1986 
put into force by the Reagan government. This reform brought especially large tax 
reductions for those at the top of the income distribution, with the top marginal tax 
rate falling from 50 to 28 percent. Hence, Feldstein focuses on estimating the effect of 
the reform on the taxable income of top earners. He groups taxpayers by their pre-
reform taxable income and looks at how their incomes evolve after the tax cuts of 
1986. Specifically, Feldstein uses a DiD methodology to compare the percent change 
in taxable income with the percent change in the net-of-tax-rate (= change in 
marginal tax rate) between two income groups. By doing so he obtains very large 
European Commission 
 
Study on the effects and incidence of labour taxation 
May 2015 | 79 
elasticities of taxable income (above 1), with far-reaching implications for policy 
conclusions, such as that the United States has been on the wrong side of the Laffer 
curve for the rich and that cutting tax rates might raise tax revenue even further. 
Partly due to this result, Feldstein’s study gained much attention, but also received 
strong methodological criticism. For instance, grouping taxpayers in a way as Feldstein 
does can result in very biased results for the DiD estimator when elasticities vary 
greatly between these two groups already before the reform. Further, the sample size 
Feldstein uses is rather small, and results are driven by few observations. Another 
source of bias are underlying secular income trends such as skill-biased technical 
progress that increase the income share of top earners but are unrelated to any tax-
driven changes in top incomes. When considering tax cuts at the top of the 
distribution without accounting for underlying trends of increasing top income shares, 
the obtained elasticity estimates might be substantially upward biased. Finally, mean 
reversion can cause biased estimates when grouping taxpayers according to their pre-
reform income level, since taxpayers with a positive income shock in the pre-reform 
year will tend to have a lower income in the following years, independently of the 
reform (= problem of transitory incomes).65 
Other studies identifying the ETI through a tax reform 
Subsequent studies aimed to address these issues and re-estimated Feldstein (1995) 
using both different methodological techniques and different tax variations as 
identification. For instance, Auten and Carroll (1999) studied the same tax reform but 
employed richer data and found much smaller elasticities (around 0.6). Gruber and 
Saez (2002) carefully examine the effects of mean reversion and secular trends in 
income inequality on the estimated ETI, using as well the Tax Reform Act of 1986 for 
identification. Specifically, they controlled for base year income by including 10-piece 
splines of pre-reform gross income. Furthermore, they emphasised the difference 
between taxable income and broad income responses, where broad income is defined 
as income before deductions. In Gruber and Saez (2002) the elasticity estimate of 
0.12 for broad income is notably smaller than their corresponding estimate for taxable 
income, suggesting that much of the taxable income response comes through 
deductions, exemptions, and exclusions. Consistent with this conclusion, they find that 
most of the response in taxable income can be attributed to itemisers (for itemisers, 
the elasticity is 0.65, whereas for non-itemisers, it is negative and insignificant). 
In a similar vein, Giertz (2007) investigates differences in elasticity estimates of 
taxable income versus broad income when using several distinct tax reforms (US tax 
reforms of 1986 and 1993 in particular) for identification. While finding large 
differences in the ETI estimates depending on the reform used for identification, the 
variation in elasticity estimates of broad income (e.g. wage earnings) was much 
smaller between the single tax reforms. This let him conclude that differences in the 
availability of deductions and exemptions matter in determining the ETI because 
itemizing was much more common after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In sum, his 
findings support the argument that changes regarding the breadth of the tax base and 
                                           
65 In the econometric terms, the systematic differences in elasticities already before the reform 
constitute a selection problem, and different trends in wages for the top income earners 
constitute a violation of the common trend assumption, while the mean reversion can be seen 
as an example for the Ashenfelter (1978) dip. 
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exemption rules (which usually occur when a tax reform is enacted) have a strong 
effect on the ETI but leave the underlying elasticity of broad income rather unaffected. 
Kleven and Schultz (2014) use a method similar to Gruber and Saez (2002) to 
uncover the ETI from various income tax reforms over the period 1984 to 2005 in 
Denmark. Methodological, their main advantage is a very stable income distribution in 
Denmark, allowing to identify behavioural responses to tax reforms much easier. 
Furthermore, they can rely on an impressive set of tax variation imposing different tax 
rates on different income components. They estimate an overall ETI of around 0.05 for 
wage earners and 0.10 for self-employed individuals. Moreover, they find larger 
elasticities when focusing on large tax reforms, consistent with the argument that 
taxpayers are more likely to overcome adjustment frictions when tax changes are 
salient and substantial in size. 
Recently the approach of Gruber and Saez (2002) has been criticised by Weber (2014) 
for failing to adequately controlling for serial correlation and therefore mean reversion. 
Using the same dataset as Gruber and Saez (2002), it is argued that a different choice 
of instrumental variables can help to better overcome the endogeneity. In particular, 
Weber (2014) finds significantly larger elasticities (0.858 for taxable income and 0.475 
for broad income) using higher order lags of the instruments. In contrast to previous 
studies the higher elasticities are interpreted as correctly estimated, rather than 
reflecting a longer-run elasticity. At the same time, the study still suffers from a 
number of the above mentioned limitations, most notably from the restricted sample 
of top income earners and the potential differential trends for this income group. 
Using nonlinearities in the tax schedules to identify the ETI 
A promising new avenue was laid out by Saez (2010), proposing a bunching estimator 
to uncover the elasticity of taxable income. His approach is based on the intuition that 
discontinuous reductions in wage rates at kink points of a tax schedule yield a non-
parametric source of identification for the underlying elasticity. In other words, the 
standard labour supply model where individuals choose to supply labour until the 
marginal disutility of work equals marginal utility of disposable after-tax income 
predicts the bunching of taxpayers at kink points of a tax schedule where marginal tax 
rates increase discretely. Unlike other cross-sectional tax variations from tax reforms 
used to identify real labour supply responses which are usually contaminated by 
heterogeneity in tastes, this approach holds the potential to yield very credible 
estimates (see Chetty, 2012). Saez (2010) finds significant bunching of taxpayers at 
the first kink point of the US EITC as well as at the threshold of the first federal tax 
bracket. However, he finds the observed bunching to be prevalent only among the 
self-employed and largely due to reporting effects (e.g. itemised deductions), with no 
evidence for bunching at any kink for wage earners. This evidence is broadly in line 
with previous findings that the elasticity of wage income is close to zero while the 
taxable income elasticity is positive and statistically significant (with a value of around 
0.3). 
In recent years, increasing evidence of the ETI has also been gathered for European 
countries. A vocal point of empirical research on behavioural responses to taxation in 
Europe has been Denmark, thanks to the availability of high-quality administrative 
data containing detailed socio-economic information. Chetty et al. (2011) detect clear 
bunching of taxable income for both self-employed and wage earners at a top kink of 
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the Danish tax schedule, with corresponding elasticities of 0.02 for wage earners and 
0.24 for the self-employed. This large difference in the ETI let them explore the role of 
optimization frictions such as adjustment costs. They find that elasticities of wage 
earners are positively associated with the flexibility of labour supply and collective 
bargaining, two forces that appear to effectively reduce adjustment costs. Their 
results suggest that adjustment frictions significantly attenuate the short-run ETI 
especially for wage earners, something which has to be taken into account when 
asking critical questions about the long-run elasticity of taxable income, a key 
parameter of interest for policy making. Bastani and Selin (2014) use Swedish data 
and find no bunching in the distribution of wage earnings, and only a very moderate 
response for self-employed. Similarly Kosonen and Matikka (2014) find no bunching at 
kink points in the Finnish income tax schedule. But studies argue that the lack of tax 
payer responses is mostly due to salience and optimization frictions.66   
Summarizing the existing evidence of behavioural responses to taxation using tax 
return data, one can conclude that population-wide taxable income elasticities are 
rather modest. Especially when taking into account the different sources of taxable 
income (e.g. wage earners versus self-employed) which differ with respect to 
avoidance opportunities, the real behavioural response to taxation appears to be quite 
small. For instance, much of the evidence on the ETI suggests that it is higher for 
high-income individuals who have more access to substantial tax planning, including 
deductible expenses (Saez et al., 2012). Dörrenberg et al. (2014) confirm the 
importance of reporting effects using German data. This is also in line with the 
repeated findings that taxable income appears to be much more response than more 
general income categories such as broad income. Hence, a broadening of the tax base, 
the closing of loopholes and more effective tools of tax enforcement can have non-
negligible effects on the size of the ETI. In return, this also means that the “pure” 
labour supply response of many taxpayers seems to be fairly inelastic (at least in the 
short-run), especially for wage earners and prime income earners.  
However, the finding that the observed elasticities for wage earners are rather small 
does not mean that taxing labour comes without distortions. While it is difficult for 
taxpayers to respond to tax changes in the short-run due to adjustment frictions such 
as hours constraints and inattention, long-run responses to labour taxation might still 
be substantial. In particular, long-run responses to taxes do not need to take place at 
the individual level and as such, cannot be captured by conventional micro-economic 
models. Chetty (2012) addresses this issue in his meta-analysis of various ETI studies 
and proposes an econometric approach to put bounds on elasticities when responses 
to taxation are incomplete due to adjustment costs. Pooling estimates from the 
existing studies he calculates a structural (long-run) labour supply elasticity of 0.33.67 
He concludes that small frictions can explain most differences found between micro 
and macro elasticities, as well as between extensive and intensive margin elasticities. 
In sum, what can be learned from the literature on the elasticity of taxable income is 
the value of having low tax rates on a broad tax base, a position long advocated by 
economists.  
                                           
66 See also Kleven and Waseem (2013) who use Pakistani income tax data to analyse 
optimisation frictions.  
67 Jäntti et al. (forthcoming) find similar result in their approach, bridging the gap between 
micro- and macro estimates of labour supply elasticities.  
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3.4. Review of the literature on labour demand elasticities  
The studies discussed above implicitly assume that labour demand is completely 
elastic, and therefore changes in labour supply directly translate into changes in 
employment. If labour demand is only somewhat elastic (downward sloping, as 
depicted in Figure 5, panel B), a shift in the labour supply curve, e.g. following a tax 
reduction, will decrease market wages, and hence dampen the employment effect of 
the reform. 
The consensus in the literature however does not support the notion that labour 
supply is completely elastic. In his seminal work on labour demand, Hamermesh 
(1993) reviews nearly 200 empirical studies on the static demand for labour. He 
brackets the long run constant output68 demand elasticity of labour between 0.15 
and 0.75, with a “best guess” point estimate at 0.3. He also notices that the demand 
elasticity decreases with education, pointing to a better substitutability between low-
skilled workers and capital. In a recent study, Lichter et al. (2014) perform a meta-
regression analysis on 945 labour demand elasticity estimates from 105 micro-level 
studies. They do include micro-level studies reviewed in Hamermesh (1993), but also 
add newer research published up to 2012. They find 
 that the labour demand elasticity is higher in the long run than in the short run,  
 that it is higher for low-skilled workers, and somewhat lower for high skilled 
workers, than for the general workforce (although this last difference is less clear)  
 there are no significant differences between genders,  
 demand elasticities are higher for atypical (fixed contract) workers and 
 labour demand elasticities are increasing over time. 
This last effect might be related to globalisation and technological change giving firms 
more opportunities to substitute away from (domestic) labour as an input. Based on 
this analysis, they offer a new interval for the long run constant output labour demand 
elasticity of 0.072 to 0.446, with a preferred estimate of 0.25, very close to the 
Hamermesh’s (1993) “best guess”. Hence, assuming labour demand to be completely 
elastic might lead to biased estimates of labour supply elasticities. 
To allow for the interaction of labour supply and demand, Peichl and Siegloch (2012) 
develop a structural labour demand model, to use alongside a structural labour supply 
model (as discussed in section 3.3.2). Using matched firm – employee data from a 
German administrative dataset, they estimate labour demand elasticities by imposing 
a cost function and minimising costs given constant firm output and individual wage 
rates. They distinguish three skill levels or educational groups. In line with 
Hamermesh (1993), they find that labour demand elasticities vary across skill levels: 
the demand elasticity is highest for low-skilled workers at -1.05, and lowest for 
medium skill workers at -0.37. To link the demand and supply models, in a first step, 
they estimate labour supply elasticities by marginally increasing wages in their 
                                           
68 Two elasticity concepts are used in the literature: the constant output demand elasticity of 
labour, which only captures the firm substituting between input factors, and the total demand 
elasticity of labour, that takes into account the effect of wage changes on output prices. The 
constant output elasticity is smaller in absolute terms than the total elasticity: a perfectly 
competitive firm must raise prices as costs increase, which in turn decreases market demand, 
causing the firm’s labour demand to further decrease (Hamermesh, 1993). Here, we 
concentrate on the constant output elasticity. 
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structural labour supply model. These elasticities are fed into the labour demand 
model to calculate new wage rates given the new (increased) labour supply. These 
new wage rates in turn serve as input for the labour supply model, and so on, until 
changes in labour supply and wage rates become very small. The incorporation of 
labour demand does work to offset the labour supply effect by about 25 %. 
Another approach to allow for labour demand restrictions in a labour supply model is 
to introduce the probability of involuntary unemployment into a discrete choice labour 
supply model as discussed in section 3.3.2 without fully modelling the firm side. 
Demand side frictions are introduced into the model only on the basis of worker 
characteristics. These models are called Double Hurdle Models because the labour 
supply decision can be seen as a two-step process: first, the worker determines her 
preferred working hours category, and if she decides to work positive hours, she faces 
the probability of not finding employment. The probability of involuntary 
unemployment typically depends on worker characteristics (education, labour market 
experience, industry and so on) as well as on local labour market characteristics 
(Peichl and Siegloch, 2012, Bargain et al., 2010). A recent example of this approach is 
Bargain et al. (2010). Using German survey data from 2002, they estimate two labour 
supply models: as a benchmark, they use a standard structural labour supply model 
(as discussed in section 3.3.2), which is unconstrained in the sense that it assumes 
realised labour supply decisions to be the result of individual optimisation. In other 
words, the model assumes that unemployed individuals choose to be so, given their 
after-tax income and their preferences for consumption and leisure. This can lead to 
overestimated preferences for leisure, especially for groups with a high incidence of 
involuntary unemployment (such as single men). For the second, constrained, model, 
the authors use information on desired working hours, as available for unemployed or 
non-participating individuals in their data-set, as the optimal hours choice. 
Additionally, the probability of not finding employment, conditional on moving from 
non-participation into employment, is explicitly introduced into the model. They find 
that labour supply (employment) reactions are overstated if all unemployment is 
assumed to be voluntary: individuals who are involuntarily unemployed find 
themselves unable to react to an increase in their wage rate, and individuals who want 
to react face a risk to be rationed on the labour market. Simulating a policy reform 
geared to encourage low-wage workers to work full-time, they find that this bias 
amounts to about 60 % of the total employment effect. 
3.5. Learning about labour tax incidence in CGE models 
CGE models are general equilibrium models, which are calibrated to given economies. 
The particularity of the models varies from simple extensions of theoretical models to 
extensive versions with many countries, many production sectors and many household 
types. Also the modelled behaviour of the households and firms vary from exogenous 
supply or demand in some markets to dynamic optimization under uncertainty. In 
basic models the prices in the labour, capital and goods markets adjust without 
frictions to equalise demand and supply. 
The benefits of the CGE models are well recognised. The models have sound 
theoretical basis laid on the optimization decisions of firms and households. They allow 
an analysis of the investment, labour demand and production decisions of the firms 
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and consumption and labour supply decisions of the households. Dynamic versions of 
the model allow studying optimal adjustment to new equilibrium. The use of these 
models avoids the Lucas critique and allows also quantifying the effects of large policy 
changes, which may generate non-trivial reactions in many markets. The model 
builder must specify the optimization behaviour, markets and institutions, which 
compels making conscious choices and makes the models transparent. Peichl (2009) 
stresses the potential of linking CGE models with a microsimulation model. This allows 
to combine the analysis of distributional effects from microsimulation models with 
feedback effects from CGE models. However, due to the complexity and high set up 
costs of these combined models only very few researchers are applying them.  
3.5.1. Properties, which are important for incidence of taxes 
The choices made by the modeller on the specification of the markets and institutions 
and the optimization of households and firms determine largely the incidence of taxes. 
The key benefit of CGE models is that complex interactions between different markets 
are taken into account, which in turn makes it difficult to clearly single out the effect 
of a particular assumption. It is however possible to review the effects of the 
individual assumptions in isolation, which gives an indication of the broad direction of 
the effect. Table 5 provides a summary of the expected effects on the tax incidence of 
several key assumptions made in the model design of CGE models.  
Table 5: Modelling choices in CGE models affecting tax incidence 
Channel Assumption 
Ceteris paribus effect on  
tax incidence 
Market 
environment 
Country size and  
openness 
In smaller and more open countries 
more incidence is on labour 
Goods market 
competition 
Imperfect competition results in less 
incidence on labour 
Labour 
Demand 
Elasticity of substitution 
between input 
More substitutability results in more 
incidence on labour 
Adjustment frictions on 
the capital market 
More frictions on the capital market 
result in less incidence on labour 
Labour 
Supply 
Intratemporal labour 
supply elasticity 
The higher the elasticity the less the 
incidence is on labour 
Intertemporal 
substitution elasticity 
The higher the elasticity the less the 
incidence is on labour 
Migration 
More migration results in less tax 
incidence on labour 
Public sector 
Link between 
contributions and 
benefits 
A stronger link between 
contributions and benefits shift tax 
incidence on labour 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Four broad channels are identified through which the tax incidence is determined. The 
general market environment determines whether the tax burden ultimately can end up 
on consumers rather than on capital owners or workers. The labour demand and 
labour supply channels determine whether the tax incidence is borne by capital or 
labour and features of the public sector can shift this balance. 
The size and openness of the economy influence strongly the market conditions. In 
one extreme there are small open economies, which have high, if not infinite, price 
elasticities in capital and goods markets. If endogenous migration is ruled out, the 
incidence of taxes is mainly on labour.69 In another extreme there are economies like 
US, which influence both domestic and world market prices and interest rates. In this 
case the incidence is rather complicated, because also foreign households are affected 
by the price changes (see e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder, 1993 or Fehr et al., 2013). 
Besides the size of the economy, also other market conditions can play a role on the 
incidence result. For example, imperfect competition in goods markets is 
sometimes assumed, which enables shifting the incidence of payroll taxes on 
consumers.  
Not surprisingly the modelling of the labour markets is fundamental to the incidence 
outcome. Analysis of labour markets with CGE models is not very common. In many 
historical models labour supply was exogenous and market-clearing wages balance 
demand and supply. This is likely to be a sufficient description of the markets if the 
studied policy does not change the after-tax wages much.  
Studies directly aimed at analysing labour markets require naturally the specification 
of supply, demand and market clearing. As discussed by Boeters and Savard (2012), 
there are two ways to refine the analysis; either more detailed description of the 
mechanisms or disaggregation of the relevant units. 
The nation-wide labour supply potential is constrained by the working-age 
population. Endogenous participation and hours of work decisions depend on 
preferences for leisure, net wages and outside options like unemployment benefits or 
pensions. In life-cycle models individuals may also have a hump-shaped productivity 
profile, which has a different shape in different educational groups.70  
The substitution elasticity in the utility function of individuals determines the 
intratemporal labour supply and consumption reactions to changes in the relative 
prices of leisure and consumption. The higher the elasticity, the more taxation of 
labour increase consumption of leisure and the less the incidence is on labour.  
In dynamic models the intertemporal substitution elasticity defines the substitution 
between current and future leisure and consumption, when the prices change. The 
higher the elasticity, the more individuals react to changes in taxation by smoothing 
lifetime consumption and labour supply. Also the time preference of the individuals 
matter: the more impatient the households are, the sooner they prefer to consume 
                                           
69 Endogenous migration would increase the net wage elasticity of labour supply and may 
amend the conclusion. 
70 The heterogeneous productivity of households does not necessarily mean that there are 
many wage levels. Assuming that the labour units supplied are homogenous, but various 
households have different productivity in supplying those, these units can be aggregated. The 
wage determined in markets is paid to these efficiency units. 
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their lifetime resources. Correspondingly, higher probability of dying in future years 
reduces the willingness to postpone consumption. These factors imply that the 
reactions of individuals to changes in labour taxes depend both on the preferences and 
the age of the individuals. On the other hand, borrowing constraints may restrict the 
lifetime choices. If they are binding as young, labour supply is higher earlier in the 
working life.  
Additional richness to labour supply reactions and incidence comes from educational 
differences. Well educated have typically rising lifetime productivity and wage profiles, 
which start later and end later in the life cycle. Less educated have flatter labour 
income profiles, which start and end earlier and bend downward near retirement.  
The labour-leisure choices of individuals are described above. The number of 
individuals supplying labour is determined by the size of the working age population, 
participation rate and unemployment. The size of working age population can be 
endogenous, if labour taxation influences immigration. The more elastic is 
immigration, the more the incidence of labour taxes is on capital. Location, as well as 
cultural and linguistic differences matter.  
Heterogeneity among the utility maximizing individuals or households allows analysing 
intra- and intergenerational incidence of taxes. Typical characteristic which 
differentiate individuals are income, gender, education, age and birth cohort.71 The 
typical optimization horizon of households is either one period, rest of the lifetime or 
infinite.72 The information about the future may consist of perfect foresight, 
idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding e.g. lifetime wages of the individual or aggregate 
uncertainty regarding e.g. future prices in the economy.  
The demand for labour is derived from production functions and is based on the 
productivity of the marginal unit of labour and the price of output. Therefore the 
production technology is also an important driver of the tax incidence results. 
Especially the capital-labour ratio and the elasticity of substitution between 
inputs matter. Both can vary among industries. Some models include also investment 
adjustment cost to increase realism in the changes of the capital stock. There might 
also be several types of labour with varying substitutability between each other and 
with capital.73 The higher the elasticity, the easier is for firms to shift between labour 
to capital when labour supply changes and the less the incidence of taxation of labour 
incomes is on the yield of capital.  
There might be also other technological constraints that influence the possibility for 
substitution. In some dynamic models, the capital in use is determined by investments 
done during the previous period, which means that the first period incidence of labour 
                                           
71 CGE models seldom include very many types of households. It has been increasingly popular 
to study redistribution of income by combining micro-simulation models and CGE models, see 
e.g. Hérault (2010). Another possibility is to generate ex post heterogeneity by introducing 
idiosyncratic uncertainty in life cycle models, see e.g. Conesa and Krueger (1999). 
72 Planning horizon of one period refers to static models, or sequential dynamic models with 
myopic decision makers (e.g. Ballard et al., 1985), rest-of-lifetime horizon refers to lifecycle 
models with overlapping generations (OLG) structure (e.g. Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987) and 
infinite horizon refers to neoclassical growth models (e.g. Chamley, 1986). 
73 The actual labour input in production is modelled often to include labour augmenting 
productivity growth. There are also endogenous growth CGE models where tax reforms 
influence the decisions to accumulate human capital, see e.g. Granzau and Martin (2003). 
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income tax change is on capital. A more advanced model type includes investment 
adjustment costs, which also tend to increase the incidence on capital, but separates 
between owners of old and new capital. If the required rate of return on capital is 
fixed, as in case of frictionless capital movements, the tax changes are immediately 
capitalised in the market value of the firms and the future owners of capital gets the 
global market rate of return. Also anticipation interacts with frictions: if the tax rate 
change is surprising, the investment adjustment costs become more important 
determinant of incidence. More generally, the use of dynamic models means that the 
incidence of a given tax can vary in time.  
Restricted substitutability of different types of labour in production provides an 
extension for the incidence results. Another extension is introduction of several 
production sectors with varying production technologies. 
Labour market mechanisms refer to choices between perfect competition and 
various versions of imperfect competition. The dominating theories of endogenous 
unemployment are based on search and matching, efficiency wages and collective 
bargaining. These theories have been used as a basis of determining an empirically 
estimated wage curve or the theories have been modelled explicitly and the structural 
parameters have been estimated (Boeters and Savard, 2012). Search models create 
involuntary unemployment due to frictions in the search for new jobs, e.g. 
(Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg, 2004). Efficiency wage and collective bargaining models 
create unemployment due to higher than market clearing wages. There might also be 
an exogenous amount of unemployment in perfect competition models, but it must be 
allocated to the individuals exogenously. 
Finally the use of the tax revenues in the public sector can largely influence the tax 
incidence result.74 One example is that any policy which influences wages in the 
private sector also increases public expenditure since the wages of the public sector 
employees are likely to rise as well as income transfers indexed to wages. Also the 
social security system influences the labour supply elasticities by providing income 
transfers, such as unemployment benefits and pensions, which are conditional on not 
working and influence thereby the labour supply decision in extensive margin. On the 
other hand, the more labour income generates (net-of-tax) pension rights, the more it 
increases the price of leisure during working years. As an example, taxation of 
earnings-related pensions reduces labour supply. Also the means tested basic income 
transfers may affect the labour supply reactions of low income individuals. 
3.5.2. Reviewing the incidence of labour income taxes in CGE models 
CGE models are not very often used to study incidence of labour taxes. One reason 
might be that the final tax burden of these taxes is generally considered to be anyhow 
on labour. This section presents examples of representative studies, which analyse 
                                           
74 Unfortunately, a typical limitation in the CGE models is that the existence of the 
public sector is not well justified. Public services are typically assumed to generate no 
utility to households or to enter household utility functions in a separable fashion. 
Intra- and intergenerational redistribution with income transfers has often been 
modelled, but a full recognition of the benefits of public policy would require modelling 
insurance effects of taxes and transfers (see e.g. Harenberg and Ludwig, 2014) and 
the influence of externalities and other market imperfections. 
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comprehensive tax reforms, fiscal devaluations, pension reforms and the insurance 
role of the progressive tax and transfer system. Even though these studies do not aim 
directly the incidence of the labour income taxes, they provide also interesting 
incidence results. 
One popular policy issues studied with CGE models has been comprehensive tax 
reforms in which the current progressive tax system is replaced by different versions 
of a flat tax or a consumption tax. The aim of these reforms is to increase efficiency by 
limiting progressivity in the labour income taxation and moving to cash flow taxation 
of profits. The studies offer also rich results on intra- and intergenerational and in 
some cases also international incidence of the tax system, see e.g. articles in Aaron 
and Gale (1986), Auerbach and Hassett (2005) or Diamond and Zodrow (2008). 
Altig et al. (2001) studies five alternatives to U.S. federal income tax with a large 
scale dynamic life-cycle simulation model, which is an extension of the famous 
Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987) model. The tax reform alternatives are a proportional 
income tax, a proportional consumption tax, a flat tax (Hall and Rabushka, 1995), a 
flat tax with transition relief and X tax (Bradford, 1996), which is a progressive version 
of the flat tax. The model used includes 12 types of households, which different 
lifetime labour productivity profiles, and 55 birth cohorts. The changes in market 
prices are strong since the economy is closed. There are no market imperfections.  
A transition to a proportional wage income tax without exemptions would increase the 
long run capital stock and output due to lower marginal tax rates on labour, which 
increase overall labour supply. But the elimination of progressivity increases the tax 
rates of the poor and reduces their incomes permanently.  
A transition to a proportional consumption tax (actually implemented as a proportional 
wage income tax and a business cash flow tax) has largely similar influence on growth 
and income distribution. But it hurts also the initially rich due to the fall in the 
purchasing power of wealth. The working-age generations compensate it by working 
and saving more, but the retired generations suffer a loss of consumption. 
A flat tax introduces a deduction in the consumption taxation, which eliminates some 
of the adverse income distribution results. But now the reaction of labour supply and 
economic growth is subdued and the loss of welfare extends also to middle income 
citizens. The initial negative wealth effect remains.  
Next the wealth effect is mitigated by allowing tax depreciations of the existing capital 
stock. The subsequent loss of tax revenues compels to increase permanently the flat 
tax rate and the labour supply effects and the overall long run gains from the reform 
are small. Sheltering the poor and the current rich from the adverse outcomes lowers 
the welfare of the current and future middle class citizens.  
The last experiment was a transition to an X tax, which preserves the progressive 
taxation of wages and combines it with cash flow taxation of capital incomes. The cash 
flow tax rate is the same as the highest marginal tax rate of the wages. The growth 
effects are large, since the cash flow tax allows immediate expensing of new 
investments against the high tax rate. Also the distributional effects are more 
favourable, except that the initial implicit wealth tax is now higher.  
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The simulations of large scale CGE-OLG model highlight the diverse incidence 
outcomes of the various fundamental tax reforms. The strongest limitations in the 
used model are the closed economy assumption and perfect foresight of the agents. 
Also a more detailed production and consumption structure would increase realism of 
the results. 
Fiscal devaluation aims to improve the international competitiveness of the 
economy. Its effects are known to be mostly temporary and therefore it represents 
counter-cyclical policy more than structural policy. In the most common version it is a 
revenue neutral combination of a reduction in employers’ social insurance 
contributions and an increase in the VAT rate. Actually this reform also increases 
efficiency, since the burden of an increase in VAT rate is spread broadly to the 
economy: in addition to wage incomes its falls on current wealth and income 
transfers, which are not indexed to consumer prices. Therefore the needed increase in 
the VAT rate is also smaller than the reduction in the contribution rate. The problems 
of the reform are its potentially negative effects of income redistribution and short-
lived impact on external balance. The analysis can also be made stepwise to reveal the 
different incidence effects of the reduction in the contribution rate and the VAT rate.  
The crisis in the Euro area has increased interest in fiscal devaluations. There are 
several recent simulation studies that focus on the Southern European members of the 
EMU, such as Annicchiarico et al. (2014), Bosca et al. (2013), Gomes et al. (2014) and 
Engler et al. (2014). Typical methods to analyse the outcomes are dynamic multi-
country CGE models or estimated macroeconometric models. Unfortunately these 
types of models are not able to separate the incidence of the reform on income 
redistribution. In some models also the important price and wage rigidities are lacking. 
The study of CPB and CAPP (2013) covers both the macroeconomic and distributional 
effects of fiscal devaluations. The macroeconomic effects were studied using the 
macroeconometric multi-country model NiGEM and an OLG model and the 
distributional effects with several microsimulation models. The NiGEM simulations 
suggested that the balanced-budget reform increases GDP and employment, but has 
little effect on the trade balance. The OLG model simulation revealed that there might 
be permanent effects on the labour costs, if non-indexing the social transfers weakens 
the bargaining power of labour unions. The microsimulations show that fiscal 
devaluations are regressive, if the cut in social security contributions is not restricted 
to low income workers. 
The main motivation for pension reforms is population ageing, which has weakened 
the fiscal sustainability of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financed defined benefit pension 
systems. Smaller birth cohorts and longer lifetimes have resulted in an unfair 
intergenerational allocation of the burden of financing pensions. Most of the reforms 
also aim to improve efficiency by strengthening the link between paid contributions 
and the received benefits. This reduces the degree to which the contributions are 
considered as taxes. In most countries the majority of pension contributions are paid 
by employers, which brings into question the final incidence of these taxes.  
The realization of the full effects of pension reforms takes decades. Therefore 
numerical OLG models are invaluable tools for the impact analysis. To cover the full 
effects, models include heterogeneity in education, which influences lifetime 
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productivity, length of working lives and life expectancy and risks related to 
employment status, disability and longevity. 
While the incidence of labour taxes is mainly determined by elasticities of labour 
supply and demand, does the incidence of mandatory pension contributions depend on 
both the incidence of labour income taxes in general and on the degree in which 
contributions are considered as a tax. The latter varies in typical pension systems in 
time, between birth cohorts and between income groups. The less the employees’ 
contributions are considered as a tax, the less they influence labour supply. The less 
the employers’ contributions are considered as a tax, the more the employees are 
willing to adjust their wages. Therefore strengthening the link between contributions 
and benefits has shifted the incidence of employers’ contributions on labour and 
reduced labour supply distortions. 
A non-distorting mandatory pension scheme imitates the choices that a rationally 
behaving person would have done, if the scheme did not exist. These choices may 
include purchasing private pension insurance. Any deviation from this benchmark 
changes labour supply and saving decisions and asset portfolios of the households. 
The fact that there are mandatory pension systems reveals that the market solution is 
not considered to maximise the welfare of the citizens. But the market solution 
provides a useful point of comparison. So does another extreme, a mandatory tax-
financed flat rate pension scheme.  
The closest substitute to the market solution is a mandatory fully funded defined 
contribution pension scheme, especially if some additional conditions are fulfilled. 
Benefits should be determined individually by the amount of paid contributions, the 
yield of the funds, retirement age and actuarial longevity insurance. The contribution 
rate should not be higher than the individual would have chosen if the pension scheme 
had been voluntary, to avoid too large forced saving and longevity insurance and 
liquidity problems. Also the portfolio of the pension fund should correspond to the one 
that the individual would have chosen.  
Full funding of contributions and investing the money in efficient portfolio corresponds 
to private saving for old age if the mandatory contribution rate does not lead to higher 
than optimal saving in any part of the life cycle. People are often liquidity constrained 
during their early working years. Therefore a fixed contribution rate may be too high 
during these years even though it would not lead a too high total saving for old age. 
If a collective longevity insurance is actuarially neutral and compatible with longevity 
risk aversion of the individual, it may even be more efficient than voluntary individual 
pension insurance, which is vulnerable to adverse selection (and in some countries not 
available at all). On the other hand a too high level of longevity insurance cannot be 
neutralised by private actions. In an optimal situation the mandatory scheme would 
not insure very high incomes, but there is a possibility to top up it with fairly priced 
individual pension insurances. 
Apart from a neutral pension scheme, also a neutral tax treatment of the contributions 
and benefits is needed to avoid distortions. A flat income tax rate and either EET or 
TEE taxation fulfils the criteria. In EET taxation the contributions are deductible from 
the income tax base and are taxed with the yield accrued, when withdrawn. The 
government participates in sharing of the rate-of-return risk, and is rewarded with 
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positive expected tax revenues. In TEE taxation the contributions are not deductible 
but the pension capital and its yield are not taxed when withdrawn. The income tax 
rates should be fixed in time.  
In the neutral scheme described above there is no intra- or intergenerational 
redistribution between individuals and no distortions. A socially optimal pension 
system deviates from this benchmark for several reasons. Redistribution increases 
welfare in the society. Moreover, PAYG elements provide insurance against aggregate 
shocks, such as variation in the yield of the pension funds, if labour productivity and 
the yield are not strongly correlated. Therefore adding these elements to a pre-funded 
pension scheme expands the set of available portfolios and allows risk sharing 
between generations.  
There are several aspects how the current pension systems deviate from the 
neutral one. The link between paid contributions and received benefits is in current 
pension systems weaker than in the non-distorting benchmark for many reasons. 
Typical features in mandatory earnings-related pension systems are defined benefits 
principle and PAYG financing. The monthly pension is determined typically by the 
earned wages and a coefficient which translates the wages to pension rights. Basic 
pension systems are typically tax-financed and provide flat rate residence-based 
pensions.  
There is often a ceiling for the wages that generate earnings-related pension rights. It 
is also quite common that a limited amount of pensions is accrued during spells of 
inactivity, like unemployment and maternity leave. The third extensively used 
redistributing element is the means-testing of earnings-related pensions against basic 
pensions.  
An overwhelming share of the mandatory pension systems is funded following a PAYG 
principle. Working generations pay the pensions of the retired. If the average growth 
rate of wage bill falls short of the average yield of pension funds, the ratio of received 
benefits to paid contributions is lower for an individual than in a fully funded system.  
The PAYG funding principle is also sensitive to changes in demographics, employment 
rates and the rate of productivity. A temporary increase in fertility or immigration 
would lower the contribution rates of the large working cohorts, but increase those of 
the next generations. Baby boom generations are a good example of this. An increase 
in the growth rate of productivity would lower the contribution rates if the accrued 
pension rights and paid pensions are not fully indexed to growth rate of the wage bill. 
Realisation of these aggregate risks implies that in PAYG financed pension systems the 
degree of which the contribution rate includes elements of tax varies in time and 
between birth cohorts. The intergenerational variation in the tax contents is in many 
cases obscured by pension reforms, which include birth cohort specific grandfathering 
clauses. 
Many of the recent pension reforms have tightened the link between the wages and 
pensions.75 In some cases also elements of defined contribution pension scheme have 
been introduced in defined pension systems. Pensions, retirement ages or required 
contribution periods are linked to the remaining life expectancy of the retiring cohort. 
                                           
75 This tightening has abolished the rather arbitrary redistribution related to final salary plans. 
Other details of the recent reforms have been described e.g. in OECD (2012c, 2014b). 
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The notional defined contribution (NDC) principle goes further towards a neutral 
pension scheme. The benefits are determined by the amount of contributions paid 
during the working life, even though funding of the scheme is based on PAYG 
principle. Any variation in demographics or employment rates are reflected in the 
indexation of accrued pension rights and paid pensions. In ageing societies this 
indexation provides typically weaker average yield on pensions than a fully funded 
scheme. 
The adequacy of pensions is typically secured by high contribution rates in mandatory 
pension schemes. But it means that these rates are likely to be too high to be optimal 
for some stages of life. Also the amount of income insured against idiosyncratic and 
aggregate longevity risk may be too high to be optimal. This issue may appear both in 
defined benefit and defined contribution pension schemes, making it more likely that 
contributions are considered as taxes. The recent cuts in pension benefits have 
reduced the likelihood of having too high replacement rates. 
Uncertainty and the insurance role of the tax system 
The recent development in the numerical models has improved the potential of 
studying new issues such as optimal progressivity of the income taxes, when there is 
idiosyncratic uninsurable labour income uncertainty. The models are still rather simple 
descriptions of the economies.  
Conesa and Kruger (2006) compare the insurance benefits of progressive income 
taxes and the efficiency losses due to lower labour supply and investments. They find 
out that a transition to a flat tax system with a tax rate of 17.2 % and fixed deduction 
of $ 9400 would be optimal for US. The lower labour income tax rate for the high 
income earners increase labour supply so that initially the real wages fall and output 
increases. In the long term also the capital stock increases allowing the productivity of 
labour and real wages to rise above the initial level. The welfare calculations show that 
income-poor gain from the tax deduction and income rich benefit from the lower tax 
rate. It is not possible to separate the incidence of labour taxes due to the 
comprehensive taxation of incomes.  
Kindermann and Krueger (2014) simulate the optimal tax rate for the highest 1 % of 
income earners. The simulation model is a large scale OLG model with uninsurable 
labour productivity risk. The optimality criterion is the weighted sum of expected 
lifetime utility of households currently alive and born in the future. With this kind of 
measure, the welfare loss of the top income earners has little weight in the social 
welfare function. They find out that the revenue maximising marginal tax rate for the 
highest 1 % of income earners is 95 % and the welfare maximising tax rate is 89 % in 
the long run. The jump in the tax rate reduces initially the labour supply of the top 
income earners by 40 %. The aggregate labour input falls by 10 % and the output by 
7 %. The tax transition is financed with public debt, which crowds out private 
investments. In the long term the supply of labour recovers somewhat, but remains 
lower than in the initial steady state. The aggregate consumption falls by 7 % in the 
long term. The stochastic labour productivity process is the key element in the study. 
It generates very high and somewhat persistent income with small probability. Badel 
and Hugget (2014) suggest that if individuals have the possibility to accumulate 
human capital, the optimal top marginal tax rate is substantially lower. 
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3.5.3. An illustration of the link between contributions and benefits 
We simulate the incidence of employers’ pension contribution rate using a numerical 
OLG model. The aim of this example is to show the main driving forces of the 
adjustments in the economy. 
Description of the FOG model 
The FOG model is of the type originated by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The model 
is modified to describe an almost small open economy and calibrated to the Finnish 
economy. The FOG model consists of four sectors and three markets. The sectors are 
households, enterprises, foreign sector and a government sector. The general 
government is divided further to central government, municipalities, two pension 
funds and a social security institute. The labour, goods and capital markets are 
competitive and prices balance supply and demand period-by-period. There is no 
money or inflation in the model. The unit period is five years, and the model has 16 
adult generations living in each period. The model is described in more detail e.g., in 
Lassila and Valkonen (2007). 
We assume that the pre-tax rate of return on saving and investments is determined in 
global capital markets. Household and firms take the interest rate as fixed in their 
plans. The stock market value of the firms adjusts to generate a stock market yield 
which corresponds to the bond yield. Only immediately after an unexpected profit 
shock there will be share price changes which deviate from this arbitrage rule.  
The firms have some monopoly power in exports, which makes the terms of trade 
endogenous. The goods that are used as intermediate good, in private consumption 
and in investments are CES composites of the imported and domestic goods, implying 
that their substitutability is imperfect. Foreign economies are assumed to grow with 
the trend growth rate of the domestic labour productivity. 
Labour input is determined partly by exogenous assumptions and partly due to 
endogenous adjustments in the model. Hours of work are decided by households, but 
age-specific participation rates and unemployment rates are exogenous. Real wage 
adjusts to equalise the value of marginal product of labour and labour costs in the 
production of domestic goods.  
We assume that the modelled subsectors of the general government have their own 
budgets, which are balanced either by social security contributions or earned income 
taxes. The only exception is the state budget, which is balanced by using a lump sum 
transfer. Earned income tax brackets are adjusted with the growth of the economy. 
Households react to the income and substitution effects of taxation, social security 
contributions and pension rules. 
The current statutory Finnish pension system is modelled in detail. It consists of a flat 
rate tax-financed basic pension scheme and an earnings-related scheme, which is 
partially pre-funded. In the earnings-related scheme all earnings during the lifetime 
accrue pension rights with age-specific accrual rate. The pension rights and paid 
pensions are indexed to wage rate so that for the accrued rights the weight of the 
wage increase is 80 % and weight of the consumer prices 20 %. The corresponding 
weights in the indexation of pensions are 20 % and 80 %. The pensions are reduced 
further by life expectancy adjustment. Pensions are taxed using the EET principle. 
European Commission 
 
Study on the effects and incidence of labour taxation 
May 2015 | 94 
Simulation results 
We simulate the outcomes of an unanticipated pension financing reform in which 2.5 
percentage points of the employers’ contribution rate is shifted to be paid by 
employees. A similar reform was actually implemented in Finland 1992-1993 to 
support the competitiveness of the firms. It was also agreed that the new employer’s 
contribution will reduce the pensionable wage that is used to calculate the earned 
pension rights each year. The aim was to keep the relative living standards of 
employees and pensioners unchanged. The changes in the employees’ contribution 
rate also influence the indexation of benefits. Third element was to agree that any 
further changes in the contribution rate are divided equally between employers and 
employees. All these elements are also included in this simulation example.  
If the shift in the tax burden would have been implemented without the link between 
employees’ contributions and pensions, it would have expanded the pension system 
permanently. This is because lower employers’ contributions increase wages and 
thereby the future pensions, even though the marginal product of labour does not 
change.  
Table 6 shows how the contribution rates, wages and pensions react to the reform. 
The first observation is a small decline in the total contribution rate. This is because of 
the increase in the employees’ contribution rate lowers the pensionable wage and 
pensions. Furthermore, the increase in wages is only partially reflected in the 
pensions, due to the indexation rules. The replacement rate reduction is larger for 
future generations. 
Table 6: Changes in contributions, wages and pensions, in percent 
 Contribution rate, private sector  
Pensions,  
of total wages Time Employee Employer Total Wages 
2013-2017 2.32 -2.68 -0.36 2.13 -0,46 
2023-2027 2.23 -2.77 -0.54 2.16 -0.66 
2033-2037 2.13 -2.87 -0.75 2.23 -0.75 
2043-2047 2.07 -2.93 -0.85 2.29 -0.74 
2053-2057 2.04 -2.94 -0.91 2.33 -0.72 
Source: Own simulations with FOG. 
The initial 2.5 % increase in the employees’ contribution rate is reduced to two 
percentage points in the long term. Similar outcome is observable in the employers’ 
contributions. The reason for the adjustment is that falling pension expenditure. The 
net effect of the changes in the wages and employees’ pension contributions on the 
disposable income of the workers is rather small. 
The reform has very small effects on the economy. The labour supply falls marginally 
(0.08 %) in the long term. Dividends of the firms, as well as the market value of the 
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firms decline a little due to the reduction of the labour supply. The effect on capital 
stock is almost non-existing, as well as the change in the amount of domestic 
production. In the short run, the reduction of pensions generates a marginal decline in 
the private consumption. In the long term, wage income increases enough to reverse 
the trend. The price of the domestic good falls initially somewhat, because the fall in 
consumption requires an increase in exports. Also this trend reverses in the long term.  
The influence of the reform on the public finances is rather complicated. The increase 
in the wages both expands the tax base for income taxes and compounds the public 
expenditure due to higher income transfers. The wages in the public sector increase, 
but the need for employers’ contributions falls. 
The employees’ contributions are deductible from taxable wages. With the high 
marginal taxes prevailing in Finland approximately only a half of the increase in the 
contribution rate would decrease the disposable income of the employees. Firms can 
deduct the labour costs from the taxable profits. The more completely the wage reacts 
to the cut in the employers’ contribution rate, the less the corporate income tax 
revenues fall. The net outcome of all these changes is a marginal reduction of the 
municipal income tax rate and a somewhat higher increase in the lump sum tax used 
to balance the central government finances. The total tax revenues as a percentage of 
GDP increase marginally. 
Discussion 
As noted earlier, the incidence of labour income taxes is largely determined by the 
main features of the CGE simulation model. With the almost small open economy 
structure and frictionless labour markets, the incidence of pension contributions should 
be mainly on wages, with only small effects on profits, production, employment, prices 
and public finances. Furthermore, the 5-year unit period in FOG rules out analysis of 
short-term reactions. The results are largely as expected.  
The details of the pension system matter however. Without a compensating link 
between employees’ contributions and pensions, the reform would have expanded the 
pension system. Another important rule is the indexation of pensions. In the Finnish 
case, where the change in real wages has little effect on pensions, the reform causes a 
rather large intergenerational shift in incomes. If the accrued pension rights and paid 
pensions were indexed to total labour income costs of the employer, the incidence of 
changes in pension contributions would be more equally distributed among the 
households and even less important for the real economy. But this kind of indexation 
does not exist in practice. 
3.6. Summary 
Who ultimately bears the burden of labour taxes is a question which has been around 
in the academic literature for a while and yet there is no clear consensus in the 
empirical evidence. In a recent meta-analysis Melguizo and González-Páramo (2013) 
find that on average about two thirds of the incidence of labour taxes falls on workers. 
However, there is too much variation across different countries to view this result as a 
precise estimate. There are however a number of intermediate results which can be 
taken away from the survey of the literature. Table 7 summarises the main points of 
the three strands of literature considered.  
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Even if the tax incidence literature does not provide a clear answer to the question of 
how the tax burden of labour taxation is shared, it still does indicate that there is 
some degree of sharing even in the long run. The second key finding is that the 
literature looking at the long run tax incidence is struggling with identification issues 
and that there are up to our knowledge so far no convincing studies available which 
look at medium-term effects or adjustment processes. Regarding the IIP the evidence 
is also less than compelling, but allows the tentative conclusion that the legal 
incidence matters at least in the short run. In fact, the finding that tax incidence is not 
fully on workers already hints at a relevance of legal incidence.  
Table 7: Overview of results of survey on labour tax incidence 
Strand of  
literature Aspect Result 
Tax 
incidence 
Overall finding 
Tax incidence does not fully fall on worker, 
large variation across countries 
Time horizon 
In the long run more incidence is on 
workers, severe identification issues with 
long-run estimates 
Invariance of incidence 
proposition (IIP) 
No clear evidence, most likely legal 
incidence matters at least in the short run 
Role of centralised 
bargaining 
More centralised bargaining results on 
more incidence on workers, intermediate 
centralization results on more incidence on 
employers 
Level of observation 
Market level incidence can vary 
substantially from micro level incidence 
Labour 
Supply 
Overall finding 
Labour supply elasticities vary widely 
across demographic groups and are falling 
over time 
Differences across 
socio-economic groups 
Women (in particular mothers) are more 
responsive 
Younger persons are more responsive  
Margins of response 
Response is mostly at the extensive 
margin 
More recent studies also find evidence for 
reporting responses 
Labour 
Demand 
Overall finding 
Labour demand elasticities is not 
completely elastic, but increasing over time 
Differences across 
socio-economic groups 
More elastic labour demand for low skilled 
and those with flexible contracts, no 
gender differences  
Source: Own elaboration based on literature review. 
 
There are differences across countries which can be at least partly attributed to the 
non-trivial role of centralisation of bargaining. The evidence is relatively robust that 
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more centralised bargaining shifts the tax burden towards labour, while intermediate 
levels of coordination result in a partial shift of the tax incidence on employers.  
Following the argumentation of Metcalf (2002) the question of tax incidence can also 
be seen as a question of the relative elasticity of labour demand and labour supply. 
The review of these two strands of the literature in this section allows some tentative 
conclusions. First, labour supply elasticities appear to be falling over time and recent 
meta-analyses place them around 0.4 to 0.3. The overall elasticity is driven to a very 
large extent through the extensive margin, whereas the elasticities at the intensive 
margin are close to zero. Furthermore recent studies, as discussed in Saez et al. 
(2012b), exploiting tax return data find that the elasticities at the intensive margin 
can mostly be attributed to reporting effects. The literature is also relatively clear as to 
how the elasticity at the extensive margin varies across different socioeconomic 
groups. Women and in particular single mothers have a more elastic labour supply. 
Men typically have a higher labour supply elasticity at the extensive margin at the 
beginning or the end of the career when they face trade-offs with further education 
respectively early retirement.  
Concerning the labour demand elasticities a recent meta-analysis by Lichter et al. 
(2014) suggests that the elasticities are increasing over time with a best guess of -0.3 
as the average labour demand elasticity. The long-run elasticity is found to be higher, 
as well as higher labour demand elasticities are observable for fixed term contracts 
and low-skilled workers.  
Finally a brief review of the CGE literature suggests that the incidence outcome will 
depend on the size and openness of the country, the substitutability between capital 
and labour and the migration patterns. Of further importance is the link between the 
taxes and contributions and the benefits. This is in particular true for pension 
contributions, where the incidence is likely to fall fully on workers if they acquire 
pension entitlements and therefore do not perceive the pension contributions as taxes. 
For our framework of indicators the most important conclusion is that legal tax 
incidence matters, which demands a more detailed look at the composition of the tax 
burden on labour. Furthermore the role of wage bargaining is found out to be an 
important determinant of the tax incidence results. Therefore, together with further 
labour market institutions discussed in the next subsection, the level of centralisation 
of the wage bargaining will be a key indicator. The review of the labour supply 
literature reinforced the importance of distinguishing between different socio-economic 
groups. Additionally, the fact that labour supply is more responsive at the extensive 
margin, especially for the young who face a trade-off between work and education and 
for mothers who face a trade-off between work and child care and home production, 
highlights that aspects of the welfare state can alter the work incentives. Therefore 
the next subsection will also investigate how these aspects affect the labour supply 
decisions. 
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4. Review of the interplay between labour market 
institutions/regulations and labour taxation 
This section of the study embeds the previous review of the literature on the economic 
incidence of labour taxes into the context of labour market institutions and the 
broader economic environment. To this end, we will focus on institutions that are 
considered to be the most influential for the labour market outcomes and economic 
incidence. Specifically two important aspects of the institutional environment of the 
labour market will be considered: The wage setting process and the welfare system. 
4.1. Wage setting institutions 
Taxes do not create unemployment when they operate in isolation in a competitive 
labour market. They may, however, reduce employment; the magnitude of this 
reduction depends on the elasticities of supply and demand as broadly discussed in 
section 3. However, labour market institutions such as unions influence the wage 
setting process and change the labour supply curve faced by firms by imposing a 
mark-up over the reservation wage of individuals (Boeri and van Ours, 2008). 
The analysis of taxes in a labour market with perfect competition omits unemployment 
entirely. In this section we discuss models of imperfect labour markets (union 
bargaining, search und matching) to analyse the impact of taxes on unemployment 
and on tax incidence. Cahuc et al. (2014) present a simple search and matching model 
to analyse the impact of taxes and unemployment. First, the model illustrates that tax 
has the same impact on unemployment whether it is paid by the firm or by the 
employee. Second, increases in the level of taxes increase unemployment. Tax 
increases reduce the surplus of jobs. It is the difference between the wages net of 
taxes and the income of the unemployed that exerts an impact on unemployment. 
Therefore, all taxes and transfers that decrease the income of the unemployed by the 
same amount should have no effect on unemployment. Third, increases in tax 
progressivity, keeping tax level constant, reduce unemployment because more 
progressive taxation exerts a downward pressure on wages. As progressivity 
increases, any wage rise produces a smaller utility for workers and entails a higher 
marginal cost for the firm. 
The seminal paper of Pissarides (1998) shows the dependence of the impact of taxes 
on wages and employment on the structure of the labour market. In addition to the 
competitive model he distinguishes three alternative settings: a labour market model 
where unions and firms determine the wage through bargaining; a search model 
where there are costs for firms and workers in finding each other – potential 
transaction costs lead to rents both parties bargain about; an efficiency wage model in 
which the firm sets the wage in order to avoid employees from shirking. 
In the competitive model the tax structure does not matter. The same is true for the 
efficiency wage model. The simulations show, however, that a tax cut leads to much 
higher effects on employment in the efficiency wage model compared to the 
competitive model, where most of the tax cut is absorbed in wages. This is due to the 
no-shirking condition being flatter than the labour supply function in the competitive 
model, what leads to a higher impact of taxes on employment. 
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In the two models with bargaining over wages (between unions or individuals and 
firms) the tax structure matters. In the union model introducing a progressive tax with 
no tax revenue effects at all decreases unemployment with almost no effect on wages. 
In this model the key factor is a flat labour demand curve. A shift in the wage curve 
due to a change in the tax structure leads to considerable effects on labour demand 
with only a small fall in wages. The search model shows similar, albeit smaller, results 
of a change in the tax structure. 
A second focus in Pissarides’ paper is on the design of unemployment benefits. He 
distinguishes two scenarios: in the first unemployment benefits are determined by a 
fixed ratio to wages, in the second unemployment benefits are kept constant. All four 
labour market models imply that tax cuts have little impact on employment when the 
ratio of unemployment benefits to wages is constant: If unemployment benefits are 
increased in line with the wages the tax is more likely to be absorbed by the wage. 
However, if unemployment benefits remain constant the employment effects of the 
tax cuts can be large. 
Summing up, different labour market models imply different results regarding the 
impact of employment taxes on wages and employment. In some models the tax 
structure matters considerably. In all models the design of unemployment benefits has 
a large influence on the outcome. 
Interactions between labour market institutions and labour taxation  
Labour market institutions like taxes, unions, employment protection legislation, 
unemployment benefits and active labour market policy interact with each other. The 
effect of one policy cannot be analysed in isolation, as it depends on the 
characteristics of other institutions. Thus, considering interdependencies between 
institutional factors is important when identifying country-specific reform effects on 
unemployment. For example, Belot and van Ours (2004) model and empirically test 
interactions of labour market institutions and their impact on employment within a 
right-to-manage union bargaining model. They focus on three particular interactions: 
the interaction between the unemployment benefits system and labour taxes; the 
interaction between the level of bargaining and employment protection legislation; and 
the interaction between the level of bargaining and the union density. An increase in 
the replacement rate of unemployment benefits shifts the wage curve upwards leading 
to higher wages and less employment. However, the magnitude of this effect depends 
on the value of the replacement rate as well as on the magnitude of labour taxes in 
place. An equal sized shift of the wage-setting curve lowers employment more in case 
of low tax rates (as the second derivate of the demand curve is negative). However, 
the size of the shift in the wage-setting curve due to a change in the replacement rate 
also depends on the tax level. Thus, whether the interaction is positive or negative 
does not follow from the theoretical model. Empirically they find a positive interaction. 
Various studies use cross-country panel data to investigate the impact of average 
rates of taxation on unemployment. Reduced-form unemployment equations 
consistent with standard-job-search and wage setting/price setting models are 
estimated. The unemployment rate is regressed on usual labour market policies and 
institutional variables (e.g. tax-wedge, unemployment benefit generosity, degree of 
employment protection legislation, union membership rates, degree of centralisation in 
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the wage bargaining, product market institutions).76 Control variables for the output 
gap, country and time fixed effects and dummy variables for large idiosyncratic shocks 
are also included. Generally this strand of literature finds that an increase in the tax 
wedge leads to higher unemployment (see e.g. Bassanini and Duval, 2009). 
From theoretical considerations (e.g. Belot and van Ours 2004, Coe and Snower 1997) 
we know that the impact of labour taxes on employment depends on their interaction 
with labour market institutions. When analysing the incidence of labour taxes it is thus 
important to take these interactions into account. In this chapter we scan the 
empirical literature for specifications that allow for interactions between labour taxes 
and other institutions when analysing the impact of taxes on employment. Most 
papers we found allow for interactions between labour taxes and the degree of 
centralisation and coordination in wage bargaining. We found little empirical literature 
on the interaction of taxes and minimum wages and taxes and unemployment 
benefits. 
Note, that the use of cross-country panel regressions to analyse the effects of labour 
market reforms on unemployment has been heavily criticised. The results of 
macroeconomic studies with short-time series have failed to provide convincing 
evidence about the robustness of their results (Bassanini and Duval, 2009). Moreover, 
theory suggests that interdependencies between institutional factors are important to 
identify country-specific reform effects on unemployment. Sachs (2015) provides a 
short methodical critic of the empirical cross-country literature that estimates the 
impact of labour market institutions on unemployment considering interactions 
between institutions. Several empirical papers have dealt with the identification of 
interdependencies between individual labour market institutions to determine 
conditional institutional effects on unemployment. However, interaction terms are 
often selected in a subjective and unsystematic way. Unfortunately, the large number 
of potential interactions hinders the construction of detailed and comprehensive 
models, which would be able to provide clear-cut predictions on institutional effects. 
Theory can only provide limited support which institutional interactions to consider. 
Economic institutions matter for the impact of labour taxes on labour costs and 
unemployment (see Melguizo and González-Páramo, 2013). Empirical evidence 
indicates the impact of labour taxes is higher in economies with an intermediate 
centralisation of the wage bargaining process and a strong trade union presence. 
When looking at employment outcomes and the degree of centralisation and 
coordination in wage bargaining Calmfors and Driffil (1988, p. 14) reason that 
“extremes work best”. Highly centralised systems with national bargaining (Nordic 
countries, Austria) or decentralised systems with wage bargaining at the firm level 
(USA, Switzerland) perform best. Small unions on the firm level have little market 
power. Large trade unions have market power, but take into account the potential 
unemployment effects of wage increases when bargaining over wages. In contrast, 
medium-sized unions have some market power, but do not consider macroeconomic 
consequences of their bargaining results. Thus, the relationship between centralisation 
of wage bargaining and wages is not monotonic but rather hump-shaped. 
                                           
76 Alesina and Perotti (1997), Arpaia and Carone (2004), Nunziata (2005) and Azemar and 
Desborde (2010) use labour costs as dependent variable. 
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Summers et al. (1993) use the measure of corporatism developed by Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988) to test their hypothesis that labour taxation is less distortionary on 
labour supply when centralisation is higher. They find a linear connection between tax 
distortions and centralisation in an estimate for 17 countries. In addition to the 
reasoning of Calmfors and Driffill that macroeconomic consequences of bargaining 
results are considered by the bargaining parties they argue that unions also take into 
consideration that taxes raised lead to public goods benefiting their members. Thus, 
although in countries with high centralisation taxes are higher, these are less 
distorting. 
There are some empirical studies measuring the impact of taxation on employment 
outcomes in the presence of union bargaining.77 Alesina and Perotti (1997) analyse 
the link between taxation and labour costs on a panel of 14 OECD countries for the 
period 1965-1990. They find that the shifting of labour taxation to labour costs 
increases with the degree of centralisation. However, in highly centralised labour 
markets it is lower than in labour markets with negotiations on the level of industries. 
They thus confirm the hump-shaped form of the relationship found by Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988) and developed in their own theoretical model. 
Elmeskov et al. (1999) assess the effectiveness of OECD policy recommendations 
regarding unemployment by estimating the impact of labour market institutions. They 
allow for interaction between labour taxes and degree of coordination in wage 
bargaining. They find that the negative impact of labour taxes on unemployment is 
especially high in countries with intermediate levels of coordination. 
Nickell et al. (2000) analyse the determinants of the falling unemployment rates in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands during the 1980s and 1990s (especially when 
compared to other European countries). While the wage bargaining power in the 
United Kingdom was reduced by legislation, the unions in the Netherlands have 
operated very co-operative and co-ordinated. Both “extremes” led to only moderate 
increases in wages and thus to a low level of unemployment. 
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) distinguish three models of wage-setting institutions 
across OECD countries: Anglo-Saxon countries (little centralisation in wage 
bargaining), continental Europe (powerful trade unions with little coordination) and 
Nordic countries (centralised wage bargaining). Estimating the effects of taxes on 
employment and growth for a panel of 14 OECD countries from 1965-1995 they find 
that negative effects of labour taxes on employment and growth are higher in 
continental Europe. In these countries higher tax rates are shifted onto higher gross 
wages, which is not the case in the other OECD countries analysed. 
Arpaia and Carone (2004) use dynamic panel data techniques for a sample of EU-15 
Member States and test whether the composition of labour taxes affects labour costs 
(both in the short- and in the long-run) and whether employment performance is 
better in highly centralised bargaining systems. They use three different measures of 
centralisation of bargaining in their equations and assign countries to low, 
intermediate and high levels of centralisation. While the first variable concentrates on 
the wage-setting procedure, the latter two focus on coordination. Simulation results 
                                           
77 See also Section 3.2 for a review of the literature which includes the centralisation of 
bargaining in the analysis of tax incidence. 
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do not differ strongly for the different variables used. In contrast to previous studies, 
they find that labour costs are not influenced by the tax wedge in countries with 
centralisation at intermediate level. Labour costs increase with an increase in the tax 
wedge in countries with high or low level of centralisation. This diverging result can be 
reconciled through their use of a dynamic panel estimator which includes the lagged 
dependent variable. Indeed, the coefficient for the lagged real labour cost is around 
0.95 for almost all regression, leaving very little room for other variables to explain 
the variation of real labour costs.  
Nickell et al. (2005) analyse the determinants of unemployment in 20 OECD countries 
from 1961-1995. They interact labour taxes with an index of coordination (low, 
middle, high) stemming from two different series. They find that the negative impact 
of labour taxes on unemployment becomes stronger in countries with little 
coordination. In general, they find a lower impact of labour taxes on unemployment in 
the long-run than Daveri and Tabellini. For a country with medium coordination a 10 
percentage points increase in employment tax leads to a 1 percentage points rise in 
unemployment. 
Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000) keep the assignment of 
countries to a level of centralisation constant over the observation period. In contrast, 
Nunziata (2005) uses a different measure of labour market coordination.78 He 
constructs three variables: net union density (the ratio of total reported union 
members to employees), bargaining coordination (an index with range 1 to 3 
constructed from the OECD data on bargaining coordination) and dummy variables for 
six different coordination types following a taxonomy by Traxler (1996) and Traxler 
and Kittel (2000). With this specification he takes into account that countries change 
their coordination and centralisation level over time. He finds that the impact of the 
tax variable on labour costs is reduced in the presence of high bargaining 
coordination. In order to test the hypothesis of the hump shape relationship between 
tax wedge and labour costs in the presence of centralisation/coordination he then 
divides the countries into three groups (again allowing the countries to move from one 
group to the other over time). Although the tax variable has the highest impact on 
labour costs in intermediate countries he finds a shift to labour costs in the long-run in 
the other groups too. A 2 percentage points increase in the tax induces a 0.5 % 
increase in labour costs in not coordinated and coordinated countries and a 0.6 % 
increase in the intermediate countries. When focusing on centralisation only (like 
Alesina and Perotti, 1997) he also finds slightly deviating results: While there is no 
impact of taxes on labour costs in centralised countries, a 2 percentage points 
increase in taxes induces a 0.6 % increase in labour costs in decentralised and 
intermediate countries. 
Azemar and Desborde (2010) use the index of bargaining coordination created by 
OECD and provided in Nickell (2006).79 They estimate the impact of a rise in non-wage 
labour costs on real manufacturing labour costs in OECD countries. This impact 
                                           
78 While centralisation only refers to the level at which wages are bargained, coordination refers 
to mechanisms where the aggregate employment implications of wage determination are taken 
into account. This can be due to highly centralised wage bargaining, but also due to institutions 
(e.g. employers’) assisting bargainers to act in concert although bargaining itself takes place on 
industry or plant level. (Nickell et al., 2005). 
79 The index ranges from 1 to 5 and increases in the degree of coordination. 
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decreases with the degree of wage bargaining coordination. In the short-run in 
countries with high coordination a rise in the tax rate by 1 percentage point would 
lead to a fall in gross wages by 0.77 %, whereas in countries with low coordination 
gross wages would decrease by 0.25 %. In the long run about 45 % of the tax 
increase is shifted to employers in countries with little coordination, whereas in highly 
coordinated regimes workers bear the tax increase entirely. 
Sachs (2015) applies a Bayesian model approach on panel data for 17 countries from 
1982-2005. This methodology allows him to test all relevant institutional interactions 
for significance and he does not need to make a subjective selection of interactions. 
He finds a negative interaction term between bargaining coordination and the tax 
system, meaning that an increase in the income has a less adverse impact on the 
labour market in case of coordinated wage setting. However, when it comes to a 
reduction in the tax burden the negative coefficient of the interaction term implies that 
a tax cut is more beneficial when bargaining coordination is low. Sachs argues that 
coordination avoids a strong labour demand effect of a tax cut by letting employees 
benefit from the tax gain. He finds no robust and significant interaction effects 
between labour taxes and other labour market institutions (unemployment benefit 
system, employment protection, product market regulation). 
Next to the level of unionization and the wage-setting process the existence of a 
minimum wage can influence the incidence of payroll taxes. When an employee 
already receives the minimum wage, it is impossible to shift a rise in the payroll tax 
onto the worker. The burden of the extra tax must fall on the employer (see Nickell, 
1997). 
Picard and Toulemonde (2001) derive conditions for taxes levied on workers to have 
the same employment effects as taxes levied on firms considering processes of wage 
determinations. They find that in a competitive labour market a budget neutral 
restructuring of taxes levied on employers and employees is irrelevant to employment. 
It is also irrelevant if unemployment benefits depend on the net wage and not on the 
gross wage. However, it is not irrelevant when the employment level is determined by 
a binding minimum wage. If the net wage is constrained by a binding minimum value 
of the net wage then again it is irrelevant. 
Bassanini and Duval (2006) study the determinants of structural unemployment in 
OECD countries allowing for interactions between labour market institutions. They put 
special emphasis on the complementarity of labour and product market institutions 
and find a strong interaction between the minimum wage and the tax wedge: An 
increase in the ratio of minimum to median wages by 10 percentage points would 
increase the impact of the tax wedge on unemployment by 50 % in the average OECD 
country. This is consistent with the theory that minimum wages prevent employers to 
shift the incidence of pay-roll taxes to wages. 
Some studies find interactions between the impact of taxes on employment outcomes 
and the design of unemployment benefits. Belot and van Ours (2004) find that 
taxes have a higher impact on the unemployment rate when the replacement rate of 
unemployment benefits is high. High replacement rates and high taxes reduce the gap 
between work and non-work income. Increasing one of the two variables has a more 
negative impact on unemployment if the other is already at a high level.   
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Overall, we found some empirical support for interactions between labour taxes and 
the degree of centralisation and coordination in wage bargaining. There is however a 
limited number of studies and consequently little empirical evidence for interactions of 
taxes and minimum wages and taxes and unemployment benefits. 
4.2. Welfare state and labour supply  
Traditionally, theoretical models studying the relationship between public policies and 
labour supply mainly focus on the role played by the tax system, and consider to what 
extent labour supply decisions, either at the extensive or the intensive margin, are 
influenced by taxation. However, a more elaborate and realistic model should 
incorporate also two other sets of policy instruments that shape the budget constraints 
of households and influence their decisions of whether to work or not, and for how 
many hours: cash transfers for low income households and the subsidization of 
services. Some micro studies (not the macro ones) include cash transfers in the 
analysis (for example, Kaliskova, 2015), but usually neglect in-kind benefits. Further, 
one should also consider the impact of the legislation regarding the rules about 
maternal and paternal leave, as well as the regulation of the possibility to access part 
time work or work sharing arrangements within firms. In this section we first provide a 
synthetic description of the interrelationships between these variables and labour 
supply decisions from a theoretical point of view and then present a synthesis of the 
relevant empirical literature. 
The effective tax burden depends not only on the structure of social security and 
personal income taxation, but also on the interactions between these taxes and public 
cash transfers to households with low incomes or with family burdens. Taking into 
account transfers through the welfare system is particularly important for women with 
children living in poor households, and for those with low education, especially in 
countries with high unemployment rates. The presence of high withdrawal rates of 
benefits or greater costs for accessing public services (e.g., kindergartens or health 
care) when a person starts working may produce the risk of poverty, inactivity or 
unemployment traps, even if the formal income tax rate is not particularly high 
(Carone et al., 2004, and Maag et al., 2012). 
The effects of a transfer on labour supply depend on its design and on its interaction 
with the structure of the tax system. Means-tested cash transfers provide an 
income for those who do not work or are in-work poor (i.e., they live in households 
with disposable equivalent income lower than the poverty line). The benefit is then 
reduced if hours of work and earnings increase. If leisure is a normal good, this kind of 
transfer should unambiguously reduce labour supply. Its impact depends on the rate 
at which the transfer is reduced when income from work rises, as well as on the 
amount of the transfer, in the sense that small sums could be ignored in deciding how 
much to work. If the cash transfer is provided only with a strict work requirement, it 
should have a positive impact on labour supply. Earnings subsidies (or in-work 
benefits) that increase the take-home pay of workers up to some point and then are 
phased out act as a negative income tax first and then like a supplement to a 
traditional income tax. Therefore they should increase work effort in the first phase, in 
particular concerning the decision to work, and should have negative labour supply 
effects in the second stage, i.e. in the withdrawal segment of the budget constraint. 
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Benefits in kind, i.e. services provided for free or at prices lower than their market 
value (housing, child care, health care, etc.) could have a positive effect on work 
effort if they are complementary to labour supply (Gavhari, 1994). Their impact is, 
therefore, an empirical question, and depends also on the size of the subsidy. If the 
amount of the good or service provided by the government is higher than the optimal 
amount that the beneficiary would choose, i.e. if the individual is obliged to consume 
more of it than its optimal quantity, it is crucial to verify the relationship between the 
in-kind transfer and labour supply: if they are complements (i.e. if the in-kind good or 
service and leisure are substitutes), the demand for leisure should decrease, therefore 
increasing labour supply (Moffitt, 2002). For example, the provision or subsidization of 
housing services may be expected to have negative effects on labour supply because 
housing and leisure are complements, while child care services could have a positive 
impact on labour supply, because child care and labour are complements (child care is 
a substitute for leisure). 
The interaction between these different forms of transfers, together with the structure 
of the personal income tax and of social security benefits, determines the change in 
disposable income associated to the decision to start working, or to devote more time 
to work. Following the reasoning in section 2.1 we group the incentive issues resulting 
from the welfare system into adverse incentive problems of the tax benefit system and 
a reduction of the opportunity costs of work. 
4.2.1. Incentive issues of the tax and transfer system 
Concerning the impact of cash transfers on labour supply, the review of Moffitt 
(1992) concluded that the most important income tested benefits in the USA do 
reduce work effort, but the effects are generally low. A similar conclusion is contained 
in Ben Shalom et al. (2012). This means that these transfers are able to reduce 
poverty even if we evaluate their effect against a counterfactual that incorporates the 
correct number of hours of work without the transfers (higher than the number of 
hours after the receipt of the transfer). A pure cash transfer that reaches it maximum 
amount when earnings are zero and then falls with an implicit tax rate of 100 % when 
the individual starts working has a very strong disincentive effect, but this case is 
mainly theoretical, because beneficiaries of social assistance transfers are mostly 
subject to a series of conditions (accepting reasonable job offers, participation to 
training programs, school attendance, etc.) that they must accept if they do not want 
to lose the benefit. 
Unemployment benefits have a theoretically unambiguous effect on labour supply: the 
more they last and the higher their amount, the lower should be the propensity of the 
unemployed to seek work until they are available. High replacement rates can create 
an “unemployment trap”. This fear has stirred a vast number of reforms of these 
benefits in all advanced economies in the last few decades. 
Replacement rates have been lowered and their length shortened. From “passive” 
policies, aimed simply at providing income to the unemployed, there has been a shift 
towards “active” policies, which underlines the importance of training and investing in 
the human capital of the unemployed, so as to increase the likelihood of finding a new 
occupation and to reduce the loss of capabilities during the period spent out of work. 
The general consensus is that the predictions of the simple theoretical argument are 
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difficult to observe in reality because there is a vast heterogeneity of particular cases, 
regarding for example the presence and strength of active labour market policies and 
job conditionality, and that as a consequence it is unlikely that unemployment 
benefits, at least in their present configuration, exert a significant negative effect on 
employment. The aim of recent reforms has been to “activate” the weaker segments 
of the labour market (long-term unemployed, younger and older people, single 
mothers, migrants, disabled), with important challenges for the organisation of 
training services and local public authorities, cash transfers, patterns of human capital 
formation. However, recent budget problems induced by the recession and austerity 
measures have often reduced the resources available for forms of activation of high 
quality, with negative effects on the skills of the unemployed and on their perspective 
of finding new jobs (Graziano and Heidenreich, 2014). The set of these institutional, 
political and cultural changes make, in any case, less relevant the possibility that 
labour market policies may have important negative effects on labour supply. 
The OECD has done an extensive work about the effects of cash benefits and taxes on 
financial incentives to work. The results show that in many developed countries 
implicit tax rates can be very high, although they are nearly always below 100 %, 
indicating that in general household income rises after the decision to work more. An 
important result from the comparative studies is that for jobless households the 
marginal effective tax rates associated to a low-wage work are generally higher than 
those associated to an average-wage work. The reason is simple: in a jobless 
household when one of the adults starts working the household loses a substantial 
part of assistance benefits. The combination of this loss of benefits with a small 
income from work results in marginal effective tax rates that are often higher than 
60 % and in some cases reach 90 % or more. In households where one member is 
already working, the marginal effective tax rate associated to the beginning of a low-
wage activity for the partner is much lower than in jobless households, because if a 
member is already working, the household has already lost much anti-poverty 
benefits. The result is that if partner is already working, even a low paid work is a 
convenient option for the partner, with marginal effective tax rates usually lower than 
50 % (without considering child care costs). The transition from a low-wage job to an 
occupation paid at the average wage is subject to not particularly high tax rates since, 
again, only the personal income tax generally applies to these cases, not the loss of 
benefits, in particular for two-earner households. 
The effects on labour supply of changes in the amount or other institutional 
characteristics of cash transfers to poor households may be evaluated with a rich set 
of tools. The main distinction is between ex-ante and ex-post studies. The first ones 
use simulation techniques to study the likely effect of these changes, while the second 
group rely on data that refer to specific episodes of policy change, either experimental 
or quasi-experimental. Ex-ante studies are typically divided into a first stage in which 
a behavioural model of labour supply is estimated on existing data, and a second one 
where the coefficients are applied to a hypothetical reform. Ex-post studies are based 
either on a structural model of choice applied to the data or on a reduced form 
estimation strategy. Many of the studies based on the microsimulation model Euromod 
are examples of ex-ante simulations of the potential effects of a tax or transfer 
scheme (Figari et al. 2013). Some of these analyses do not account for behavioural 
reactions and are therefore able to simulate the immediate distributional impact of a 
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policy change, evaluating the potential disincentive effects only through an 
examination of the changes in average and marginal tax rates. Other papers apply to 
the simulated distribution of incomes and policy parameters the labour supply 
elasticities estimated on the same dataset or taken from other studies (Colombino and 
Narazani, 2013). Examples of ex-post studies based on “real” policy changes, with 
data collected both before and after the reform, either experimental or quasi-
experimental, are provided in the following subsection on in-work benefits. 
What are the effects of the basic form of cash transfers, i.e. minimum-income 
schemes (cash transfers aimed at providing a basic income for those without other 
sources of income) on labour supply? A first important factor is the design of the 
scheme with respect to other possible sources of income: its amount when there are 
no other resources, its level with respect to average earnings or to the national 
poverty line, and its relationship with the level of unemployment benefits. Further, it is 
important to observe the speed with which the benefit declines for each additional unit 
of income from work, in particular the phase-out point and the marginal effective tax 
rate over the phase-out range. Second, the presence of work-related requirements for 
the receipt of the transfer means that the effects of minimum income benefits on 
labour supply is typically very different from what can be inferred from the 
examination of the individual budget line in a simple graph linking net income with 
hours of work. A survey conducted by the OECD (Immervoll, 2009) shows that all 
OECD countries providing minimum income benefits impose on beneficiaries a 
(variable) series of conditions, for example the willingness to accept suitable job offers 
for those who are able to work, the registration to the local employment office, 
participation in integration measures like training so as to improve their employability 
without losing a contact with the labour market. A constant monitoring of current 
circumstances can also guarantee that benefits are not wasted and do not encourage 
a state of dependency. These characteristics should greatly reduce the risk of 
distortions of minimum income schemes on labour supply. Some caveats are however 
important. First of all, it is not always clear whether the formal rule governing benefit 
administration and eligibility conditions are tightly or loosely applied in the different 
countries. Second, it is important to reduce the risk that, in case the beneficiaries do 
not comply with the rules, other family members unable to work (children, disabled, 
etc.) may suffer the consequences of a reduction or a withdrawal of the benefit. 
Further, not all the poor adults are able to work, for a variety of reasons, so that only 
a fraction of the beneficiaries will manage to be “activated” and reach self-sufficiency.  
Bargain and Doorley (2011) find that the French guaranteed minimum income 
(Revenu Minimum d'Insertion) for young uneducated men reduces the participation at 
the labour force by 7–10 %. Other national experiences however show, in general, a 
significant effect of minimum income schemes on the extent and gravity of poverty, 
although the level of protection is almost always not enough to reach the commonly 
used relative poverty line set at 60 % of median disposable income. The impact on the 
number of beneficiaries who find a job is much more limited: it is usually positive but 
low, ranging between 12 % and 35 % (Blommesteijn and Malee, 2009, Marchal and 
Van Mechelen, 2013).  
In-work benefits are tax credits or direct cash transfers reserved to people who are 
working but are earning low wages, or live in households with low total disposable 
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income. When they take the form of tax credits, they are refundable, i.e. they turn 
into cash benefits, so as to guarantee in any case an increase in disposable income for 
the worker. The main difference to traditional transfers aimed at supporting the 
incomes of poor households, is that the subsidy is zero for those who are not working. 
In contrast, a more standard anti-poverty subsidy would reach its maximum amount 
exactly for households with zero incomes from work. Such schemes, many argue, 
have the drawback of stimulating passivity and dependency, while the main effect of 
an in-work benefit consists in making low-paid or unqualified jobs attractive. One of 
the main reasons that justify the widespread interest for this kind of benefit is the by 
now general awareness of the importance of in-work poverty: many persons are still 
in poverty (defined at the household, not personal level) despite being engaged in a 
working activity. It is deemed that such a situation can be ameliorated either by way 
of an increase in the labour intensity within the household, i.e. through an increase in 
the number of workers, or with a greater take-home pay of those who are already 
working. For both these aims, an in-work benefit can be useful, since it increases the 
wage of workers with low market incomes, and provides a stimulus for currently non-
working members of the household. In-work benefits are also judged to be more 
consistent than passive cash transfers with a series of measures aimed at improving 
self-sufficiency and individual activity, like child care services, investment in education 
and training, and active labour market policies. In general, the impact of in-work 
benefits on labour supply is a problem that deserves to be studied because these 
benefits are targeted to some of the groups of the population with a more elastic 
labour supply, in particular low-income workers, lone parents, women earning low 
wages. We therefore expect a positive effect on labour supply, at least at the 
extensive margin. 
Concerning the effects of in-work benefits on labour supply (Immervoll and Pearson, 
2009), there have been numerous studies of their most important application, the 
Earned income tax credit in the USA. The EITC is zero for those who are not working, 
then provides a positive transfer (negative income tax) if household income is below a 
certain amount, remains constant for a segment of the earning-labour supply line and 
finally decreases with increasing values of household income, until it becomes zero. It 
should therefore have a positive effect on the extensive margin, inducing some non-
workers to start working, while it should have a negative impact on the phase-out 
region. Numerous empirical studies suggest that the EITC has actually increased the 
number of single mothers who are employed: Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) for 
example found that 60 % of the increase in the employment rate for single mothers 
between 1984 and 1996 was due to the EITC. Further, the program has virtually zero 
impact on labour supply of married men, and a small negative effect on the occupation 
rate (-1 %) and on the number of hours worked by married women, i.e. the secondary 
earners in the family, by between -1 % and -4 % (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006, Hotz and 
Scholz, 2003). The negative effects on hours worked are however small, so that the 
net effect of the EITC on labour supply is surely positive (Keane and Moffitt, 1998; 
Ellwood, 2000; Hotz and Scholz, 2003; Eissa and Hoynes, 2006). 
Blundell et al. (2000) use simulation techniques to study the impact of the UK Working 
families tax credit (later replaced by the Working tax credit and the Child tax credit) 
on labour supply. They use a discrete behavioural model of household labour supply 
with controls for fixed and childcare costs, and unobserved heterogeneity. Their main 
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finding is a substantial increase in labour supply for single mothers (+2.2 % in 
participation rates), and a modest reduction in labour supply for married women as a 
result of the EITC. Brewer et al. (2006) found similar results.  
In France, a small in-work benefit (Prime pour l’emploi) has been introduced in 2001. 
Various studies, using in part simulation methods and in part ex-post evaluation 
techniques on quasi-experimental “real” data distinguishing between a treatment and 
a control group, have found that this scheme, which was inspired by the American and 
UK examples, has a very small, almost negligible positive effect on the labour supply 
of women. The main reason is the limited amount of the benefit (no more than 600 
yearly euro per recipient), as well as the significant lag between the moment when 
one starts working and the receipt of the incentive, reducing its visibility (Cochard et 
al., 2008).  
Simulation studies have stressed the preference, from an efficiency point of view, for 
the determination of the benefit on the basis of the income of the single individual 
involved, and not of the total household income. The reason is that the individual basis 
avoids the possible negative effect on the labour supply of secondary earners deriving 
from the means-test on household income (Blundell et al., 2007).  
Given these generally small negative effects on the number of hours of those who are 
already working and a positive impact on the number of workers, one can conclude 
that the positive impact of the EITC on the living standards of workers are not 
significantly weakened by incentive effects. Programs of this kind should therefore be 
able to improve the living standards of those earning modest wages without negative 
behavioural reactions on labour supply, and with positive results on the participation 
rates of some of the weaker segments of the population, in particular women with low 
earning potentials. 
4.2.2. Opportunity costs of work and the welfare system 
For a given structure of labour supply elasticities, the actual effects of current personal 
income and payroll taxation, and of their possible reforms, also depend on the socio-
economic environment. For example, women’s labour supply is influenced by the 
availability and cost of social services like child care and care for the elderly. The 
absence of a satisfactory public provision of these services, at prices lower than in the 
corresponding private markets, may significantly reduce female labour supply through 
their effects on the cost of work (Gornick and Meyers, 2003, Del Boca and Wetzels, 
2008). More generally, the study of the effects of public policies on labour supply 
cannot be confined to personal income taxation, social security contributions and 
means-tested cash transfers, but must also consider how the revenue is spent, and in 
particular if public expenditure is designed also with the aim of favouring labour 
supply. As already discussed, if the state provides or subsidises in-kind transfers 
that are complementary to work effort, like child or elderly care or public transport, 
then the distortionary impact of taxes and transfers on labour can be significantly 
reduced, particularly at the extensive margin, which is generally considered as the 
most important dimension for the study of the effects of the tax-benefit system on 
labour supply. Kleven (2014) builds from aggregate data of a sample of advanced 
economies a measure of the participation tax rate, i.e. an average net tax rate 
representing the share of earnings that remain to the worker after he/she decides to 
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take a job. A simple plot of the employment rate (either of the whole population or 
only of women) against this measure should provide a negative relationship, but the 
striking result is that the relationship is clearly positive, i.e. nations with the highest 
participation tax rates (notably the Scandinavian countries) have also the highest 
employment rates. In other words, the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the 
overall tax rate at the extensive margin could be positive. The difference with respect 
to other macro studies, which usually provide a more standard negative correlation 
between average tax and employment, may be due (apart from the time span covered 
by the data) to the neglect of an important factor that can have an effect on 
incentives: the provision or subsidization of services that are complementary to 
labour: across OECD countries, there is a positive relationship between the 
employment rate and the share of GDP that goes to public expenditure on child care, 
preschool and elderly care. Countries may compensate the heavy distortions caused 
by their tax burdens with public spending for services that lower the costs associated 
to work effort, therefore benefiting in particular the group of the population with the 
highest labour supply elasticities, i.e. women with family burdens and low or average 
earning potentials.  
Empirical research on the effects of child care provision consistently finds a positive 
effect of the availability of places on mothers’ labour supply, as well as a favourable 
impact deriving from a reduction in the cost of the service. In the UK and the USA, 
where the service is mainly privately provided, women’s labour supply is mainly 
dependent on the cost of the service, while in continental and south European 
countries the more relevant variable is the availability of subsidised places. Del Boca 
et al. (2004) study the impact of child care provision on labour supply and child care 
demand of Italian mothers aged from 18 to 45 years. They simulate the effect of 
changes in the cost of the service and in its availability. Public services are mainly 
used by working mothers with high education. An increase in cost reduces the demand 
for public child care and also labour supply, while an increase in the supply of public 
child care has a strong positive impact on female labour supply. An increase in the 
degree of subsidization of the service would have a positive effect on labour supply 
only in the absence of rationing in service provision. Vandellannoote et al. (2014), for 
the Flanders region, find again a strong impact of the service provision on labour 
supply, while the effect of the cost of the service is lower. 
Having a child is a happy event for a family, nevertheless it also entails economic 
costs for parents. The costs of a child can be divided into two components: a rise of 
family expenditures and an increase of opportunity costs, i.e. foregone earnings (Del 
Boca et al., 2003). As a result, the government could be interested to reduce the cost 
of this precious “good”. Given the high cost that a state has to face to provide a 
reliable and universally accessible system of public childcare for children under six, 
several countries found an alternative in the system of child-related leaves (De Henau 
et al., 2008). The public option to set up an adequate system of child-related leave 
is supported by the fact that, for most parents, home represents the safest and coziest 
place for their children. Moreover, parents often consider themselves the best 
caregivers when their child is very young. 
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Table 8: Average duration and payment rate for type of leave, 2013 
 
Maternity 
Leave 
Average 
payment 
rate1 
Paternity 
leave 2 
Average 
payment 
rate 1 
Parental and 
prolonged 
period 
of leave 3 
Average 
payment 
rate 1 
Total paid 
leave for 
mothers 4 
Average 
payment 
rate 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) = (1)+(5) (8) 
Austria 16.0 100.0 13.0 24.2 65.0 24.2 81.0 39.2 
Belgium 15.0 72.7 15.0 28.7 13.0 19.9 28.0 48.2 
Canada 17.0 46.8 0.0 0.0 35.0 51.8 52.0 50.2 
Czech Republic 28.0 70.0 0.0 0.0 84.0 46.4 112.0 52.3 
Denmark 18.0 51.5 2.0 51.5 32.0 51.5 50.0 51.5 
Estonia 20.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 62.0 104.4 82.0 103.3 
Finland 17.5 80.7 9.0 70.0 140.8 20.1 158.3 26.8 
France 16.0 98.4 2.0 98.4 26.0 18.7 42.0 49.1 
Germany 14.0 100.0 8.7 49.4 43.3 49.4 57.3 61.8 
Greece 17.0 100.0 0.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 17.0 100.0 
Hungary 24.0 70.0 1.0 100.0 136.0 20.9 160.0 28.2 
Iceland 13.0 64.0 13.0 64.0 13.0 64.0 26.0 64.0 
Ireland 42.0 26.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.0 26.1 
Italy 21.7 80.0 17.3 30.0 26.0 30.0 47.7 52.7 
Latvia 19.0 100.0 2.0 80.0 52.0 70.0 71.0 78.0 
Lithuania 21.0 100.0 4.0 100.0 44.0 100.0 65.0 100.0 
Luxembourg 16.0 100.0 26.0 42.2 26.0 42.2 42.0 64.2 
Netherlands 16.0 100.0 0.3 100.0 26.0 18.6 42.0 49.6 
Norway 9.0 88.9 12.0 88.9 27.0 88.9 36.0 88.9 
Poland 22.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 104.0 12.8 126.0 28.0 
Portugal 17.1 100.0 20.1 51.6 13.0 25.0 30.1 67.7 
Slovak Republic 28.0 55.0 0.0 0.0 136.0 20.5 164.0 26.4 
Slovenia 15.0 100.0 2.1 100.0 37.1 100.0 52.1 100.0 
Spain 16.0 100.0 2.1 100.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 100.0 
Sweden 15.6 80.0 10.0 78.3 44.4 61.6 60.0 66.4 
Switzerland 14.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 80.0 
Turkey 16.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 66.7 
United Kingdom 52.0 22.5 2.0 19.1 0.0 0.0 52.0 22.5 
United States 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1) The “average payment rate” is defined as the average replacement rate over the length 
of paid leave entitlement for a person normally on average wages. If this covers more 
than one period of leave at two different replacement rate then a weighted average is 
calculated based on length for each period. 
2) Information refers to the entitlement for paternity leave and the father quota included in 
some parental leave regulations (for example, Finland and Iceland). 
3) Information refers to parental leave and subsequent prolonged periods of paid leave to 
care for young children (sometimes under a different name, for example, “Childcare 
leave” or “Home care leave”, or the Complément de Libre Choix d’Activité in France). 
4) The total paid leave for mothers refers to the maximum duration of the paid parental 
leave entitlement not for exclusive use by the father minus any period of maternity leave 
taken after the birth of a child that overlaps with the period of parental leave. 
Source: OECD Family database (omission of some non-EU countries). 
In general there are three types of child-related leaves, which differ with respect to 
their length and their effect on mothers’ behaviour  in the labour market: (1) 
maternity and paternity leave; (2) parental leave; (3) childcare or home-care leave. 
The first type of leave consists in an employment-protected leave of absence for 
employed mothers or fathers at around the time of childbirth (OECD, 2011). It is 
generally short and directed separately to the two parents. The second type consists 
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in an employment-protected leave of absence for employed parents, which is often 
supplementary to specific maternity and paternity leave periods, and usually, but not 
in all countries, follows the period of maternity leave (OECD, 2011). Although the 
entitlement to this (generally long) leave period is individual, it is addressed to both 
parents to allow them to stay close to their child during his early life. The third type of 
leave is very similar with the second one, but, in this case, payments are not 
restricted to parents with a prior work attachment (OECD, 2011). 
The ILO, within the framework of the Maternity Protection Convention (2000), 
recommended a minimum period of “not less than 14 weeks” of paid leave. Nowadays 
almost all OECD countries have ratified this recommendation, but many countries 
have fixed maternity leave entitlements just above this minimum (ILO, 2010). Indeed, 
across the OECD, the average duration of maternity leave was around 18.1 weeks in 
2013. Table 8 summarises the situation in the OECD countries.  
Women are entitled to the longest maternity leaves in the United Kingdom (52 weeks) 
and Ireland (42 weeks). In the United States, instead, there is no statutory right to 
any of the types of leave or other statutory measures. Only some individual States 
provide income support during leave through either sick-leave insurance or maternity 
leave programmes (OECD, 2011; Kamerman and Waldfogel, 2011). 
Entitlements to parental, home-care or childcare leaves vary widely in their length 
across the OECD: from no parental leave (Greece, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States) to about 141 
weeks in 2013 in Finland. Moreover, parental leave payment rates are often 
considerably lower than maternity pay, and income support often only covers a limited 
part of the parental leave period (OECD, 2011). 
The impact of child-related leave on female labour supply has been analyzed by 
several studies (Klerman and Leibowitz, 1997; Waldfogel et al., 1999; Del Boca et al., 
2003; Pronzato, 2009). According to most of these, the impact on the mothers’ 
participation in the labour market is very ambiguous (Klerman and Leibowitz, 1997; 
Del Boca et al., 2003). In general, child-related leaves rise female participation 
because women are not forced to exit the labour market after the birth of their 
children to better care them (Waldfogel et al., 1999; Del Boca et al., 2003). Moreover, 
the higher the replacement income provided to the mothers during leave period, the 
higher the increase of their participation (Klerman and Leibowitz, 1997). On the other 
hand, when leaves become significantly long, they run the risk of determining a rise of 
dismissal probability during pregnancy, a deterioration of the mothers’ skills and 
therefore to compromise their long-run employment prospects, in terms of promotions 
and opportunities for work experience (Klerman and Leibowitz, 1997; Del Boca et al., 
2003). Too long child-related leaves can, contrary to what is expected, produce 
negative effects both on female employment rate and on mothers wage (for an 
employer the cost of hiring a woman is bigger). In support of this finding, OECD 
(2011) shows that: countries with shorter periods of leave had, in 2008, higher 
employment rates among mothers with young children than countries with prolonged 
periods of paid leave; prolonged periods spent out of work significantly affect career 
development and the so-called “family pay gap” that measures the lifetime differential 
in earnings between mothers and childless women.  
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Further, there are differences on the impact of child-related leaves on female 
participation in the labour market according to their voluntary or compulsory character 
and the mother education level. First of all, a comparison of leave policies 
implemented in the different EU countries showed that only a lengthy compulsory 
maternity leave has a negative effect on the work probability of a woman, while the 
length of an optional maternity leave determines a positive effect on the female 
employment rate (Del Boca et al., 2003). Secondly, several studies state that highly 
educated mothers are less likely to take a long time out of work after childbirth 
(because of their elevated opportunity costs), while low-educated mothers (generally 
also low-income earners) are most likely to make full use of prolonged leave 
arrangements and, in many cases, exit the labour market (Del Boca et al., 2003; Del 
Boca et al., 2009; Pronzato, 2009; OECD, 2011). Waldfogel et al. (1999) perform their 
analysis on the effects of family leave coverage on women's employment using 
microdata from the United States, Britain and Japan. To better assess the effects of 
family leave policies on women’s labour supply, they use panel data to track women’s 
employment path after childbirth. In all countries the retention rate (percentage of 
women that return to work for their previous employer within 12 months of their most 
recent birth) was clearly higher for those who were covered by maternity leave than 
those who were not covered (especially in Japan). Moreover, the increase in retention 
probability due to maternity leave coverage is 16 % in Britain, 23 % in the United 
States and 76 % in Japan. Del Boca et al. (2003) review the main factors that may 
affect women’s participation in the labour market: availability and costs of childcare, 
child-related leaves, own characteristics of the labour market, child benefit and so on. 
Using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and selecting all women aged 
21-45, married (or cohabitant) from Italy, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands available 
for the years 1994-1999, they develop several logit estimations on the probability of 
working. The results show that the length of maternity leave has a negative impact on 
participation, because the longer women stay out of the labour force, the greater the 
loss they incur in terms of skill deterioration and lost opportunities. 
Another way to reduce the incompatibility between motherhood and career prospect, 
reducing the potential opportunity costs of children, may be increasing employment 
flexibility in the labour market (Del Boca and Locatelli, 2008), particularly when other 
policies to improve female labour supply are underdeveloped (Hegewish and Gornick, 
2011). 
Part-time work allows mothers to have more time in the day and, therefore, it is more 
suitable for workers who have family responsibilities and care commitments (Del Boca 
et al., 2009). Indeed, according to an OECD report (2011), the recent wide 
mobilization of unused labour supply, particularly among women, is attributable to the 
strong growth in part-time work since the 1980s. Moreover, to highlight the 
importance of part-time jobs in balancing family and work, many OECD countries have 
set statutory rights for parents to request part-time work, usually as long as the child 
reaches primary school age (OECD, 2011). 
The positive effect of part-time work on women’s labour supply has been reported in 
numerous studies generally based on cross-country analyses. Del Boca et al. (2003), 
using the ECHP for the years 1994-1999, showed a positive impact of the diffusion of 
part-time jobs  on the women’s probability of working in Italy, the Netherlands, 
European Commission 
 
Study on the effects and incidence of labour taxation 
May 2015 | 114 
Denmark and Spain. Similar results are attained by Del Boca et al. (2004) in their 
study on Italian data (matched data set for 1998 from the Bank of Italy SHIW and 
ISTAT Multiscopo). Indeed, they found through a bivariate probit estimate that 
regional part-time employment leads to a statistically significant increase in the 
mothers’ probability of working.  
Sauer and Del Boca (2006) formulate a dynamic utility maximization model of married 
women’s labour force participation and fertility choices in France, Spain and Italy. To 
compare labour markets of these three countries, they analyze ECHP data from 1994 
to 2001. France, Spain and Italy have similar cultural characteristics; nevertheless 
show very different labour market statistics. According to Sauer and Del Boca (2006), 
this cross-country difference is substantially determined by dissimilar social policies 
related to labour market flexibility and child care availability. And, effectively, their 
estimates confirm this proposition evidencing the higher number of working mothers 
in the French labour market, which is the most flexible, with respect to the Spanish 
and Italian ones. 
Finally, another recent evidence of the positive effect of part-time work on female 
labour supply is given by Addabbo et al. (2015) who, using EU-SILC micro data from 
2007 to 2012 for Spain, find that for women there is an increase in the probability of 
working also when the status of part-time worker is assumed by the partner. In 
particular, they show that being married to a part-time worker increases the labour 
supply of women by 38 % for those aged from 20 to 29, and by 28 % for those from 
30 to 39 years. 
Figure 7: Share of part-time employment (in %) in 2012 
 
Notes: 1) Part-time employment refers to persons who usually work less than 30 hours in their main job. 
2) Data are updated to 2007 for Cyprus, Malta and Romania. 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, version April 2014; and ELFS for non-OECD EU 
countries, version December 2013 
Figure 7 shows that in most developed countries part-time work is used more by 
women than by men. This evidence is attributable to the fact that usually part-time 
jobs are seen as a tool to balance work and family responsibilities, primarily for 
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mothers. According to OECD data, in 2012 the highest incidence of part-time 
employment for females is found in the Netherlands (60.7 %), followed at length by 
Switzerland (45.6 %) and UK (39.4 %). Below the OECD countries mean (26.4 %), we 
find France (22.4 %), Sweden (18.6 %), USA (18.3 %) and Eastern European 
countries. Naturally some of these values cannot be read per se, but must be seen in 
their specific context. For example, the low incidence of the female part-time 
employment in Sweden does not represent a limit for Swedish women’s work decision, 
because in Sweden there is a considerable availability of childcare services and other 
important social policies to support families. 
The share of female part-time employment and female employment rate are positively 
correlated across the European countries as can been seen in Figure 8. In the Eurostat 
data, the Netherlands and Switzerland show the highest share of female part-time 
employment, but in this case we can link these values with a very high employment 
rate for women aged from 15 to 64. However, the shown correlation in Figure 8 is 
stronger in the EU-15 countries than in the Eastern European countries. With the 
exception of Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, part-time work is not very 
developed in Eastern European countries, while women’s employment rate is high. 
Figure 8: Female part-time workers as in % of total employment and 
female employment rate (15 to 64 years) in 2013 
 
Source: Eurostat – Data Explorer 
Among the EU15 countries, Greece has the lowest female employment rate (39.9 %) 
as well as the lowest share of part-time among workers (12.7 %). Other 
Mediterranean countries (Spain, Malta and Italy) have a higher share of female part-
time and employment rates, but still below the European average.  
However, part-time work does not always have a positive effect on female 
participation in the labour market. Under particular conditions, part-time jobs may 
have also negative effects on hourly earnings, training, career prospects, job security 
and on the access to unemployment insurance (Del Boca et al., 2003; OECD, 2011). 
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Part-time jobs tend to be more frequent in low-qualified occupations (Del Boca et al., 
2003), often leading to very fragile work positions especially for young women 
(Addabbo et al., 2015), and if part-time workers living in families with low disposable 
incomes have high probabilities to leave the labour market (OECD, 2011). 
Bardasi and Gornick (2008), investigating the wage gaps between part-time and full-
time women workers in six OECD countries (Canada, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the UK 
and the US) in the mid-1990s, find the existence of a part-time wage penalty among 
women in all countries except Sweden. For their analysis the authors use comparable 
micro-data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). According to Bardasi and 
Gornick (2008) there are several factors that lead to expect part-time pay penalties: 
unadjusted wage differentials that favour full-time workers, because full-time work 
may be seen as a signal of higher levels of human capital; the existence of a pay gap 
between full-time and part-time workers that depends on unobserved characteristics 
(for example, the attention level). Generally women with a part-time employment are 
presumed to be less productive on the job because their energy and attention are 
divided between employment and caregiving. The results of their analysis across 
countries reveal that the highest wage gaps between part- and full-time workers are 
found in the US (18 % in less for part-time workers) and in Italy (15 %), while 
Canada and Germany stay close the average values (8-9 %). Moreover, while the UK 
difference is not statistically significant, the Swedish wage gap is even positive 
(+2.8 %). 
Matteazzi et al. (2012) compare Austria, Italy, Poland and the UK in the EU-SILC data 
for the year 2009 and conclude that different profiles of female participation and part-
time employment can be observed within Europe. The statistics analysed show that 
the largest full-time/part-time wage differentials, in percentage terms, are found in 
the United Kingdom and Poland where, on average, a full-time worker earns about 
15 % more than a part-time one, while the wage gap is significantly smaller in Austria 
(8.9 %) and Italy (10.3 %). In conclusion of their study, Matteazzi et al. (2012) 
divided the four countries under examination into two groups: in Austria and the UK 
part-time employment is widespread, while in Italy and Poland it is still rare and 
underdeveloped. Nevertheless, within both of these groups, there is heterogeneity in 
the entity of the wage gap. 
4.3. Summary  
This section reviewed the literature on the broader economic environment affecting 
the incidence of labour taxation. Among the wage settings institutions the role of wage 
bargaining is once more stressed, with a more centralised bargaining resulting in more 
incidence on workers than bargaining at the industry level. Furthermore minimum 
wages will affect the labour market outcome. In case they are binding the incidence 
result is clear, with the incidence fully falling on the employers. However, even in the 
case of non-binding minimum wages the literature suggests that they contribute to 
labour tax induced employment problems.  
Theoretical results suggest that the progressivity of the personal income tax affects 
the labour market outcome in the presence of matching inefficiencies. For a given tax 
burden a more progressive tax system will reduce the search effort of unemployed 
people because a higher part of the additional match-specific rent will be tax away. 
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Similarly the incentive to pay efficiency wages above the market clearing wage rate is 
reduced in progressive tax system. Despite the lack of conclusive evidence for these 
theories so far, we therefore will also include progressivity measures in our framework 
of indicators.  
A review of the impact of welfare state on labour supply stresses the importance of 
measures of unemployment or participation trap. The withdrawal of cash benefits or 
transfers in-kind can create adverse incentive problems which can translate into 
employment problems through the labour supply side. Another important aspect 
affecting especially female labour supply is the availability of part-time work and 
possibility of parental or maternity leave.  
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5. Framework with indicators to identify the role of 
labour taxation in causing and solving employment 
problems 
This section aims to unify the findings of the study so far and embed them in a 
framework, which allows identifying the scope of labour taxation reforms to improve 
the labour market outcomes in the different Member States. We will develop a number 
of indicators, which will break down the question of how effective tax measures are to 
solve employment problems into components.  
The first set of indicators aims to identify the extent of the unemployment, non- or 
underemployment and whether these are mainly structural in nature or whether these 
can be traced back to business cycle reasons. The second set of indicators sheds some 
light on the tax structure and the public finance situation in the Member States and 
therefore evaluates the potential role of labour taxation in causing or solving 
employment problems. The third set of indicators tackles the question what will affect 
the incidence of labour taxation.  
Before we set out to derive a framework of indicators, we take a step back and 
highlight the value-added and the limitations of indicators in the next subsection. To 
this end we will have a closer look at the Lisbon Methodology Working Group (LIME) 
assessment framework (LAF) as it is developed by the European Commission (2008). 
Where appropriate we will also consider the comparison to the simple averages and to 
best practice examples additionally to the LAF. 
5.1. Value-added and limitations of indicators  
The LAF is very prominent analytical tool to systematically compare the GDP growth 
performance and 20 policy areas affecting growth in the individual Member States to a 
benchmark. The heart of the LAF is a standardised continuous score system where the 
score of each indicator is defined as 
Score=[(Indicator-EU15 average)/Standard deviation]*10 
with a cap at 3 standard deviations.80 However, as the European Commission (2008) 
very clearly pointed out it is neither a rule nor is it free from caveats or limitations. In 
the following we briefly summarise the main benefits and drawbacks already 
mentioned by the European Commission, and add a few additional limitations in the 
context of this study and how we aim to circumvent these.  
5.1.1. Key benefits and value-added of LAF  
The most obvious advantages of the LAF are the systematic approach and its 
transparency. Given the clear documentation and the simple formula used there is a 
straightforward answer provided to the question which in growth relevant aspect 
Member States under- or over-perform. Additionally the framework is flexible in two 
key aspects. First it is easily possible to introduce additional policy areas or to replace 
current policy areas with more fitting ones. And secondly the transparent list of 
qualification reasons can be expanded to cover extraordinary circumstances for 
                                           
80 See also European Commission (2008) for a description and discussion of the methodology. 
European Commission 
 
Study on the effects and incidence of labour taxation 
May 2015 | 119 
particular circumstances in Member States. In sum, the LAF can be very useful to 
identify policy areas to enhance the growth potential in the Member States, but only if 
one bears in mind a number of limitations as the next subsection will show.   
5.1.2. Main limitations and caveats of LAF  
Following the European Commission (2008) we start with the limitation of the LAF 
which were already pointed out by the developers themselves. A lot of this critique is 
not specific to the LAF, but rather general in nature. First and foremost, the 
framework of indicators is showing a correlation and does not provide any 
information about causality. This limitation will also apply to the framework of 
indicators developed in this study. To say anything about causality one would either 
have to find exogenous variation in indicators or make strong (most likely non-
testable) theoretical assumptions. Since this is beyond the scope of this study, the 
limitation of non-causal interpretation is also applicable for all our indicators. 
Secondly a very general limitation of LAF is the problem of inevitable time lags, which 
will result in many indicators used in the LAF not reflecting the impact of recently 
adopted reforms. This problem exists for very data-based indicator and highlights 
potential a trade-off between more recent data and more reliable data. For complex 
information like GDP and corresponding growth rates, output gaps, tax revenues and 
public expenditures there is likely to be a bigger chance of revision if the Member 
States need to provide the necessary information at short notice. This problem is even 
more pronounced if major reforms have been implemented. The provision of very 
recent data is then often only possible with a prediction of the impact of the reforms. 
Hence relevant reforms contribute to the trade-off between timeliness of the data and 
reliability.  
A further caveat is the level of aggregation. Again, this is a very general limitation 
which not only applies to the LAF. Similar to the timeliness, there is a clear trade-off 
between data availability and comparability and the level of aggregation. The more 
disaggregated the data is used, the better the actual situation in the Member States is 
represented. At the same time the more disaggregated the individual indicators 
become, the less comparable they will get across the Member States. In consequence 
one needs to strike a balance between comparability and availability and level of detail 
to make comparisons amongst all Member States. 
An additional issue may arise when two sets of indicators are to be interpreted 
together because of spill overs or complementarities between them. If the level of 
the score in one particular indicator depends either directly (in some instances even 
mechanically) or indirectly through a third latent variable on the score of another 
indicator the isolated interpretation of this indicator can be misleading. A prominent 
example is the youth unemployment rate which is strongly dependent on the labour 
force participation of the young population. If a large fraction of the youth is still in 
education, this can drive up the youth unemployment rate and therefore lead to wrong 
conclusions.  
Two further aspects of (potential) limitations are pointed out by the European 
Commission (2008). The first one is the fact that LAF is not covering all relevant 
aspects of policies which might be growth relevant and the second one is the fact that 
no relative importance can be assigned to the individual indicators. These are again 
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very general aspects which are not met by any set of indicators and therefore also 
apply to any indicators put forward in this study.  
More importantly there are some aspects of the LAF framework, which are clearly 
limitations and are not fully addressed in European Commission (2008) and relevant 
for the framework of indicators in this study. The first one is the fact that the main 
benchmark in the LAF is the average of the EU15 countries. By fixing this 
benchmark a lot of weight is given to the value of the large Member States like France 
and Germany. The LAF does somehow acknowledge this by allowing a qualification 
rule if the average is not ambitious enough, but there is no clear discussion of the role 
of the big countries in the average.81 
Furthermore the comparison to an average does not necessarily provide the correct 
answers if the indicator has a non-linear impact of the outcome in question. This 
could create a simple under- or overestimation of the relevance of the indicator if the 
relationship is not monotonous but progressive/regressive. Or in the case of a non-
monotonous impact the result could be meaningless. To provide an example in our 
context, take the degree of centralisation in the bargaining process. If intermediate 
levels of centralisation, i.e. bargaining at the industry level, are associated with the 
biggest share of incidence on the employers a comparison to the average level of 
centralisation of bargaining will not be very informative.  
5.1.3. Dealing with limitations of the LAF 
Most of the above mentioned limitations of the LAF are inherent to any data-based 
indicators. While this should not allow the potential users of indicators or any 
framework of indicators to ignore the limitations, it is little more which can be done, 
other than openly discuss the inherent problems. It is noteworthy that the European 
Commission (2008) does raise most of the problems themselves, like the trade-off 
between timeliness of the data and data availability/quality, the trade-off between the 
level of aggregation and data comparability/availability and the impossibility to use the 
framework of indicators for causal interference. It is also beyond the scope of this 
study to address these issues, but for the last two points of criticism at the LAF, i.e. 
the weight of the large countries in the benchmark and potentially non-linear impact, 
we want to offer an additional approach to complement the approach of LAF.  
Particular aspects we want to address are the complementarities, the potential 
weighting problem through using the average of the EU15 as a benchmark and non-
linear relationships. To identify these issues and to make further progress in 
understanding the potentially complex relationship between indicators we propose a 
simple extension of the LAF framework. We start to plot indicators which are 
theoretically linked to each other against each other. Figure 9 sketches the idea. The 
simple scatter plot of two indicators can reveal a number of things. 
 
 
 
                                           
81 The LAF framework has more recently been used with the EU28 as benchmark, which 
mitigated, but not solves the problem with the weight of large countries. Additionally the use of 
averages for ordinal scales or categorical data is not appropriate. 
European Commission 
 
Study on the effects and incidence of labour taxation 
May 2015 | 121 
Figure 9: Proposed extension to the LAF 
 
Source: Own illustration 
On the left panel we depict a combination of two indicators where we expect a positive 
correlation; while on the right panel we depict a combination with a negative 
correlation. Examples for a positive correlation include the plot between total 
unemployment rate and structural unemployment rate, total tax revenue and tax 
revenues on labour taxation. On the other hand we would for example expect a 
negative correlation between the total unemployment rate and the employment rate 
or between tax on labour and tax on consumption, if both are measured as share of 
tax revenues.  
The dashed lines represent threshold values of the indicators and therefore divide the 
area of the scatter plot into four areas. Note that these areas would only be equally 
sized if the distribution of the values of the indicators is not skewed and the simple 
average is use as a threshold. It is also easily possible to use the weighted average of 
all EU Member States, or the EU15 as in the original LAF. If one also excludes the 
areas plus/minus 3/10 of a standard deviation from the weighted average, one is back 
to plotting two LAF scores against each other, which allows a direct link to the existing 
framework. The two shaded areas A and B represent the regions where we would 
expect most observations to lie in. In contrast if Member States lie clearly in the area 
of C or D they have at least to some extent altered the link between the two 
indicators. In the right panel, the case of the positive correlation between the 
indicators, countries falling to area A (B) are clearly (over-) underperforming on both 
measures. In the left panel there exists a trade-off between the two indicators, and 
countries falling to area C have managed best to achieve a good result on both 
indicators. In contrast the area A and B now give an indication on the relative weights 
Member States put on policies with a trade-off.  
An additional benefit plotting two indicators against each other can be the illustration 
of non-linear relationships between the two indicators. For example, if a plot between 
two indicators does only fall in A, B and D in the right panel, this could be an 
indication of an exponential relationship between the two indicators. A possible 
example could be the relation between the total tax wedge and tax avoidance. 
Similarly a u-shaped or hump-shaped relationship can be detected, like one would 
expect between the decentralisation of union and tax incidence falling on employers. 
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In the following we will illustrate the benefit of the additional graphical analysis 
through the plots for some of the indicators aiming to identify employment problems 
and the socio-economic groups especially vulnerable to the employment problems. It 
is beyond the scope of this study to collect data of sufficient quality for all proposed 
indicators and all countries. Therefore and for reasons of space and to keep the length 
of this study manageable we abstain from presenting full tables or graphical 
representation of all indicators. In this section we present data for the first indicator 
groups, but limit the exposition to the latest year available. This could easily be an 
extreme value; hence it is advisable to also consider the recent changes in the 
individual indicators, to see the historical path leading to current outcome. To further 
illustrate this section 6 will go further and work out more of the framework for a 
number of countries.  
5.2. Indicators group 1: Identification of employment problems 
The results of the indicators in this first group set the background and clarify how big 
the need for labour market improving tax reforms is. Building on the short discussion 
in section 2.1 we start with the distinction of different employment problems. After 
establishing a broad overview of the general situation of the employment problems in 
the Member States the indicators go one step further to identify the situation in the 
various groups of vulnerable persons, namely women, the youth, the elderly, migrants 
and persons with low levels of education. The third aspect in this first indicators group 
is to highlights mismatches between labour supply and demand as non-tax factors 
influencing structural unemployment. 
5.2.1. Group 1a: Unemployment, non-employment and structural 
unemployment 
Obvious starting point for the identification of employment problems is the level of the 
unemployment rate. Following the discussion about the non- and underemployment 
in section 2.1 simply looking at the unemployment rate would fall short of capturing 
the full extent of the employment problems. Consequently the second indicator we 
propose to use is the participation rate to capture the share of the population which 
stays outside the workforce. Also along the crude distinction we propose in section 2.1 
the differences between unemployment and non-employment can already hint at the 
employment problem being more on the labour demand side if both the 
unemployment rate and the participation rate are high. Put differently, if the 
participation rate is low, the employment problem is more likely also due to labour 
supply problems.  
Furthermore, since the recent recession has had an important influence on the cyclical 
part of unemployment the third indicator in this group is the NAWRU, aiming to 
describe the level of structural unemployment. While the discussion in Box 2 highlights 
that the NAWRU is only an approximate measure of structural unemployment, the 
difference between the unemployment rate and the NAWRU will give at least an 
indication how much of the unemployment is due to cyclical reasons. The bigger the 
difference between the two concepts of the unemployment rate the more is the 
employment problem due to an indirect labour demand problem because of a lack of 
aggregate demand. 
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Box 2: On NAWRU as a measure of structural unemployment 
 
 
For this first group of indicators Table 9 shows both the values and the corresponding 
scores calculated according to the LAF.82 The three indicators aim to pin down where 
the overall employment problems are most pronounced. Starting with the 
unemployment rate the countries already discussed in the introduction (Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Croatia) emerge as those with the biggest employment problems.83 
The participation rate reveals different countries with employment problems. Simply 
looking at the LAF score the countries which are identified as having a low 
participation rate include Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Malta and Romania. While at this 
stage the underlying causes for the differences in the participation rate are not clear, 
it seems natural to go beyond the overall participation rate and evaluate the 
participation rate for the identified vulnerable groups. This will be done in the next 
subsection. 
Before turning to the vulnerable groups, Table 9 also reports a measure of structural 
unemployment. The idea behind the use of NAWRU is to filter out unemployment 
which is driven by cyclical factors. However a closer look at the values and LAF scores 
for the NAWRU already points at the very close relationship to the actual 
unemployment rate. The countries with the highest structural unemployment are 
again Greece, Spain and Croatia.  
 
                                           
82 We deviate somewhat from the original calculation, since we use the average of the EU 28 
countries as benchmark. 
83 We calculate the unemployment rate for the active population in working age, defined as 20 
to 64 years. 
The concept of NAWRU to measure the structural unemployment is controversial. 
The European Commission (2013c) investigates the concept of the NAWRU 
further and finds that this measure indeed includes significant cyclical variation. 
If the real wages only adjust slowly to large cyclical shocks the labour demand 
will be cyclical in nature and the NAWRU consequently will contain a cyclical 
component. To gain further understanding of the extent of the cyclical part in the 
NAWRU the analysis of the European Commission (2013c) predicts the NAWRU 
only on structural features (labour market institutions, tax wedge etc.) of the 
individual Member States. The result show that this predicted part of the NAWRU 
is markedly lower in most Member States. In particular the difference is most 
pronounced for some southern countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece where 
the aggregate demand shock was very large. However, since there is no 
comprehensive data for structural unemployment available, the first set of 
indicators still relies on the NAWRU. A further reason for not relying on a 
measure derived from estimations based on institutional features is that this 
measure will be endogenous to the question we aim to address in this study. 
Therefore, in the absence of a better measure of structural unemployment, we 
have to rely on the NAWRU and the caveat, that this measure may still contain a 
significant share of cyclical variation needs to be borne in mind. 
European Commission 
 
Study on the effects and incidence of labour taxation 
May 2015 | 124 
Table 9: Indicator group 1a: Values for 2013 
Country 
Unemployment 
rate 
Participation 
rate NAWRU 
Value 
LAF 
Score Value 
LAF 
Score Value 
LAF 
Score 
Austria 4.6 -10.6 79.2 5.9 4.4 -12.8 
Belgium 8.3 -4.1 73.2 -6.9 7.7 -3.7 
Bulgaria 12.8 3.9 72.8 -7.8 12.6 9.6 
Cyprus 15.8 9.4 79.8 7.1 11.3 5.9 
Czech Republic 6.9 -6.6 77.9 3.0 6.8 -6.2 
Germany 5.2 -9.5 81.6 11.0 5.6 -9.7 
Denmark 6.6 -7.1 80.9 9.5 5.8 -9.0 
Estonia 8.7 -3.4 80.3 8.2 9.8 2.0 
Greece 27.3 29.8 72.7 -8.0 17.7 23.4 
Spain 25.6 26.8 78.8 5.1 18.8 26.5 
Finland 7.5 -5.4 79.3 6.0 7.5 -4.4 
France 9.5 -1.9 76.9 0.9 9.6 1.3 
Croatia 16.6 10.8 68.6 -16.8 14.1 13.8 
Hungary 10.1 -0.9 70.3 -13.2 9.7 1.5 
Ireland 12.9 4.1 75.2 -2.7 11.7 7.2 
Italy 12.0 2.5 67.9 -18.3 10.4 3.6 
Lithuania 11.9 2.3 79.3 6.0 11.1 5.3 
Luxembourg 5.6 -8.9 75.4 -2.3 5.5 -9.8 
Latvia 11.9 2.4 79.1 5.7 12.2 8.6 
Malta 5.6 -8.9 68.8 -16.3 6.2 -7.8 
Netherlands 6.2 -7.8 81.5 10.8 5.3 -10.3 
Poland 10.2 -0.6 72.3 -9.0 9.6 1.4 
Portugal 16.5 10.6 78.3 4.0 11.8 7.5 
Romania 7.3 -5.9 68.9 -16.1 6.9 -6.0 
Sweden 7.1 -6.1 85.9 20.2 7.0 -5.8 
Slovenia 10.2 -0.6 74.9 -3.4 8.1 -2.6 
Slovak Republic 13.9 6.0 75.5 -1.9 13.0 10.8 
United Kingdom 6.7 -6.9 80.2 8.0 6.0 -8.4 
European Union  10.6 
 
76.4 
 
9.1 
 Source: LFS and AMECO database 
To directly investigate the relationship between the indicators in group 1 we follow the 
argumentation above and plot them against each other. The left panel of Figure 10 
shows the unemployment rate plotted against the participation rate and the right 
panel plots the unemployment rate against the NAWRU. 
The red lines represent the weighted average for the EU 28 countries and divide the 
graphs into four quadrants. The upper left quadrant in the left panel shows countries 
which are potentially facing the worst employment situation. The combination of a 
high unemployment rate and a low participation rate hints at the fact that in addition 
to a large fraction of the workforce looking for a job a substantial fraction of the 
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population stays away from the workforce because of unfavourable job prospects. 
Countries very clearly falling into this category are Greece and Croatia. The upper 
right quadrant in the left panel show countries which have a high unemployment rate 
but also an above average participation rate. These countries still face big challenges 
at the labour market, but the unemployment rate is not artificially masking the 
problem but rather painting a realistic potentially even too negative picture. Countries 
falling into this category include Spain, Portugal and Cyprus. The lower left quadrat in 
contrast contains countries where the unemployment rate might send too optimistic 
messages, because of a low participation rate. Countries falling into this quadrant 
include Malta and Romania. Finally countries, in the lower right quadrant e.g. Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands or Sweden, have with respect to this measure, the best 
labour market outcome. 
Figure 10: Unemployment rate, participation rate and NAWRU, 2013 
  
Source: LFS and AMECO database, own illustration 
The right panel of Figure 10 plots the unemployment rate against the NAWRU. The 
most obvious thing to learn from this plot is the close relationship between these two 
measures of unemployment. The second, more subtle, thing that can be observed is 
that some of the new Member States tend to have a slightly smaller difference 
between the overall unemployment rate and the structural unemployment rate. The 
grey dotted line represents the 45 degree line. Countries lying above this imaginary 
line have a cyclical component – according to the NAWRU measure of structural 
unemployment – component in their current level of unemployment. The biggest 
cyclical component is not surprisingly observable for the countries with a large overall 
unemployment rate, name Greece, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus.  
5.2.2. Group 1b: Employment problems and vulnerable groups  
The indicators in the previous subsection give a first impression of the countries with 
the potentially largest employment problems, but do not contribute much to the 
further understanding of the underlying causes, or the situation of the different socio-
economic groups in the various Member States. To go beyond the overall number of 
unemployment we suggest to repeat the exercise for the unemployment rate and the 
participation rate separately for each of the vulnerable groups and the corresponding 
non-vulnerable group. Figure 11 illustrates this for women, with the unemployment 
rate plotted against the participation rate for women in the left panel and the 
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corresponding plot for men in the right panel. A quick comparison of the weighted 
average again depicted through the red lines shows no big difference in the 
unemployment rate with 10.5 % for men and 10.6 % for women. The participation 
rate in contrast is with 70 % for women much lower than the 83 % for men. This 
reflects the more responsive labour supply of women.  
Figure 11: Unemployment and rate participation rate, by gender, 2013 
 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
The relative situation for women varies substantially across the different Member 
States. For example in countries like Malta, Cyprus and Ireland the unemployment 
rate is higher for men than for women, which reflects the much smaller participation 
rate of women in these countries. In other countries like Greece and Italy women have 
a clearly lower participation rate and a higher unemployment rate reflecting the very 
severe situation at the labour market. It is mostly the Nordic countries, in particular 
Sweden, where the labour market situation for men and women is comparable.  
Figure 12 shows the same plots for different age categories to identify Member States 
where young people or elderly people face more difficult situations at the labour 
market. The top two plots compare youth unemployment and participation rate to the 
rest of the workforce. From the red lines, again representing the weighted average of 
the EU28 countries, it becomes apparent that the population between 15 and 25 has a 
much weaker attachment to the workforce with an average participation rate of 
approximately 40 %. At the same time the unemployment rate is much higher for the 
young people. The clearly visible negative correlation reflects that a large fraction of 
young people is still in education and low-skilled are overrepresented in the workforce 
between 15 and 25 years. Nevertheless the results in Figure 12 clearly demonstrate 
the employment problems of the youth. 
The lower part of Figure 12 analyses the situation for the elderly. Here we can observe 
a lower participation rate of only 54.3 % together with a lower unemployment rate of 
7.6 % for the part of the workforce aged between 55 and 64. This reflects that elderly 
people losing the employment are more likely to leave workforce altogether. Or, 
indeed, that a large share of the population opts for early retirement and thereby 
reduces both unemployment and participation rate. Again, there are large differences 
between the Member States. In Sweden the elderly still have a participation rate of 
77.5 %, while in other countries with seemingly healthy labour market like Austria or 
Luxembourg the participation rate is only at 46.5 % respectively 42.4 %.  
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Figure 12: Unemployment and rate participation rate, by age groups, 2013 
 
 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
The clearly lower participation rates for both the young and the elderly hint at a labour 
supply problem. The reasons for not participating at the labour market, however, are 
very different. Young people very often stay in education while the elderly opting for 
early retirement. The much higher unemployment rate for the youth confirms that 
there is also a labour demand problem, while the lower overall unemployment rate for 
elderly might disguise an issue of long-term unemployment. Here, a further 
refinement of the indicator might be in order to separately analyse long-term 
unemployment of the elderly. 
In Figure 13 we present the results for one more vulnerable group, namely migrants. 
Again the left panel shows the situation for the part of the workforce which is not 
included as domestic in the LFS and the right panel shows the situation for the native 
workforce as comparison.84 
While the participation rate for the foreign-born part of the population is on average 
similar to the one of the native population, the unemployment rate is clearly higher. 
This is true across the board and even in Sweden the unemployment rate of foreigners 
is above 20 %. The countries with relative better labour market outcome for 
                                           
84 In fact the LFS does in principle break down the population into more migration categories 
such as non-European migrants or migrant from the new Member States, but since the data is 
incomplete for some countries we use the difference between “Total” and “domestic”. Still for 
Romania no data about unemployment by migration status is reported, therefore the entry for 
Romania is omitted in the graph. The participation rate for foreigner is 59.3 % in Romania. 
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foreigners include the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. In other new Member 
States like Croatia and Bulgaria foreign born are participating significantly less at the 
labour market. However, a further look into the composition of the migrant population 
is necessary to put these numbers into perspective.  
Figure 13: Unemployment and rate participation rate, by migration status, 
2013 
 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
Finally the level of education, respectively the skill-level of workforce will play a 
crucial role for their chances at the labour market. Therefore Figure 14 compares the 
labour market outcome of low-skilled against the rest of the workforce. Evidently the 
low-skilled part of the workforce performs worse on both dimensions. The participation 
rate is only slightly above 60 % in comparison to the participation rate of slightly 
above 80 % for the rest of the workforce. Additionally the average unemployment rate 
is at 19.1 % for the low-skilled compared to only 8.4 % for the rest of the workforce. 
Interestingly the unemployment level of the low-skilled is particularly high for Eastern 
European countries like the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria and the Czech 
Republic. In contrast, for the higher skilled part of the work force unemployment is 
highest in the countries with a larger cyclical component of unemployment  
Figure 14: Unemployment and rate participation rate, by skill class, 2013 
 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
A necessary further refinement of the indicators presented so far is therefore the link 
of the already presented vulnerable groups with their respective education level. 
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However, since these data result in a much more disaggregated data level with worse 
coverage and a large number of possible combinations we do not present results in 
this study. 
Overall the look into the specific groups highlight that the underlying causes for 
employment problems are most likely very diverse. For women and the elderly, these 
first indicators point towards a labour supply issue. For the other groups, the lower 
participation rates together with high levels of unemployment indicate both a labour 
supply and a labour demand problem. The skill-level is also found to be a very 
important determinant, with the higher skilled workforce generally having a lower 
unemployment. In the countries where higher skilled are also hit by unemployment 
this this seems to coincide with a cyclical aspect of unemployment.  
5.2.3. Group 1c: Non-tax factors contributing to structural 
unemployment  
Before the next subsections set out to identify the contribution of labour taxation to 
employment problems, we propose to include a few indicators which identify important 
non-tax factors of unemployment. As already identified in the broad discussion of 
employment problems in Section 2.1 a mismatch between labour supply and labour 
demand can result in unemployment. Therefore the indicators in this group aim to 
capture the contribution of the mismatches to structural unemployment. The disparity 
between the labour supply and labour demand can originate in a difference in skills, in 
the sector of employment and geographical. Therefore we suggest to follow Arpaia, et 
al. (2014) and use their three mismatch indicators.  
First there is the sectoral mismatch indicator defined as 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝐼 = ∑ 𝑒𝑖|𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖|
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑖 indicates the sector, and 𝑒𝑖, 𝑣𝑖, and 𝑢𝑖 denote the respective shares of 
employment, vacancies and unemployment. All of the necessary data to construct this 
indicator can be obtained from the LFS.85 
For the skill-mismatch indicator a somewhat different approach is necessary since 
there is no detailed information about the skill level for vacancies available. Hence the 
indicator for the skill-mismatch is, again following Arpaia et al. (2014), based on the 
difference between the skill level in the population and the employed workforce. The 
indicator is then defined as 
𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑀𝐼 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖|𝑞𝑖 − 𝑛𝑖|
𝑆
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑞𝑖 and 𝑛𝑖 are the share of individuals with skill level 𝑖 in the population and in 
employment. This indicator is typically built for 𝑆 =3 education groups, namely low-
                                           
85 It is however worth noting, that the data availability varies greatly across Member 
States. In particular Arpaia et al. (2014) only construct this indicator for 19 countries, 
and none of our example countries (Austria, Spain, Italy) is among those.  
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skilled, which are defined as having only pre-primary, primary or lower secondary 
education (ISCED levels 0-2), medium-skilled with upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED levels 3 and 4) and high-skilled with tertiary 
education (ISCED levels 5 and 6). The data is again available from the LFS. 
The third mismatch indicator aims at geographical mismatches between the labour 
supply and labour demand. This regional mismatch indicator is defined as 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝐼 =
√∑ (𝑢𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)2
𝑅
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑅
𝑖=1 /𝑅
 
where 𝑢𝑖 describes the unemployment in region 𝑖 and ?̅?𝑖 the average unemployment 
over all regions 𝑅. Data for regional unemployment rates at the NUTS 3 level is again 
available from the LFS.  
To learn more about the origins of the mismatch between labour supply and demand 
two more sets of indicators can be useful. First the mismatch can originate more from 
the labour demand side, which will be reflected in changes in vacancies and 
employment. Secondly the mismatch can result from the labour supply side if the 
characteristics of the population and consequently the workforce change due to socio-
demographic trends. 
Therefore the three mismatch indicators are complemented through adding 
corresponding indicators measuring the change in employments.86 For a sectoral 
employment change index one can define 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝐼 = ∑ |
𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑡
−
𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑠
𝑁𝑡−𝑠
|
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑛𝑖𝑡 denotes the employment in sector 𝑖 in time 𝑡 and 𝑁𝑡 is the total 
employment. Correspondingly the 𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑠 and 𝑁𝑡−𝑠 describe the situation 𝑠 periods 
before. This indicator gives a broad idea of shifts in the relative employment in the 
sectors. The higher the value in this indicator is, the higher is the pressure on the 
workforce to adopt to avoid unemployment. Following the exact same logic one can 
derive corresponding employment change indicators for skill-levels and regions. 
To capture changes in the labour supply side a corresponding measure of changes in 
the socioeconomic characteristics of the population can be derived. Specifically the 
indicator for change in skill-levels in the workforce can be defined as  
𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝐼 = ∑ |
𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑡
−
𝑙𝑖𝑡−𝑠
𝐿𝑡−𝑠
|
𝑆
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑙𝑖𝑡 denotes the workforce in skill category 𝑖 in time 𝑡 and 𝐿𝑡 is the total 
workforce. It is noteworthy that this change indicator is expected to change slower 
                                           
86 If available, disaggregated information about vacancies would be even more suitable. 
However, to have some consistence we propose to use employment information which is 
sufficiently available at this level of disaggregation. 
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than the employment change indicators above, therefore the length of the period 𝑠 
could be adjusted accordingly. Two additional workforce composition indicators which 
can provide useful insights are the age categories and the migrations status. 
As a last step in this group of indicators we propose again to graphically analyse the 
relationship between the change and the mismatch indicators. In combination these 
indicators can give an indication about the extent of unemployment which is due to 
shifts in labour demand or labour supply and resulting mismatches in the labour 
market. Appendix Table 2 lists the values for some of the mismatch and change 
indicators. Apart from a few outliers, which include a large sectoral change in Hungary 
and a substantial skill mismatch in Malta the results show that there is a relatively 
strong regional variation in unemployment in Austria, Italy and Romania. The sectoral 
shifts seem to play a role in Spain, Ireland, Poland and Greece. This is, however, only 
a static view in one particular year, that’s why will look at the change over time in the 
worked out examples in section 6. 
5.3. Indicators group 2: Potential approaches for labour tax 
reforms 
Indicators in group 2 will shed more light on how a reform of labour related taxes 
could look like. To this end the first set of indicators in group 2 follow the reasoning in 
Wöhlbier et al, (2014) and first identify fiscal challenges and the availability of “tax 
space”. The second part of the indicators investigates the structure of the tax burden 
and thereby identifies the scope and need of labour tax reforms.  
5.3.1. Group 2a: Fiscal challenges and tax space  
As a first indicator in this category we propose to measure the fiscal challenges 
through the use of general government debt as share of GDP and the net 
lending of general government as share of GDP. Both of these indicators are 
available from the AMECO database, which is the main advantage of these indicators 
over the composite fiscal sustainability indicators as developed in Berti et al. (2012). 
The composite indicator does necessarily come with a longer time lag because of the 
greater data and computational requirements. In combination debt level and the 
deficit give an impression of the fiscal challenges of the Member States. Countries with 
high levels in both indicators will have to find a way to finance an eventual cut in 
labour taxation by either fiscal consolidation or increases in other taxes.  
Similar reasoning applies to the second indicator in this group. The tax-to-GDP ratio 
aims at measuring the “tax space” for a reduction of labour taxation. In contrast to 
Wöhlbier et al. (2014) we see the tax space not as a room for further tax increases, 
but rather as space for labour taxation reforms, which reduce the tax burden on 
labour. Hence a high value in the tax-to-GDP ratio does primarily indicate that the tax 
pressure is high. If the indicators of the fiscal pressure do not show a strong need for 
more tax revenues this indicates that there is room for reforms, which reduce the tax 
burden on labour. A further explanation and reason why to include this indicator is the 
fact that a high tax-to-GDP ratio can contribute to the aggregate demand problem. 
Appendix Table 3 list the values for this group of indicators, showing the well-known 
fact that Greece, Italy and Portugal face a public debt problem with a debt level of 
more than 120 % of GDP. With net lending of more than 5 % of GDP the United 
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Kingdom, Spain and Slovenia are not in a position to lower labour taxation without 
finding other ways to reduce the deficit. In contrast, Germany and Luxembourg have a 
small surplus. The overall tax burden, measured through the tax-to-GDP ratio, is 
highest in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy and Sweden with values 
clearly above 40 % of GDP. Therefore, in these countries a reduction of the overall tax 
burden might be in order.  
5.3.2. Group 2b: Overall and labour tax structure 
The first indicator in this group is the ratio between the implicit tax rate on 
labour and consumption. These implicit tax rates are based on the national 
accounts and are regularly published by the European Commission (2014b). The way 
the implicit tax rates are constructed is at the same time a benefit and a limitation of 
the indicator. On the positive side the very broad nature of this indicator does take 
into account all the aspects of taxation on labour respectively consumption. That also 
includes taxes which are levied on employers such as employers’ contribution to social 
security and further payroll taxes. On the negative side these indicators do not 
recognise differences with respect to benefit entitlements linked to these 
contributions. Nevertheless the ratio between the implicit tax rate on labour and 
consumption gives a first indication of the overall tax burden on labour compared to 
consumption and a high value hints at room for tax shift towards consumption. The 
first column of Appendix Table 4 shows that in countries like Croatia, Luxembourg or 
Denmark the tax burden on labour is not much higher than on consumption. At the 
other end of the spectrum are Italy and Spain with a labour tax burden which is 
almost two and half time higher than the tax burden on consumption. A further 
refinement of this indicator is the ratio between the implicit rate on labour and 
the implicit tax rate on immoveable property. This follows the ranking of growth-
friendly tax structures as proposed by Johansson et al. (2008).87 Given the relative 
small denominator in this ratio the variation is likely to be rather large and the values 
need to be seen with some caution.  
The next group of indicators is concerned with the structure of the labour taxes 
themselves. The first indicator is the implicit tax rate on labour split up into the 
components as it is regularly done by the European Commission in their publication 
Taxation Trends in the European Union.88 Specifically this includes a split into 
employers’ SSC, employees’ SSC and personal income tax. These indicators provide a 
first insight on the legal incidence of the tax burden on labour. It is however important 
to see these indicators as a group of indicators since a low value on one or two 
aspects of the labour tax components can be misleading if the remaining part is high 
to compensate for this difference. Appendix Table 4 clearly illustrates this for the 
example Denmark, where the personal income tax makes up the lions’ share of the 
tax burden on labour. Hence investigating only the personal income tax part would 
indicate a very high tax burden on labour while looking only at SSC would indicate a 
                                           
87 It is however noteworthy, that the national accounts data on the tax burden on property or 
more general on capital might be less accurate, since some countries do not tax a large 
proportion of property directly but rather finance their public services through fees which are 
only indirectly linked to the property. We therefore do not put too much emphasis on this 
indicator and do not collect data for it in this study.  
88 For the most recent edition see European Commission (2014b). 
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low tax burden. In combination one can learn that the labour tax burden is average in 
Denmark, and that the legal incidence is almost entirely on the worker.89 
In addition to the implicit tax rates the statutory tax rate and social security 
contribution rates should be used as indicators. This immediately raises a number of 
questions since these rates are depending on a number of additional characteristics, 
like the income level, marital status and number of children. As a starting point we 
therefore suggest to use the information for a single person without children at the 
average workers wage.90 Since labour taxation is typically not proportional but 
progressive it is important to use two measures of the statutory tax burden. First the 
marginal effective tax rate (METR) which describes the tax burden on an additional 
Euro of income and the average effective tax rate (AETR) which describes the share 
of the tax burden in the gross income. We suggest to start with these two statutory 
tax measures for the overall tax wedge, i.e. the sum of both employers’ and 
employees’ social security contribution and the personal income tax should be used. 
Furthermore, as already mentioned in the discussion of the implicit tax rates, each of 
the individual components should be used separately in comparison to the total 
wedge. Appendix Table 5 displays the values for an average worker, single and no 
children, in 2013. The average total tax wages is highest in Belgium with 55.8 %. 
Further in Austria, France, Germany and Hungary the total tax wedge for the average 
workers income is close to 50 %. This average total tax burden is equally split 
between employers SSC, employees SSC and personal income tax in Germany, while 
in other countries with a higher tax burden the employers SSC plays a dominant role. 
The marginal tax burden is about then percentage points higher in most countries, 
reflecting the progressive nature of the income tax schedules.  
The tax burden for the average person needs to be put into context of the 
progressivity of the labour taxation. We think of a tax system as being progressive if 
a higher income will be taxed at a higher rate. This is reflected in the fact that the 
METR is higher than the AETR. However, no system of labour taxation will have the 
same ratio between the METR and AETR over the whole income range. To nevertheless 
have a simple and comparable measure we propose the following progressivity 
indicator 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 =
1
𝑁
∑ (
𝑀𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝐴𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑀𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖 and 𝐴𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖 are the marginal and average tax rate for income 𝑖 and 𝑁 is 
the total number of income levels considered.91 To operationalise this indicator we 
propose to draw on the “Taxing Wages” publications by the OECD. The latter provides 
the necessary tax rates for income levels from 50 % of the average workers income 
up to 250 % of the average workers income. Therefore the progressivity measure will 
                                           
89 See graph 13 in European Commission (2014b, p.14) for an illustration of the decomposition 
of the labour tax wedge. 
90 This is one of the baseline scenarios in the data provided by the OECD. For more information 
on the OECD taxing wage database see: http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxing-wages-20725124.htm  
91 If the AETR is zero this indicator not defined. In these cases we suggest to replace the value 
in the bracket with 0, since - apart from the exact value of the threshold for the starting rate – 
the METR is also zero. 
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be based on N=201 income levels. This progressivity measure can be calculated for 
the overall tax wedge as well as for the components (income tax, employers’ and 
employees social security contributions) separately. This yields most likely very 
different results since especially the employees’ social security contributions are to 
some extent regressive in a most Member States because of upper earnings limits 
above which no more social security contributions are levied. Appendix Table 6 shows 
the results for the different progressivity indices for the year 2013. The Irish tax 
system is found to be the most progressive system overall, while the tax system in 
Hungary is a flat tax. Some of the systems are hardly progressive overall, because of 
the regressive nature of the social security system. Typical examples are here Austria, 
Germany or Spain. Looking only at the personal income tax system, Greece stands out 
with a very progressive system, according to our measure of the progressivity. 
A limitation of the progressivity index so far is that is not taking into account the 
actual income distribution in the Member States. In fact if one wants to use the 
statutory tax rate and progressivity indicators for an evaluation of the development 
over time, it would also be possible that changes purely originate from changes in the 
average workers income. Hence in the next set of indicators we propose to link the tax 
measures with the income distribution to find out more about the broader context in 
which the labour taxation is set. An alternative approach would be to use the Kakwani 
(1977) index, which is based on the Gini index of both the tax burden and the taxable 
income. Provided that the necessary data is available the Kakwani index is be able to 
show the actual progressivity of any tax system. However, since the calculation of the 
Kakwani index is much more data demanding, we propose to initially use a simple 
measure of progressivity until the necessary data for the more elaborate measure is 
available.  
5.4. Indicators group 3: Identification of factors affecting the 
incidence of labour taxation 
The two groups of indicators describe the situation of labour taxation in the Member 
States, whether there is room and a need for a reduction in the taxation of labour, but 
have not put the situation into the broader context in the individual Member States. 
This is the aim of the third group of indicators. The first subgroup of indicators puts 
the level and the progressivity of labour taxation into the context of the income 
distribution. The second group highlights links between the contributions and the 
benefits and the third one aims to capture further aspects in the Member States which 
are likely to influence the labour market outcomes as a result of labour taxation.  
5.4.1. Group 3a: Labour tax structure in a broader context  
Starting point here are the indicators of the previous subsection. The level and 
progressivity of taxes on labour need to be put into the context of the income 
distribution in the Member States. To measure this we propose an income adjusted 
progressivity indicator defined as 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜃𝑖 (
𝑀𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝐴𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
)
𝑁
𝑖=1
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where 𝜃𝑖 represent the share of the population which has an income of 𝑖. To 
operationalise this indicator we propose the use of the EU-SILC. The EU-SILC reports 
the income deciles of households in the individual Member States. The cut-offs for the 
deciles are reported in equalised disposable households incomes. This implies that the 
household income is divided by the number of consumption equivalents in the 
household to get comparable information about the disposable income. While this is 
not the taxable income of the individual workers it still gives a reasonable 
approximation of the income distribution of the households.92 Grossing up the cut-off 
points and taking the average between the upper and lower cut-off point gives the 
income levels 𝑖 for the adjusted progressivity indicator. The share of the population is 
either 1 % for the top and bottom 5 percentiles, 5 % for the remainder of the top and 
bottom decile and 10 % for the deciles in between.93 
A related indicator is the weighted statutory tax rate which can be defined as 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝐴𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where 𝜔𝑖 is the fraction of the income of the population with an income level of 𝑖. This 
will result in a weighted average tax burden for the population, and can again be 
calculated for employers’ and employees’ SSC and the personal income tax. Despite 
the above mentioned issues in using the SILC information for the earnings 
distribution, this indicator provides us with some information for the overall statutory 
tax burden in the Member States. Relating this to the implicit tax burden indicators 
gives an impression of the width of the tax base definitions.  
The second indicator which can be approximated with the use of the EU-SILC income 
distribution is the fraction of the population which falls below the first tax 
income bracket. The grossed-up cut off points from the EU-SILC income distribution 
can be compared to the thresholds of income tax as reported by the OECD in their 
Taxing Wags database. This shows what fraction of the workforce will not be able to 
benefit from a cut in labour taxation because their income level is so low that they fall 
below the first tax threshold.  
5.4.2. Group 3b: Link between contributions and benefits  
If there are strong links between SSC contributions and entitlements to benefits the 
labour market outcome will most likely be different since these parts of the labour tax 
burden will not be seen as taxes. The most obvious case for a link between the 
contribution and benefits entitlements is in the pension system. The OECD (2013b) 
                                           
92 The use of equalised disposable household income can be problematic because of a number 
of reasons. First it may contain government transfers which are not taxable, secondly it may 
contain other income (capital income) which is taxed at different rates, and thirdly the 
household composition can affect the tax burden on the income, especially in countries with 
joint filing. Therefore much more detailed research should go into the use of EU-SILC data as 
weights. Nevertheless, we think that due to the ease of availability and the standardisation the 
EU-SILC can serve as very useful starting point. 
93 Since there is no top cut off point for the top 1 percentile an assumption needs to be made. 
For a more sophisticated approach one could also estimate the appropriate mean through 
assuming a pareto distribution. 
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reports the gross pension entitlements as a proportion of economy-wide 
average earnings which can be used as an indicator for the strength of the link 
between the contributions and the benefits entitlement. The OECD (2013b, p. 155) 
depicts the link graphically and categories countries into groups with weak, strong and 
intermediate links. To move for this broad categorisation to an indicator we suggest 
the following approach: 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 =
1
(𝑁 − 50) + 1
∑ − (
𝑃𝐸𝑖
𝑃𝐸𝑁
− 1)
𝑁
𝑖=50
 
Here 𝑃𝐸𝑖 and 𝑃𝐸𝑁 denote the gross pension entitlements at an income level 𝑖 % of 
the average worker income. The OECD (2013b) reports gross pension entitlements for 
income levels between 50 % and 200 % of an average workers income resulting in 
151 observations. This indicator will be zero if the gross pension entitlement is 
constant over the whole income range and positive if the gross pension entitlements 
increase over the income range examined. The higher the value of this indicator the 
more likely is a stronger link between the contributions and the benefits entitlement. 
Note that to fully measure the link one would also need to take into account eventual 
caps to the SSC contributions. 
The second aspect covered in this subgroup of indicators is the interaction between 
the welfare system and the tax system. To this end we suggest to draw on the tax and 
benefits database by the European Commission. Specifically we propose the use of 
two indicators to measure the (dis-)incentives to take up work, namely the inactivity 
trap and the unemployment trap. Both these indicators measure the marginal tax 
burden for a labour market transition. While for the inactivity trap measures the METR 
for a transition into the workforce, the unemployment trap measures the tax burden 
on a transition from unemployment into employment. The key difference is that the 
inactivity trap includes the loss of social assistance while the unemployment trap 
includes the loss of unemployment benefits; see Carone et al. (2004) for an in-depth 
discussion.94 Both indicators are targeted to shed light on tax effects on the labour 
supply at the extensive margin and ceteris paribus a higher value on these indicators 
will result in worse effects for the labour supply. Given the discussion about the link to 
benefits entitlement the METR measuring both inactivity and unemployment trap 
should also be split into the components. A high marginal burden may be much less 
harmful for labour supply effects if a benefit entitlement is linked to the SSC 
contributions. Appendix Table 7 summarizes the pension entitlement index, the 
unemployment and the inactivity trap indicators. The link between the earnings and 
the pension entitlement is strongest in Sweden, while it is weak in the United Kingdom 
and not existing in Ireland. Evaluated at a very low level of income, namely at 33 % of 
the average workers earnings, the inactivity trap results in net earning losses in 
Denmark and Ireland. In contrast in Italy and Romania the incentive to take up work 
is very strong because of a low share of the additional income taken away through 
taxes and reduced benefits. The situation is different for the unemployment trap 
indicator, which shows a net income loss in Denmark, Lithuania and the Netherlands. 
The incentives for moving from unemployment back to employment are strongest in 
                                           
94 The OECD tax benefits database is available at http://www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-
wages.htm. 
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the United Kingdom and the Slovak Republic with a more than 60 percent increase in 
net disposable income.  
5.4.3. Group 3c: Other factors influencing labour tax effects 
The literature review in section 3 and 4 has uncovered two further key aspects which 
should affect the employment effects of labour taxation. First there is the role of wage 
bargaining through unions and secondly there is the role of a binding minimum wage.  
To tackle the first aspect we suggest to draw on the Institutional Characteristics of 
Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database 
provided by the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies. This 
comprehensive database contains an indicator for centralisation of the wage 
bargaining process. This indicator assigns a value from 1 (very decentralised 
bargaining at the firm level) to 5 (very centralised bargaining). The assignment of 
values from 1 to 5 already indicates that the level of decentralisation is not necessarily 
a continuous variable. Indeed, the review of the literature seems to suggest that the 
impact of the degree of centralisation to the outcome of bargaining is non-linear. 
Therefore the position relative to the average will be meaningless for this indicator. 
Instead intermediate values for the centralisation of bargaining should give an 
indication of more sharing of the tax burden while both low and high levels of this 
index point towards more incidence of labour taxation on workers. The second aspect 
of the wage bargaining process is the strength of unions, measured as the union 
density rate. This indicator is defined as the union membership as a proportion of 
wage and salary earners in employment, again available from the ICTWSS database.95 
A higher value for this indicator reflects a stronger bargaining position of the union 
and should therefore increase the share of tax burden borne by the employers.  
A binding minimum wage rules out that the tax incidence of an employers’ SSC or 
payroll tax increase falls on the worker. Therefore another indicator should be the 
nominal monthly minimum wage. Data on the nominal monthly minimum wage is 
available from the ILO. Since a number of countries do not have a nationwide 
minimum wage, but rather have sector specific minimum wages they will not appear 
in this dataset. To nevertheless get an idea of government intervention in the area of 
minimum wages we suggest to supplement the minimum wage indicator with the 
index for minimum wage setting by the ICTWSS. This index ranges from 0 to 8, 
where 0 stands for no minimum wage legislation and therefore no government 
intervention and 8 stands for a freely set minimum wage by the government. 
Intermediate values represent different levels of intervention. Values of 1 and 2 
describe not nationwide minimum wage setting and values between 3 and 7 describe 
nationwide minimum wages with decreasing consultation and influence of businesses. 
Appendix Table 8 collects the information of centralisation of wage bargaining, union 
density and the minimum wage setting. The United Kingdom, Poland and the Baltic 
countries are classified to have very decentralised wage bargaining, while Belgium, 
Finland and Greece are characterised through very centralised bargaining. In line with 
                                           
95 The ICTWSS does provide two alternative measures for the net union density. First as a 
fraction of wage and salary earners as in the national labour force survey and the union 
coverage, defined as employees in workplaces or establishments covered by unions or works 
councils as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment. 
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expectation the union density is highest in the Scandinavian countries. At the same 
time Denmark, Finland and Sweden are along with Austria, Cyprus and Italy the only 
countries not to have a national minimum wage. Of the other countries having 
national minimum wage the value varies from 184 Euro monthly in Bulgaria to 1,923 
Euro monthly in Luxembourg.  
To get an impression whether the minimum wages are binding we propose to compare 
the nominal minimum wages to the median monthly earnings from the Structure of 
Earnings database as provided by Eurostat. Using the median rather than an average 
gives a better approximation of the share of the workforce for which the minimum 
wage is binding. The database does further allow to distinguish between gender, 
education and occupation.96 This can give further insights whether the minimum wage 
is more binding for the above identified vulnerable groups. An alternative measure of 
the income distribution can be drawn from the EU-SILC. Appendix Table 9 compares 
the median monthly earnings to the top cut off value of the 2nd, 5th and 8th decile of 
the net equalised household income in the EU-SILC. The comparison shows that there 
is a significant dispersion of the income levels both across Member States and within 
Member States. A comparison between the information for the Structure of Earnings 
dataset and with the net equalised income from the EU-SILC shows that there is a 
considerable difference. This is due to the fact that the Structure of Earnings is 
measuring the gross labour income while the EU-SILC is looking at net income 
including other income.97  
5.5. Overview and structure of framework of indicators 
The subgroups of indicators in the previous subsections form an overall framework 
which helps to identify the scope of labour tax reforms to mitigate employment 
problems. The indicators in the different subgroups identify specific aspects on their 
own, but sometimes more information can be extracted if the indicators are viewed in 
the conjunction with each other. To facilitate a better overview Table 10, Table 11 and 
Table 12 summarise the indicators, their source and their use and interpretation. 
The indicators in Table 10 quantify the extent of employment problems, how the 
different vulnerable groups are affected by them and to which extent non-tax factor 
determine employment problems. For example high levels of unemployment [1], 
which are not artificially inflated through a low level of participation rate [2] hint at a 
problem of unemployment. If primarily the participation rate [2] is low the country is 
dealing more with a non-employment problem. Comparing these results with the 
NAWRU [3] as a measure of structural unemployment and the mismatch indicators in 
[6] puts the employment problems into the context of business cycle fluctuations and 
matching efficiency as factors contributing to unemployment and non-employment. 
Repeating this exercise with the unemployment and participation rate for the 
vulnerable groups in indicators [4] and [5] further narrows down the employment 
problems.  
                                           
96 Again, this is seen as a first step to further the knowledge of the income distribution. 
Refinement of the use of the structure of earnings database should be subject to further 
research. 
97 A potential limitation is the fact that the Structure of Earnings Survey only includes 
employers from establishment with ten of more subsidiaries. 
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Table 10: Overview of framework of indicators (first part) 
Indicator Source Use and interpretation 
Indicator group 1a: Unemployment, Non-employment and structural 
unemployment 
[1] Unemployment rate LFS 
Higher values indicate employment 
problems, especially in conjunction with 
low values of [2] and high values of [3] 
[2] Participation rate LFS 
Lower values indicate employment 
problems, especially in conjunction with 
high values of [1] 
[3] NAWRU AMECO 
Higher values indicate structural 
unemployment problems. Big 
differences to [1] indicate a large 
cyclical part of unemployment 
Indicator group 1b: Employment problems and vulnerable groups 
[4] Unemployment rate, 
by(gender, age group, 
migrant status, skill 
levels) 
LFS 
Higher values indicate employment 
problems, especially in conjunction with 
low values of the corresponding 
indicator in [5]. Differences to [1] 
highlight the vulnerability of particular 
groups 
[5] Participation rate, by 
(gender, age group, 
migrant status, skill 
levels) 
LFS 
Lower values indicate employment 
problems, especially in conjunction with 
high values of the corresponding 
indicator in [4]. Differences to [2] 
highlight the vulnerability of particular 
groups 
Indicator group 1c: Non-tax factors contributing to structural unemployment 
[6] Mismatch indicators  
(skill, sectoral, regional) 
LFS 
High values indicate non-tax related 
employment problems 
[7] Employment change 
indicators  
(skill, sectoral, regional) 
LFS, 
AMECO 
High values indicate a labour demand 
side contribution to employment 
problems as indicated in [6] 
[8] Workforce composition 
change indicators  
(skill, age, migrant 
status) 
LFS 
High values indicate a labour supply 
side contribution to employment 
problems as indicated in [6] 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The second set of indicators in Table 11 looks at the overall fiscal situation and the 
structure of taxation to identify whether there is room for reductions in the tax burden 
on labour. High levels of government debt [9] and a large fiscal deficit [10] especially 
in conjunction with a high tax-to-GDP ratio [11] indicate that any significant reduction 
of the labour tax burden needs to be financed through fiscal consolidation. A high ratio 
between the implicit tax rate on labour and the implicit tax rate on consumption [12] 
indicates the potential to shift the tax burden away from labour. The analysis of the 
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components of the implicit tax rate on labour [13] shows the distribution of the legal 
incidence. The statutory tax rates, i.e. the METR and AETR for the average worker 
[14] give further insights on the extent of the tax burden and the legal incidence. In 
combination with the progressivity measure [15] the structure of the labour taxation 
can be outlined. Higher levels of progressivity for a given level of taxation as 
measured in [12] can give an indication of the bargaining incentives for workers and 
should contribute to better labour market outcomes.  
Table 11: Overview of framework of indicators (second part) 
Indicator Source Use and interpretation 
Indicator group 2a: Fiscal challenges and tax space 
[9] General government 
debt in % of GDP 
AMECO 
High values indicate little room for non-
financed cuts in labour taxation, 
especially in conjunction with high 
levels of [10] and [11] 
[10] Net lending in % of 
GDP 
AMECO 
High values indicate little room for non-
financed cuts in labour taxation, 
especially in conjunction with high 
levels of [9] and [11] 
[11] Total tax revenues in 
% of GDP 
AMECO 
High values indicate little room for non-
financed cuts in labour taxation, 
especially in conjunction with high 
levels of [9] and [10] 
Indicator group 2b: Overall and labour tax structure 
[12] Implicit tax rate on 
labour/implicit tax rate 
on consumption 
Taxation 
Trends in 
Europe 
High values indicate room for a 
reduction of labour taxation. Especially 
in conjunction with high levels of [11] 
and not too high levels of [9] and [10] 
[13] Composition of 
implicit tax rates on 
labour 
Taxation 
Trends in 
Europe 
High values of implicit tax burden on 
labour and employees’ SSC indicate 
legal incidence being mainly on workers 
[14] Statutory tax rates, 
employers’, 
employees’ SSC and 
personal income tax 
Tax and 
Benefits 
Database, 
OECD 
High values indicate room for a 
reduction of labour taxation (see also 
indicator [12])  
[15] Progressivity index 
for total wedge, 
employers’, 
employees’ SSC and 
personal income tax 
Tax and 
Benefits 
Database, 
OECD 
High values indicate a more progressive 
system. For a given level of [12] this 
should improve matching efficiency.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
The third set of indicators in Table 12 links the labour tax system with other relevant 
aspects of the economies in the Member States. 
 
 
European Commission 
 
Study on the effects and incidence of labour taxation 
May 2015 | 141 
Table 12: Overview of framework of indicators (third part) 
Indicator Source Use and interpretation 
Indicator group 3a: Labour tax structure in a broader context 
[16] Adjusted 
progressivity index  
Tax and 
Benefits 
Database, 
EU-SILC 
High values indicate that a large 
fraction of the workforce is in the 
progressive part of the tax schedules. 
Tax reducing reforms should therefore 
have a stronger impact. 
[17] Weighted statutory 
tax burden  
Tax and 
Benefits 
Database, 
EU-SILC 
High values indicate a larger tax burden 
(see indicator [14]) Values far above 
the corresponding values in [12] 
indicate a narrow tax base. 
[18] Fraction of workforce 
with incomes below 
first income tax 
threshold 
Taxation 
Trends in 
Europe 
Higher value indicates less scope of 
labour tax reforms to reduce 
employment problems, because a large 
fraction is not subject to personal 
income taxation. 
Indicator group 3b: Link between contributions and benefits 
[19] Pension benefit link 
indicator 
Pensions 
at a 
glance, 
OECD 
Higher value should reduce the 
employment problems due to SSC. 
Effect is strong in conjunction with a 
high value of SSC in [13]. 
[20] Inactivity trap and 
unemployment trap 
Tax and 
Benefits 
Database, 
OECD 
High values indicate potential for labour 
tax reforms to increase potential labour 
supply. In combination with low values 
for [2] or [5] labour supply problems 
can be identified. 
Indicator group 3c: Other factors influencing labour tax effects 
[21] Centralisation of 
wage bargaining 
ICTWSS 
Intermediate values indicate more tax 
incidence on employers’ side. Impact is 
likely to increase with low values for 
[19] and high values for SSC in [13] 
and [14] 
[22] Union density rate ICTWSS Higher values reinforce result for [21] 
[23] Nominal (monthly) 
minimum wage 
ILO 
Higher values are likely to increase 
unemployment regardless of taxation 
[24] Index for minimum 
wage setting 
ICTWSS 
Complements [23]. Higher values imply 
stronger minimum wage regulation. 
[25a] Median monthly 
earnings 
Structure 
of Earnings 
Survey 
Low values in combination with high 
values for [23] and [24] imply more tax 
incidence on employers.  
[25b] Earnings distribution EU-SILC  
Source: Own elaboration. 
The adjusted progressivity index [16] measures the progressivity in conjunction with 
the distribution of the income in the Member States. High values in this indicator show 
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that a large fraction of the population earns income in the progressive part of the 
income tax schedules. This in turn suggests that tax rate reforms should have a 
stronger effect. The weighted average statutory tax rate [17] gives further an 
approximation of the tax burden. In comparison to the corresponding implicit tax rates 
in [12] the width of the tax base can be assessed. The fraction of workforce below the 
threshold for the starting rate for the income tax [18] yields information about the 
part of the workforce which cannot benefit from tax reductions in the personal income 
tax. The higher the value of this indicator the less is an income tax reform capable of 
reducing employment problems and reforms should tackle SSC. 
Higher values for link between contributions and pensions entitlements [19] give an 
indication about the extent to which SSC can be seen as equivalent to taxes. A higher 
the value in [19] signals a stronger link and therefore less labour supply effects in 
reaction to the SSC should be observed. In combination with a large share of SSC in 
[13] the labour supply effects of the overall tax burden should be smaller. The 
inactivity and the unemployment trap [20] directly measure the labour supply effects 
of labour taxation. The higher the values of [20] the stronger the disincentives to take 
up employment are. If the high values of [20] coincide with low values in the 
participation rate [2] or for the vulnerable groups in [5] negative labour supply effects 
of taxation can be identified.  
The last subgroup of indicators in Table 12 investigates the role of other institutional 
characteristics in the determination of tax incidence of labour taxation. The 
centralisation of wage bargaining [21] has a non-trivial impact on the tax incidence 
outcome, but the literature review suggests that intermediate values for this indicator 
should imply a larger fraction of the tax burden falling on the employers’ side. A 
higher value for the union density rate [22] reinforces the results of [21], but may 
well also have a positive impact on the share of the tax burden borne by employers.  
Higher nominal minimum wages [23] should result in more tax incidence on the 
employer side. For countries without a nationwide minimum wage the a higher value 
for the minimum wage setting process index [24] can give an indication that minimum 
wage legislation is nevertheless contributing to the employment problems. The value 
for the nominal minimum wage should be seen in conjunction with the median 
monthly earnings [25a] to gauge the extent to which the minimum wage is binding. A 
high value for [23] and a low value for [25a] indicate that the minimum wage 
legislation is most likely binding for a larger fraction of the workforce. This implies 
most likely more unemployment and also more tax incidence on the employers’ side. 
More generally, minimum wages need to be seen in relation to the earnings 
distribution [25b] to have a better understanding on their relevance. 
The get a better understanding how this framework of indicators can be used, the next 
subsection presents some worked out examples for three countries. Namely we will 
look at the situation of Austria, Italy and Spain.  
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6. Country examples for the framework of indicators  
This section works out more detailed examples for selection Member States to 
highlight the functioning of the framework of indicators. Specifically we look at Austria 
as a country with a very high level of labour taxation and seemingly no severe 
employment problems, at Spain as one of the countries hardest hit by the recession 
and at Italy a country with persistently high levels of unemployment, low female 
labour force participation and low GDP growth.  
6.1. Austria 
Starting with the overall picture we see that the labour market in Austria is 
characterised through a low level of unemployment and an above average 
participation rate in 2013. Figure 15 plots Figure 10 again with the development of the 
two indicators for Austria highlighted through the red line. Starting in 1996 the 
participation rate in Austria showed small changes and significantly increased over the 
last years. At the same Austria so a small fall in unemployment and after the crises a 
moderate upward trend set it. Latest figures for unemployment confirm that this trend 
in Austria is continuing with the result that Austria is no longer the country with the 
lowest unemployment in the EU. Even more importantly, the forecast is that Austrian 
unemployment continues to rise and Austria is predicted to fall behind a number of 
countries like Germany and Luxembourg. The right hand side of Figure 15 shows that 
there has been no strong pattern in both the movement of the NAWRU and the 
unemployment rate suggesting that over the period observed Austria was not affected 
strongly by cyclical unemployment.  
Figure 15: Unemployment rate, participation rate and NAWRU, Austria 
 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
In Figure 16 we compare the development of the participation rate and the 
unemployment rate separately for men and women. The red line again highlights the 
development in Austria between 1996 and 2013. The left hand part of Figure 16 shows 
the development for women and confirms that a large part of the higher overall 
participation rate in Austria is due to a higher participation rate of women. The right 
part of Figure 16 shows that there has been some rather unsystematic movement for 
men as well.  
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Figure 16: Unemployment rate, participation rate, by gender, Austria 
 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
Figure 17 and Figure 18 repeat this exercise for the other vulnerable groups. The left 
part of Figure 17 shows an initial reduction in the participation rate for the youth in 
Austria which then has been reversed. The participation rate of the youth in Austria 
has been high in comparison to other European countries throughout the period 
observed, which is to large part due to the Austrian system of apprenticeship. The 
right panel of Figure 17 show that after a few years of very low participation rates 
there has been a steady increase in the participation rates for the elderly in Austria. 
This is reflecting the policy change in Austria which aims to reduce early retirement.  
Figure 17: Unemployment rate, participation rate, by age class, Austria 
  
Source: LFS, own illustration 
In the left part of Figure 18 the situation of non-Austrians in the Austrian labour 
market is plotted. There is no very clear pattern observable over the period 1996 to 
2013, but the participation rate has dropped overall in this period and no improvement 
in the unemployment rate can be observed.  
The right hand side of Figure 18 shows the change of the unemployment rate and 
participation rate for the low-skilled in Austria for the period 2004 to 2013. There has 
been an initial improvement in both the participation rate and the unemployment rate, 
but in the more recent year especially the unemployment rate of the low-skilled 
increased.  
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Figure 18: Unemployment rate, participation rate, foreigners and low-skilled, 
Austria 
 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
Figure 19 shows the relative situation and the development of Austria in the skill, 
regional and sectoral mismatch and change indicators. The most striking pattern here 
for Austria is the high position and the strong variation in the regional mismatch 
indicator. This highlights that the regional unemployment rates in Austria change quite 
differently over time. At closer inspection the regional mismatch indicator reduced 
during the financial crisis, which is however mostly due to an increase in 
unemployment in the otherwise stronger regions.  
Figure 19: Skill, regional and sectoral changes and mismatches, Austria 
 
Source: AMECO, LFS, own calculation 
The indicators so far show that labour market in Austria has not been characterised by 
severe problems over the period observed. There is an issue of labour supply by the 
elderly people, but other than that, there seems to be little reason from the labour 
market side to investigate Austria in particular. The picture changes somewhat, once 
we start to look at the public finance side. Starting with the overall situation of the 
public finance in Figure 20 one can see that the overall debt level has reached almost 
87 % in 2014. The red line tracing the development of net lending as well, shows that 
net lending has been fluctuating wildly over the last few periods, but in none of the 
years observed Austria had a budgetary surplus. In combination with the weak 
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economic growth and high costs to stabilise the financial system this resulted in a high 
level of public debt.  
Figure 20: Debt and net lending, Austria 
 
Source: AMECO, own illustration 
It becomes even more apparent why Austria is included as an example, once looks at 
the overall tax structure in Figure 21. Both the overall tax-to-GDP ratio and the ratio 
between the implicit tax burden (ITR) on labour and the ITR on consumption are 
clearly above the unweighted average of the EU-28. Labour is taxed approximately 
twice as much as consumption in Austria and the trend has been increasing over the 
last decade.  
Figure 21: Overall tax structure, Austria 
 
Source: AMECO, Taxation Trends in Europe, own illustration 
Breaking down the tax burden on labour into its components, one can see little change 
in the development as depicted in Figure 22. Comparing the components to the 
European average one can see that the tax burden is high in all three components, but 
the SSC of the employees are the component which is furthest above the European 
average. The indicators so far show that there is a high tax burden on labour in 
Austria, in particular driven through the social security contributions of the employees. 
The overall tax burden does however not fully inform about the distribution of the tax 
burden within the Member States.  
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Figure 22: Structure of labour tax burden, Austria 
  
Source: Taxation Trends in Europe, own illustration 
To have more thorough understanding how different income groups are taxed, Figure 
23 looks in more detail at the statutory tax burden.98  
Figure 23: Structure of labour tax burden in 2013 
 
Source: OECD Taxing wages, own calculation and illustration 
The upper left part of Figure 23 plots the total tax wedge against the overall 
progressivity measure. One can see a rather clear negative correlation between the 
                                           
98
 For reasons of space we only report these graphs once for 2013. For a more detailed analysis 
one would need to look into the development over time on a country by country basis.  
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overall tax burden and the progressivity measure, highlighting that the countries 
which have a higher overall tax burden at the average worker income also have a less 
progressive tax system. Austria lies in the quadrant with an above average total tax 
wedge and below average progressivity. This implies not only that the tax burden is 
rather high, but also that most likely a large part of the workforce is subject to a high 
tax burden. The other three parts of Figure 23 show the average tax burden for the 
personal income tax (PIT), SSC for the employers and SSC for the employees, each 
plotted against the corresponding progressivity measure. The overall picture is quite 
clear in that the PIT is progressive, while the SSC are proportional in a number of 
countries and regressive in most other. In Austria the rather high and clearly 
regressive SSC for employees at to the overall picture of a high but not very 
progressive tax burden.  
Putting the statutory features of the Austrian income tax system into context of the 
earnings distribution in Austria Table 13 shows the different components of the 
Austrian tax system at the deciles of the net equalised income level from the EU-SILC. 
The median is at a net income of 22,073 Euro, where the total tax wedge amounts to 
46.7 %. Interestingly at this point of the income distribution the SSC of the employer 
make up the lion’s share of the total tax burden.  
The fact that the labour market outcome in Austria is – at least for the period 
observed – not showing severe employment problems, despite the rather high tax 
burden on the employer side leads to the question of tax incidence. Looking at the 
parameters affecting the tax incidence in Appendix Table 7 and Appendix Table 8 one 
can identify two reasons which contribute to the still favourable labour market 
outcome. First there is the link between the SSC contributions and the pension 
entitlements which should shift the incidence on the worker. Secondly the lack of a 
nationwide minimum wage and the relatively centralised wage bargaining should also 
contribute to a larger part of the tax burden shifted onto workers. 
However, the weak labour force attachment of the elderly and the resulting relatively 
low retirement age of the Austrian workforce puts increasing pressure on the pay-as-
you go system. Necessary pension reforms might further weaken the link between the 
SSC contributions and the pension entitlement. Further the absence of a national 
minimum wage in Austria is masking the fact that there are wide-spread industry 
specific minimum wages. These might not be binding for a large part of the workforce, 
but if the tax incidence continues to fall on the worker, the pressure may well rise.  
Finally, the recently announced income tax reform in Austria, scheduled to come into 
force in January 2016, include a lowering of starting tax rate to 25 percent, a 
reduction of the tax rates for most of the income distribution and the introduction of a 
new top tax bracket for very high incomes.  
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6.2. Spain 
A first look at the overall situation in Spain in Figure 24 already shows the extent of 
the employment problems. In 2013 the unemployment reached a level above 25 %. 
At the same does the red line, which traces the development since 1996, show that 
the participation rate has been steadily increasing. The turning point in the 
development of the unemployment in Spain was clearly 2007 when the unemployment 
began to rise quickly. The right panel in Figure 24 shows that this development has 
been driven to a large extent by changes in cyclical unemployment. The changes in 
both the unemployment rate and the NAWRU were very fast implying that Spain 
moved from a situation with cyclical unemployment to a situation where the 
unemployment rate was clearly below the NAWRU in 2007. The crisis the reversed this 
trends resulting in the high current unemployment rate.  
Figure 24: Unemployment rate, participation rate and NAWRU, Spain 
  
Source: LFS, own illustration 
Despite the weaknesses of NAWRU as a measure of structural unemployment this 
hints at an unsustainable situation in 2007. At the same time, the currently very high 
unemployment rate is also to a significant part due to cyclical components.  
Figure 25: Unemployment rate, participation rate, by gender, Spain 
 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
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Figure 25 breaks down the development by gender and confirms the findings, we 
already found for Austria. The clear increase in labour force participation is to a large 
part driven by women entering the workforce. Furthermore, women reduced their 
unemployment rate faster before the crisis in 2007 and experienced a slower increase 
after the crisis. Overall, therefore, the gender gap in Spain decreased over the period 
observed.  
Figure 26: Unemployment rate, participation rate, by age class, Spain 
  
Source: LFS, own illustration 
The breakdown by age categories in Figure 26 shows a similar development with 
sinking unemployment and increased participation until 2007. Then the participation 
rate for the young reduced while their unemployment rate increased very strongly. In 
contrast the elderly did not reduce their participation at the labour market, but so a 
very strong increase in unemployment. In fact the unemployment rate for the age 
group 55 to 64 years old reached 20 % in 2013, which is the highest value in all 
Member States. For foreigners and low-skilled workers, as depicted in Figure 27, the 
labour situation is very much comparable to the one of the elderly. After a period of 
steady improvement until 2007, the situation change dramatically and especially 
unemployment rate increased very strongly.  
Figure 27: Unemployment rate, participation rate, foreigners and low-skilled, 
Spain 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
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The mismatch and change indicators in Figure 28 show a plausible explanation for this 
strong change in the labour market in Spain. Both the skill and the sectoral change 
index indicate a very strong shift. The strong shift in the skill levels of the workforce 
are followed by a marked increase in the skill-mismatch indicator. This increase 
coincides with the strong sectoral change, which highlights a shift in employment 
between the sectors. The falling regional mismatch indicator shows that either 
previously booming regions fell back or that the increase in unemployment was evenly 
distributed across Spain. 
Figure 28: Skill, regional and sectoral changes and mismatches, Spain 
 
Source: AMECO, LFS, own calculation 
In Figure 29 the overall situation of the public sector is depicted. Unlike Austria, Spain 
has a surplus before the crisis in 2007. However, the crisis led to a massive 
deterioration of the public sector finances and resulted in high levels of net lending 
and an increasing debt level, reaching almost 100 % of GDP in 2014. Therefore, the 
overall tax space in Spain is limited and eventual labour tax cuts need to be financed 
with other tax increases.  
Figure 29: Debt and net lending, Spain 
 
Source: AMECO, own illustration 
Looking at the overall structure of taxation in Spain in Figure 30 one can see a 
relatively high tax burden on labour with the ITR on labour being more than twice as 
high as the ITR on consumption. Nevertheless there has been an overall drop in the 
tax-to-GDP-ratio in the recent years.  
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Figure 30: Overall tax structure, Spain 
 
Source: AMECO, Taxation Trends in Europe, own illustration 
Digging deeper into the structure of labour taxation in Spain Figure 31 reveals that 
there has been very little change in the implicit rate components. Overall, similar to 
the case in Austria, the SSC of the employer make up a large part of the total tax 
burden.  
Figure 31: Structure of labour tax burden, Spain 
 
Source: Taxation Trends in Europe, own illustration 
Looking at the statutory structure of labour taxation in Spain in Figure 23 the 
employers’ part of the SSC stands out with a high tax burden and a low progressivity 
(strong regressivity). This could further contribute to the labour demand problem 
identified above because it gives further incentives for paying efficiency wages.  
In terms of centralisation of bargaining and minimum wage legislation, the relatively 
central wage bargaining should result in a larger part of the tax incidence on the 
workers’ side. In contrast the strong government intervention and the national wide 
minimum wage should shift part of the tax burden the employers’ side. In sum, it will 
not be clear where the larger share of tax burden falls, but there should still be a case 
to reform the employer SSC. Overall, however, the employment problems seem to be 
largely driven through a labour demand problem. Partly because of cyclical aspects 
and partly because of a strong sectoral shift after the bursting of the housing bubble.  
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6.3. Italy  
The overall picture at the labour market in Italy in Figure 32 looks broadly similar to 
Spain but less alarming. The participation rate increase from very low levels in 1996 
up to the crisis in 2007. Following the crisis the participation rate fluctuated a little, 
but the primary change was a strong increase in unemployment. The right panel in 
Figure 32 shows that Italy experienced a rather fast decline in unemployment up to 
2007 and a sharp increase afterwards. The result is that at least part of the current 
unemployment can be attributed to cyclical reasons.  
Figure 32: Unemployment rate, participation rate and NAWRU, Italy 
  
Source: LFS, own illustration 
The breakdown by gender in Figure 33 shows that the strong increase in the 
participation rate is purely driven by a stronger workforce attachment of women. The 
recession in 2007 did not reverse the trend of increasing female workforce 
participation in Italy, but resulted in increasing unemployment for both men and 
women. Despite the significant increase in work force participation of women in Italy, 
the labour force attachment of women is still weak with a participation rate below 
60 % in 2013.  
Figure 33: Unemployment rate, participation rate, by gender, Italy 
 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
The breakdown by age categories in the top half of Figure 34 shows that the young 
population is increasingly withdrawing from the labour force, while the elderly are 
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increasingly participating. Unemployment is increasing in both groups since 2007. 
However, while for the elderly the unemployment rate is still at moderate levels, the 
unemployment rate for the youth is reaching 40 % in 2013. The lower part of Figure 
34 shows the labour market situation for migrants and low-skilled. While migrants 
made progress in terms of their participation rate prior to the crisis, their situation 
became worse starting in 2007. The time series for the low-skilled is too short to 
mirror this picture, but it is not unlikely that their situation at the labour market 
followed a very similar pattern. 
Figure 34: Unemployment rate, participation rate, by age class, foreigners 
and low-skilled, Italy 
 
Source: LFS, own illustration 
Investigating skill-mismatches, sectoral and skill shifts and regional dispersion of 
unemployment Figure 35 shows that these aspects are likely to play a minor role in 
Italy. Over the period observed the skill composition of the Italian labour market 
changes little and the skill-mismatch indicator declined. The right part of Figure 35 
further shows that the regional dispersion of unemployment in Italy reduced quite 
markedly since 1999.  
Hence overall the labour market in Italy seems to be characterised by both labour 
supply problems, in particular by women and the youth and even more so by labour 
demand problems. However, the latter are partly due to cyclical reasons, and no 
support for a sectoral shift or skill-mismatch can be found.  
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Figure 35: Skill, regional and sectoral changes and mismatches, Italy 
 
Source: AMECO, LFS, own calculation 
The public finance situation as depicted in Figure 36 shows persistent deficits which 
have been fluctuating between -1 and more than -6 % of GDP. The result is a 
constantly increase level of public debt reaching 131.8 % in 2014. Hence there is no 
“tax space” for a reduction of labour taxation without another tax increase to finance 
it.  
Figure 36: Debt and net lending, Italy 
 
Source: AMECO, own illustration 
Looking further into the overall tax structure in Figure 37 one can see that Italy has a 
high overall tax-to-GDP ratio and one of the highest ratios between the ITR on labour 
and the ITR on consumption. The overall trend in the last years was still increasing the 
total tax burden. The look into the components of the ITR on labour in Figure 38 
shows that SSC for the employer and the PIT part are above the unweighted European 
average, while the SSC for the employees is only moderate. The statutory situation in 
Figure 23 shows that Italy is characterised by a relatively high overall tax wedge for 
the average workers income. At the same time the personal income tax is only 
moderate progressive. Together with a proportional SSC system for both employers 
and employees this results in a only moderately progressive tax system.  
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Figure 37: Structure of labour tax burden, Italy 
 
Source: AMECO, Taxation Trends in Europe, own illustration 
Figure 38: Structure of labour tax burden, Spain 
  
Source: Taxation Trends in Europe, own illustration 
The institutional feature of Italy as described in Appendix Table 7 respectively 
Appendix Table 8 show that there is no national minimum wage and wage bargaining 
is taking place at an intermediate level. Especially the latter points towards a 
reduction of the SSC on the employer since the tax incidence should not fall fully on 
the worker.  
Regarding the labour supply side problems of the youth and women, the inactivity trap 
indicator does not suggest that this is a problem of taxation. The discussion in section 
4 would also argue that the availability of part time work and the benefits in kind like 
child care facilities are a better approach to increase the workforce attachment of 
Italian women. 
6.4. Conclusion 
This section uses the developed framework of indicators for Austria, Spain and Italy. 
All three countries have a comparatively high tax burden on labour but differ widely in 
terms of their labour market outcome. Austria has a low level of unemployment and a 
slightly above average participation rate. Italy has an unemployment rate somewhat 
above average but also one of the lowest participation rates. Spain in contrast has a 
very high unemployment rate but an above average participation rate. So from the 
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outset, there seems to be a strong labour demand problem in Spain and a moderate 
labour demand and labour supply problem in Italy. Taking into account cyclical aspects 
of the unemployment rate confirms that at least part of the labour demand problem in 
Spain and Italy is due to business cycle reasons.  
Looking into the development of the labour market situation, one can see a clear 
increase in female workforce participation, which is, however, still not reducing the 
significant gender gap in Italy. The participation rate of elderly has been increasing 
steadily in all three countries, but while in Austria this did not increase the 
unemployment rate, the unemployment rate rose since 2007 in Italy and Spain. 
Especially for the latter this indicates a labour demand problem for the elderly. Youth 
unemployment is high in both Italy and Spain. The constantly dropping participation 
rate in Italy points in addition to the apparent labour demand problem also to 
problems in labour supply by Italians youth. Unemployment rates for foreigners and 
low-skilled workers have increased dramatically in Spain since the crisis in 2007. This 
indicates a labour demand problem for these groups.  
The mismatch and change indicators pin identify a strong sectoral change and an 
increasing skill mismatch as labour demand side sources of the employment problems 
for Spain. For Austria and Italy there seems to be relevant regional variation in the 
level of unemployment, but the development is not clearly identifying whether the 
regional mismatch is contributing to the employment problems.  
The general fiscal situation in all three countries is such that all of them are struggling 
with increasing debt levels and persistent deficits, which limit the tax space to enact 
tax reforms which reduce the tax burden on labour. All three countries have a high 
ITR on labour relative to the ITR on consumption and Italy and Austria additionally 
have very high tax-to-GDP ratio. This further strengthens the point that an overall 
reduction of the tax burden is likely to contribute positively to the aggregate demand 
via an increasing private consumption due to increase net household incomes. 
Dissecting the tax burden of labour into its components one finds that SSC of 
employees make up a large part of the ITR on labour in Austria while the SSC of 
employers contributes more in Spain and Italy. This is also reflected in a high 
statutory total tax wedge for an average workers income in Austria and Italy. 
Contrasting this with our measure of the statutory progressivity one finds that Austria 
and Spain have clearly regressive SSC for both employers and employees. According 
to the search and matching theory a ceteris paribus less progressive tax burden 
should result more unemployment. This argument should be even strong since the tax 
burden in question is levied on the employers’ side. Hence the statutory structure of 
the tax burden indicates a contribution of labour taxation to demand side problems, 
especially for Austria and Spain. The high statutory tax burden in Italy will also 
contribute to the labour demand problem.  
In Italy the wage bargaining at the industry level is expected to result in shifting the 
tax incidence only partially to labour further contributing to the labour demand 
problem. A more – but not fully – centralized wage bargaining in Austria and Spain 
should result in more tax burden shifted to workers and therefore reduce the labour 
employment effects of the high tax labour burden. Additionally the link between the 
SSC contributions should contribute to the tax incidence of employees SSC falling on 
labour. The challenge in Austria is therefore more to maintain the link between 
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benefits and entitlement in the pay-as-you-go system with a continuing low 
participation rate of the elderly.  
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Appendix Table 2: Indicator group 1c: Values for 2013 
Country Skill 
mismatch 
Regional 
mismatch1 
Sectoral 
change 
Skill 
change 
Austria 2.47 45.9 0.52 1.61 
Belgium 4.86 n.a. 0.90 2.06 
Bulgaria 3.45 38.4 1.65 3.14 
Croatia 2.12 n.a. n.a. 2.86 
Cyprus 3.39 n.a. 3.03 2.32 
Czech Republic 1.19 33.8 0.57 2.35 
Denmark 2.77 13.6 0.51 1.24 
Estonia 2.94 27.0 1.44 2.01 
Finland 3.10 20.9 1.44 1.87 
France 3.02 n.a. 0.55 4.92 
Germany 1.45 n.a. 0.29 0.74 
Greece 4.72 18.8 1.72 2.70 
Hungary 3.24 28.3 4.47 1.12 
Ireland 5.11 15.4 1.89 3.71 
Italy 4.99 46.3 0.97 1.79 
Latvia 3.79 18.3 1.21 3.57 
Lithuania 6.09 23.7 1.33 2.18 
Luxembourg 4.25 n.a. 1.57 4.88 
Malta 8.60 n.a. 2.00 4.22 
Netherlands 2.78 20.5 0.53 3.64 
Poland 3.64 27.2 1.86 2.29 
Portugal 3.09 n.a. 3.33 4.85 
Romania 1.69 61.0 0.99 0.67 
Slovak Republic 2.00 33.0 0.63 1.54 
Slovenia 2.95 19.2 0.98 3.05 
Spain 6.62 25.8 1.90 2.04 
Sweden 2.12 14.3 1.67 2.64 
United Kingdom 2.95 31.0 0.89 2.07 
1) The values for the regional mismatch are for 2012.  
Source: AMECO and LFS, own calculations 
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Appendix Table 3: Indicator group 2a: Values for 2014 
Country Net lending  
in % of GDP 
Debt level in 
% of GDP 
Total Tax-to-GDP ratio 
Austria -2.86 86.77 43.11 
Belgium -3.17 106.43 45.39 
Bulgaria -3.39 27.03 27.91 
Croatia -4.96 81.45 35.72 
Cyprus -2.98 107.46 35.27 
Czech Republic -1.34 44.11 35.01 
Denmark 1.85 44.96 48.14 
Estonia -0.37 9.85 32.50 
Finland -2.66 58.88 44.08 
France -4.27 95.28 44.95 
Germany 0.41 74.23 39.12 
Greece -2.50 176.31 33.73 
Hungary -2.59 77.70 39.20 
Ireland -3.94 110.76 28.69 
Italy -3.05 131.87 43.99 
Latvia -1.52 40.43 27.93 
Lithuania -1.07 41.10 27.21 
Luxembourg 0.52 22.69 39.27 
Malta -2.26 68.56 33.63 
Netherlands -2.82 69.46 39.01 
Poland -3.55 48.63 32.51 
Portugal -4.60 128.93 32.36 
Romania -1.78 38.74 28.31 
Slovak Republic -3.03 53.58 28.32 
Slovenia -5.35 82.19 37.59 
Spain -5.63 98.30 32.54 
Sweden -2.20 41.44 44.21 
United Kingdom -5.46 88.70 35.44 
Source: AMECO database 
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Appendix Table 4: Indicator group 2b: Implicit tax rates, values for 2012 
Country Ratio implicit 
tax rate on 
labour and 
consumption 
SSC 
employer in 
% of GDP 
SSC 
employee 
in % of 
GDP 
Personal 
income tax 
in % of GDP 
Austria 1.95 7.0 6.0 10.1 
Belgium 2.03 8.9 4.4 12.7 
Bulgaria 1.14 4.2 2.5 3.0 
Croatia 1.00 6.0 5.3 3.7 
Cyprus 1.64 6.2 2.5 4.0 
Czech Republic 1.73 9.9 3.2 3.8 
Denmark 1.11 0 0.9 24.5 
Estonia 1.34 10.6 0.8 5.3 
Finland 1.52 9.2 3.0 13 
France 2.00 11.6 4.2 8.5 
Germany 1.91 6.8 6.4 8.8 
Greece 2.35 4.8 4.6 6.9 
Hungary 1.42 7.7 5.1 5.4 
Ireland 1.31 3.1 1.1 9.7 
Italy 2.42 9.3 2.4 12.2 
Latvia 1.89 5.8 2.6 5.7 
Lithuania 1.84 7.3 2.2 3.5 
Luxembourg 1.14 4.9 5.2 8.6 
Malta 1.25 2.8 2.7 6.7 
Netherlands 1.57 5.4 7.0 7.7 
Poland 1.76 4.9 4.9 4.6 
Portugal 1.41 5.1 3.6 5.9 
Romania 1.45 5.7 2.9 3.5 
Slovakia 1.93 6.8 3.0 2.6 
Slovenia 1.52 5.8 7.7 5.8 
Spain 2.40 8.4 1.7 7.7 
Sweden 1.45 7.0 0.0 15.2 
United Kingdom 1.33 3.9 2.6 9.6 
Source: AMECO database 
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Appendix Table 6: Indicator group 2b: Progressivity index, values for 2013 
Country 
Progressivity Index 
Total tax 
wedge 
SSC 
employer 
SSC 
employee 
Personal income 
tax 
Austria 1.06 0.68 0.51 1.99 
Belgium 1.19 1.01 1.11 1.39 
Czech Republic 1.12 1.00 1.00 1.67 
Denmark 1.21 n.a. 0.00 1.29 
Estonia 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.14 
Finland 1.26 1.00 1.02 1.58 
France 1.17 1.13 0.91 1.50 
Germany 1.03 0.43 0.42 1.75 
Greece 1.25 1.00 1.00 3.39 
Hungary 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 
Ireland 1.67 1.03 1.00 2.16 
Italy 1.17 1.00 1.04 1.46 
Luxembourg 1.28 0.81 0.84 1.90 
Netherlands 1.24 0.32 0.24 2.19 
Poland 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.29 
Portugal 1.30 1.00 1.00 1.85 
Slovak Republic 1.12 1.00 1.00 1.78 
Slovenia 1.24 1.00 1.00 2.58 
Spain 1.12 0.54 0.54 2.00 
Sweden 1.25 1.00 0.33 1.71 
United Kingdom 1.33 1.20 0.64 1.64 
Source: OECD Taxing Wages Database, own calculations 
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Appendix Table 7: Indicator group 3b: Link between contribution and 
benefits, values for 2013 
Country 
Pension benefits 
entitlement link 
indicator1 
Inactivity 
trap2 
Unemployment 
trap2 
Austria 0.21 91.73 65.70 
Belgium 0.10 74.89 86.84 
Bulgaria n.a. 50.33 81.61 
Croatia n.a. 55.27 90.00 
Czech Republic 0.20 78.70 68.85 
Denmark 0.24 133.93 122.61 
Estonia 0.32 71.00 63.66 
Finland 0.37 87.09 72.36 
France 0.26 64.90 88.32 
Germany 0.22 75.59 68.73 
Greece 0.28 16.50 79.54 
Hungary 0.38 64.75 88.44 
Ireland 0.00 128.41 59.87 
Italy 0.38 14.83 89.83 
Latvia n.a. 79.02 86.35 
Lithuania n.a. 62.19 102.19 
Luxembourg 0.34 83.11 82.85 
Malta n.a. 91.28 76.03 
Netherlands 0.37 86.23 102.41 
Poland 0.37 42.15 56.88 
Portugal 0.36 47.72 97.42 
Romania n.a. 24.23 67.36 
Slovak Republic 0.33 55.11 37.10 
Slovenia 0.19 69.85 84.42 
Spain 0.23 59.15 76.68 
Sweden 0.44 100.00 77.96 
United Kingdom 0.04 70.70 34.71 
1) The values for the pension benefits link indicator are for 2012. 
2) For a single person without childern at 33 percent of average workers earnings. 
Source: OECD Pensions at a glance, OECD tax benefits database 
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Appendix Table 8: Indicator group 3c: Bargaining and minimum wages, 
values for 2011 
Country 
Centralization 
of bargaining1 
Union 
density2 
Minimum 
wage setting3 
Monthly 
minimum wage4 
Austria 4 27.9 2 n.a. 
Belgium 5 50.4 3 1501.8 
Bulgaria 2 19.8 5 184.1 
Croatia n.a. n.a. n.a. 395.6 
Cyprus 2 49.0 7 n.a. 
Czech Republic 2 13.9 8 331.7 
Denmark 4 66.4 1 n.a. 
Estonia 1 6.8 3 390.0 
Finland 5 68.4 1 n.a. 
France 2 7.7 8 1457.5 
Germany 4 18.0 3 1473.0 
Greece 5 25.4 3 683.8 
Hungary 2 11.4 4 332.8 
Ireland 3 36.1 6 1461.9 
Italy 3 35.2 1 n.a. 
Latvia 1 14.8 8 360.0 
Lithuania 1 10.0 5 300.0 
Luxembourg 4 33.9 7 1923.0 
Malta 2 48.6 7 720.5 
Netherlands 3 19.0 7 1501.8 
Poland 1 13.5 8 409.5 
Portugal 3 19.5 8 589.2 
Romania 2 32.8 8 217.5 
Slovak Republic 2 16.7 8 380.0 
Slovenia 3 24.4 7 790.7 
Spain 4 17.2 5 756.7 
Sweden 4 67.5 1 n.a. 
United Kingdom 1 25.6 6 1378.9 
1) The values for Bulgaria and Romania are for 2010. 
2) The value for Malta is for 2010, for Bulgaria 2009 and for Latvia and Romania for 2008. 
3) The values for Bulgaria and Romania are for 2010. We would reclassify the current value 
for Cyprus to 2, since there are not national wide minimum wages of 924 Euros, similar 
to Austria. 
4) The values are for 1.1.2015, Germany introduced national minimum wage in 2015. 
Source: ICTWSS, Eurostat 
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Appendix Table 9: Indicator group 3c: Earnings distribution, values for 
2013 
Country 
Median 
Earnings 
(Structure of 
Earnings) 
2nd decile  
EU-SILC 
5th decile  
EU-SILC 
8th decile 
EU-SILC 
Austria 26,957 14,974 22,073 31,368 
Belgium 34,154 14,030 21,483 30,573 
Bulgaria 3,162 1,713 2,924 4,717 
Croatia 9,922 3,077 5,078 8,028 
Cyprus 19,448 10,380 15,873 25,071 
Czech Republic 9,235 5,734 7,694 10,883 
Denmark 51,938 18,556 26,897 37,564 
Estonia 8,507 4,071 6,579 11,027 
Finland 33,197 16,210 23,272 33,111 
France 28,579 14,252 20,954 30,809 
Germany 32,011 12,837 19,582 29,372 
Greece n.a. 4,667 8,371 12,693 
Hungary 7,155 3,077 4,529 6,607 
Ireland 37,960 12,573 19,078 29,603 
Italy 24,690 9,642 15,733 23,879 
Latvia 5,928 2,853 4,702 8,081 
Lithuania 5,595 2,780 4,698 7,621 
Luxembourg 37,086 21,337 33,301 50,283 
Malta 15,642 7,763 12,093 17,644 
Netherlands 31,866 14,881 20,839 29,336 
Poland 8,216 3,288 5,164 7,955 
Portugal 10,525 5,116 8,170 13,098 
Romania 4,077 1,152 2,066 3,356 
Slovak Republic 8,174 4,813 6,737 9,520 
Slovenia 14,976 8,115 11,852 16,418 
Spain 19,573 8,052 13,524 21,926 
Sweden 31,013 17,842 26,414 36,336 
United Kingdom 26,250 12,107 18,694 29,132 
Source: Structure of Earnings Survey, EU-SILC 
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